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ABSTRACT 
  
Tax represents a significant cost to shareholders as well as to the firm, and it is 
generally expected tax aggressiveness are preferred. However, this argument 
ignores potential non-tax costs that could be associated with tax 
aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency problems and 
asymmetric information. This study aims to investigate the influence of 
corporate governance on taxaggressiveness of listed Chinese firms by 
adopting an agency perspective of the firm based upon the nexus of 
institutional arrangements in place in China. An innovation of this study is 
making use of available income tax reconciliation data to examine the 
determinants and effects of tax planning activities conducted by Chinese listed 
firms. We hand-collected a sample of 229 publicly-listed firms over the 
2006-2012 period (1080 firm-year observations). This study advances a new, 
refined method of separating company book-tax differences (BTDs) into a 
'normal' component of BTDs that arises as a result of divergence between 
Chinese GAAP and tax rules, and an 'abnormal' BTD component which is 
presumed to arise a result of earning management and tax planning. When 
using the refined decomposition of tax liability to examine the effects of 
corporate governance variables, we find that firms with political 
connectionsthrough controlling shareholder and through the state ownership 
are more tax aggressive than other firms. Our results suggest that political 
connectionsare a significant determinant of abnormal book-tax differences and 
their impacts should be accounted for in ‗relationship-based‘ economies. In 
addition, incentive compensation appears to be another significant determinant 
of tax aggressiveness. In particular, we find that increase in managerial cash 
compensation tend to reduce the level of tax aggressiveness in a manner 
consistent with the optimal contracting view, which contribute to our overall 
understanding of the role of incentive compensation that plays in motivating 
managers' efforts.The empirical findings have direct policy implications for 
shareholders and tax administration in controlling and monitoring firms‘ tax 
planning activities. 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
  
Interests in the study of corporate governance have been rapidly growing and 
inter-disciplinary, with much of work being varied not only from economics 
and finance, but also from management, accounting and law. 
 
However, there lacks any accepted theoretical base or commonly accepted 
paradigms yet in corporate governance study (Parum, 2005; Harris and Raviv, 
2008). Following the two pioneering works by Berle and Means (1932) and 
Coase (1937), major contributions have since been made in the areas of 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the theory of incomplete contracts 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart& Moore, 1990), 
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and property right theory 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990), all 
these theories stem from diverse perspectives and essentially affect our views 
on what is a firm and its interests inherent in a firm. As a result, the analysis 
and development of corporate governance has been affected by multiple 
different theoretical frameworks, originating from a range of disciplines 
including finance, economics, accounting, management, law, sociology and 
organizational behavior. Using various terminologies, these frameworks view 
corporate governance from different perspectives.  
  
Corporate governance in China has evolved since the late 1970s as an essential 
part of the SOEs restructuring. It is widely agreed that Chinese corporate 
governance was based upon unique institutional arrangements which is deeply 
originated from China's political system (Qiang, 2003). The main specific 
characteristic of the corporate governance of Chinese publicly listed 
companies (PLCs) is the separation of the ownership (Jing & Martin, 2007). It 
is argued by Qiang (2003) that the concern of loss of government control and 
state assets at the very beginning of restructuring Chinese SOEs into PLCs has 
resulted in the ownership of Chinese listed firms being divided into three 
major types, the state, legal persons and individuals.On average, each group 
held about a one-third share of companies, resulting in only around 35 percent 
 10 
 
of total shares being freely tradable. A fairly large number of studies have 
investigatedaspects of corporate governance in China, such as Qian (1995), 
Qiang (2003), Sun & Tong (2003), Bai et al. (2004), Firth et al (2006), 
Gunasekarage et al. (2007), Yuan et al. (2008, 2009) and Chen et al. (2009a.b). 
Corporate governance is only part of the larger economic context and its 
framework also depends upon the legal, tax, institutional and regulatory 
environment and most research attention in the area of empirical and 
theoretical corporate tax research has been centered on how taxes influence 
capital structure, investment decisions and dividend policies. However, studies 
on the interaction of corporate governance and taxation appear scant (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2008; Owens, 2008). 
 
Tax and corporate governance issues can intersect in several different contexts. 
One set of issues is the ways to ensure that tax does not encourage behaviors 
that are conflicted with the interests of the firm and/or of its all stakeholders in 
a firm. Another set of issues is the ways to make sure the quality of 
management decisions and transparency in the tax area. In particular, it is of 
significance to ensure that the board, shareholders and other stakeholders are 
aware of the stakes that are involved in the management of taxes (Owens, 
2008).  
  
Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and its shareholders and as a 
result a reduction in cash flow available to them, and it is generally accepted 
that shareholders prefer tax aggressive activities in an effort to increase not 
only after-tax earnings per share but also cash available for shareholders. In 
theory, a dollar saved in taxes through an aggressive tax practice is an extra 
dollar for shareholders because tax aggressiveness leads to tax savings in the 
current period (Khurana & Moser, 2013). Strategic tax behaviors or aggressive 
tax planning are all those activities that are designed solely to minimize 
corporate tax obligation whose legality may be under doubts, including  
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 Tax evasion, which can be defined as intentional illegal behaviors 
such as a direct violation of tax law in order to escape payment of 
taxes 
  
 Tax avoidance, which can be defined as all 'illegitimate' but not 
necessarily illegal behaviors in order to reduce tax liabilities. 
  
 and legitimate saving of taxes, which can be defined as commonly 
accepted forms of behaviors which are neither against the law nor 
against the spirit of the law. 
  
The scope of each of these concepts varies across countries depending on state 
government's policies, tax authorities' attitudes and public opinion. In our 
research, strategic tax behaviors are thus all behaviors identified as tax 
aggressivenessor tax avoidance,which represents a continuum of tax planning 
strategies. Corporate tax shelters generate significant tax savings but it is often 
difficult to identify whether a firm is actively involved in the tax sheltering 
activities due to limited disclosures (McGill & Outslay, 2004).  
  
Consistent with Slemrod (2004) and Frank, Lynch & Rego (2009), tax 
aggressiveness is defined as tax planning that consists of a great variety of 
transactions with aim to reduce taxable income and is a subset of tax 
avoidance activities more generally, which may or may not violate income tax 
law. There are two theoretical views on firms' tax aggressiveness behaviors. 
On the one hand, in terms of the traditional view, aggressive tax strategies 
represent a firm's value maximizing activity as it entails a wealth transfer from 
the government to shareholders of a firm (Khurana, & Moser, 2013). 
Therefore, shareholder value should increase with the efficacy of corporate tax 
strategies so long as the expected marginal benefit exceeds marginal cost 
(Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). Frank et al. (2009) show that the stock market 
rewards firms with tax aggressive practices, which is consistent with the idea 
that these firms engage in value-maximizing activities.  
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On the other hand, from the perspective of agency theory, it emphasizes the 
role of agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control in 
influencing tax aggressiveness in publicly listed firms (Khurana, & Moser, 
2009a.b). Interests here focus on how tax aggressiveness can create scope for 
managerial opportunism. The role of aggressive tax behavior by managers 
within an agency framework of the firm poses a new set of issues which are 
related to the alignment of their interests with those of the shareholders: why 
and to what extent do managers pursue aggressive tax strategies; do such 
aggressive tax strategies by managers advance shareholder value; and how can 
tax savings obtained through aggressive tax behavior by managers be 
measured? For example, Desai & Dharmapala (2006) give evidence on how 
high-powered managerial incentives influence tax sheltering, and Desai & 
Dharmapala (2009) find that corporate tax aggressiveness is positively related 
to firm value. 
 
 
 1.2 Research Motivation 
  
There are many interesting questions currently under study such as why do 
some firms avoid more tax than other firms? Why do investors and managers 
engage in corporate tax sheltering activities? The main concerns are with 
variant proxies for tax sheltering and the conclusions that can be drawn given 
the selected proxies and the research questions at hand.  
 
As enlightened by the review of tax research conducted by Hanlon & 
Hertzman (2010), future research studies that explore new methodologies for 
measuring tax sheltering and methods by which to identify activities toward 
the more aggressive end of the tax sheltering spectrum are expected, as well as 
studies that investigate the effects of ownership structure and the 'managerial 
opportunism effect'. The present study is motivated by prior research 
documenting significant cross-sectional differences in tax aggression among 
firms domiciled in the U.S and by calls for more research on factors 
influencing tax aggressiveness (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; Graham, 2003; 
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Dyreng et al. 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Two reasons can be 
identified as persuasive for the study of the intersection between corporate 
governance mechanisms and tax sheltering. First of all, tax sheltering can be 
complex and may possibly allow for managerial opportunism; CEOs and 
directors plays an integral role in the selection of a tax sheltering strategy and 
effective tax sheltering is an important driver of value-maximizing activities, 
with the consequence of lower taxes and improved bottom-line performance 
(Minnick& Noga, 2010). Secondly, significant uncertainties are involved in 
tax sheltering which may not be beneficial to performance of a firm directly; 
rather the issue should be viewed from a long-term, strategic perspective. By 
studying how corporate governance is related to tax sheltering, one can gain 
insight into the efficacy of corporate governance arrangements in the short 
term as well as in the long term, for example in understanding the horizon 
problems related to ownership structure and executive compensation.  
  
Finally, China was chosen as the object country of the research as it has the 
third largest economy, the second largest market capitalization and, 
importantly, has unique institutional characteristics that set it apart from 
advanced western economies. The development of the accounting and tax 
system in China provides a unique research setting, and the study will 
highlight some aspects of tax management in China, thus contributing to 
investors' understanding of accounting and management behaviors in Chinese 
listed firms. 
  
 1.3 Research Aim 
  
Our research studies the impact of corporate governance structure on these 
tax-aggressive strategies by adopting an agency perspective of the firm built 
upon the nexus of institutional arrangements in place in a particular economy, 
namely in China at the early stages of its transition to a western-style 
market-based corporate economy.  
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It is pointed out by Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Graham (2003) that 
manager/insider control and other organizational factors such as corporate 
governance mechanisms are important but under-examined in tax research, 
most of empirical studies focus on the role of firm characteristics in tax 
planning (see Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010 for a review). We examine whether 
variation in firms' corporate governance mechanisms explains differences in 
level of tax aggressiveness across firms upon unique institutional 
arrangements in place in China, which has been under-examined in prior 
studies. They study would identify potential factors within the country studied 
that would affect the aggressiveness of tax planning and formulate and test 
hypotheses that will explain discovered differences in tax aggressiveness. 
  
From a policy perspective, corporate tax rules can affect corporate governance, 
and in turn, corporate governance mechanisms may affect corporate tax 
strategies, which have an impact on the process of decision-making around tax 
strategies and directed to manager, directors and other individuals involved 
(Desai& Dharmapala, 2008; Owens, 2008). Shareholders would like to 
minimize corporate tax payments net of the private costs in order for the 
maximization of firm value. In other words, shareholders are in favor of 
optimally aggressive in tax reporting for the firms they own.  
  
There has been recently renewed interest in the relation between corporate tax 
planning and corporate governance. Governments are concerned about 
companies' efforts to minimize tax burdens, often through the use of tax 
avoidance strategies or tax evasion strategies that border on being illegal or at 
least run contrary to the spirit of the law. The idea is that tax avoidance or 
evasion strategies can be discouraged by corporate governance measures that 
make it less likely for a firm to engage in aggressive tax minimization 
strategies. The effectiveness of such strategies must depend upon the nexus of 
institutional arrangements in place in a particular economy. Thus factors that 
affect the extent of aggressive tax strategies in one country will differ from 
those in another country. Understanding the factors, institutional arrangements 
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and firm characteristics that affect this dynamic will therefore provide 
important implications for tax policy makers.  
  
A wider concern related to governments' concerns over corporate tax 
avoidance is the issue of equity or fairness. For example, in the U.K. the main 
statutory corporate tax rate has fallen from 30% in the 2007-8 tax years to 21% 
for the 2013-14 tax years. This is presumably as a consequence of tax 
competition among governments, and the relative mobility of corporate profits, 
relative to other tax bases, in terms of their ability to choose where taxes 
become payable. If corporations are additionally able to aggressively 
manipulate how much profit they declare for tax purposes, then this raises 
political issues. Companies must trade off political costs of tax avoidance with 
the cash flow gains in lowered tax payments (Zimmerman, 1983). If political 
costs of tax avoidance are low (for example, because ―everyone is doing it‖), 
then the incorporation of tax considerations into corporate governance 
arrangements may be one means by which companies may be encouraged to 
―pay their fair share‖ of taxation.  
  
Our study firstly examines how different types of ownership structure affect a 
firm's tax aggressiveness in China. It indicates the role of political connections 
vs. market forces played in the tax reporting practices of publicly listed firms 
in China. A major difference between China and the developed countries in 
the West is that the former tend to be "relationship-based' rather than 
'market-based'' economy (Adhikari et al. 2006). Prior studies shows that 
politically connected firms receive much more preferential treatments from the 
government including bank loans, favorable tax treatments and market power 
(Fisman, 2001; Adhikari et al. 2006; Claessens et al. 2008; Wu, Wu Zhou & 
Wu, 2012). It is suggested by Faccio (2006) that the benefits associated with 
political benefits are greater in countries with highly intervened governments 
and weaker property rights protection compared to that of counterparts. State 
ownership as well as ownership concentration represents a strong form of 
political connection while institutional ownership represents the form of 
market forces. Government involvement is associated with institutional 
 16 
 
environment where the marketization and institutional environment in China 
tend to reduce the level of government interventions in operation of enterprise 
(Wu, Rui & Wu, 2013). By doing so, it contributes to the currently few 
book-tax difference literature in emerging markets by exploring the interaction 
between political connections and book-tax differences as a measure of tax 
aggressiveness in China.  
  
Moreover, our study extends the recent literature that attempts to link tax 
aggressiveness with top executive (e.g. Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Dyreng et 
al. 2008; Armstrong et al. 2012; Rego & Wilson, 2012) and firm leadership 
that cannot be explained by firm characteristics in the context of Chinese 
economy. It is possible that top executives and firm leadership are partially 
responsible for the variation in tax reporting practices across firms through 
their managerial power and compensation. To our knowledge, this is the first 
paper to quantify and examine the incremental effects of executive and firm 
leadership on tax aggressiveness in the Chinese context.   
  
Conducting a study on China is of significance as China has recently emerged 
as one of the largest economies in the world and its economy has grown 
rapidly since the beginning of economic reform. The formal separation of 
ownership and control does not exist in a number of portions of the corporate 
sector in China; governance concerns revolve to an extent around the issue of 
the dominant shareholder; due regard therefore needs to be given to a 
consideration of what are the relevant questions to ask in the Chinese context; 
corporate governance research in China must also critically evaluate the 
applicability of dominant governance theories and frameworks drawn from a 
western (largely U.S.) context in examining these research questions. In China, 
the tax system is still in its infancy, and detailed financial accounting 
disclosures have not yet reached the level of detail found in financial reports 
of companies reporting under IASB standards in mature western economies 
and, therefore understanding the characteristics that encourage aggressive tax 
planning could provide useful information to tax policy makers, as well as 
providing steers for policy makers in their attempts to improve corporate 
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governance such as to optimize ownership structure in China, as well as tools 
for investors and trading partners. Moreover, in the aftermath of various 
corporate scandals and the credit crisis in the Western world, there is now 
tangible discomfit at the current status, and even underlying rationale, of 
corporate governance. It is thus timely to consider the attributes of what 
constitutes a suitable system of corporate governance.  
  
 1.4 Research Contribution 
  
The study provides a simple theoretical framework for understanding the link 
between tax aggressiveness and corporate governance due to a concern with 
tax shelters and managerial opportunist malfeasance, and should also be of 
interest to tax policy makers concerned about declining corporate tax revenue 
and the increasing gap between reported earnings and taxable income in an 
international context. It also constructs a quantitative measure to inherently 
explain phenomenon of tax sheltering. The intersection between corporate 
governance and taxation has been neglected for many decades, accounting 
academics, on the whole, have not incorporated the possibility of agency 
problems in their analysis of tax burdens until recently such as the study 
conducted by Desai & Dharmapala (2006, 2009).  
 
This study contributes to the existing literature by advancing a new, refined 
method of separating company book-tax differences (BTDs) into ‗normal‘ and 
‗abnormal‘ components, using recently available tax reconciliation data 
required under ASBE 18 income tax expenses (ASBE, 2006). By taking a 
detailed look at the determinants of BTDs in Chinese context to determine a 
'normal' level of BTDs (tax-effect BTDs following the approach of Tang & 
Firth (2011) that arise as a result of divergence between Chinese GAAP and 
tax rules, and to deduct this from the total BTDs in order to arrive an 
'abnormal' BTD which is presumed to arise a result of earning management 
and tax planning. Using this new empirical measure of corporate tax 
avoidance, it allows for an examination of the determinants of tax sheltering 
activities including ownership structure and incentive compensation.This 
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study adds to the mostly U.S. based BTDs research by providing international 
evidence on the implications for the mechanical and opportunistic BTDs in 
interpreting the corporate governance factors that affect tax aggressiveness in 
an emerging economy China. Our finding suggest that while some prior 
studies results in the U.S. or UK based studies can be generalized to China, 
empirical evidences from the Chinese institutional setting help to enrich and 
supplement the current BTDs literature. 
  
We also contribute to the existing literature by extending the mainly U.S.-or 
UK-based literature to China where there are significant institutional 
differences in ownership structure and corporate governance system. (this 
study complements other recent studies on tax aggressiveness carried out in 
the U.S (e.g Armstrong et al. 2012; McGuire, et al. 2012) by analyzing 
tax-motivated activities of Chinese listed firms on which there is few evidence 
in the literature (e.g. Zeng, 2010; Tang & Firth, 2011; Wu, Wang, Gill & Luo, 
2012; Chan, Mo & Zhou, 2013; Wu, Rui & Wu, 2013). Chinese stock market 
provides a high-power context for our study as under-developed institutional 
corporate governance structure and infrastructure which leave minority 
investors vulnerable to tunneling (Jiang et al. 2010). Investors are concerned 
over the accounting quality and quality of accounting information in China, 
we highlight firm ownership and control factors as well as incentive 
compensation that encourage or constrain aggressive tax planning in China, 
which has important implications for both public policy and corporate 
governance in emerging markets similar to China. 
  
This study further adds to the broad literature that focuses on the determinants 
of corporate tax aggressiveness, extending prior research which focuses 
primarily on corporate tax aggressiveness within a single country by providing 
evidence that differences in tax systems (i.e. corporate tax rates, required 
book-tax conformity) as well as institutional factors (i.e. ownership 
concentration, executive compensation) impact the level of firms' tax 
aggressiveness. 
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
  
The remaining chaptersare structured as follows: Chapter 2 contains the 
theoretical development from the perspectives of the corporate governance 
and taxation in the context of the Chinese institutional setting that is relevant 
to this study, which encompass agency theory and institutional theory. Chapter 
3reviews theliterature.Chapter 4 outlines the methodology we adopt. In 
chapters five, six and seven, we present the empirical studies of this thesis. 
The final chapter, chapter eight, discusses the conclusions and makes 
recommendations for future research in this area, and discusses the limitations 
of the present study.  
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 2.0 Theoretical Development  
 
2.1 Agency and Neo-institutional perspectives on governance in China 
  
China has emerged as one of the largest economies in the world since the 
beginning of market-oriented reforms in the 1980s and the early 1990s; the 
government introduced a great variety of reform measures into state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) with the aim of privatization and marketization.China's 
reforms were mainly based on a modified version of the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance (Walter & Howie, 2003) which is normally 
associated with and rationalized by agency theory (Daily, Dalton, & 
Rajagopalan, 2003, Peng, 2004). It is argued, however, that a more inclusive 
panorama of corporate governance in transition economies may be achieved 
by complementing the agency approach with concepts from neo-institutional 
theory (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005). In the light of the agency 
model, diverging interests are present between managers and shareholders and 
those interests are aligned by governance mechanisms such as ownership 
concentration, managerial compensation, board independence, the market for 
corporate control and the managerial labor market (e.g. Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003). Several studies suggest that economic pressures are the major drivers 
for the convergence of corporate governance toward agency theory based 
solutions (Rubach & Sebora, 1998).  
 
From the perspective of the institutional view, the differences in various 
corporate governance systems can be explained by the institutional differences 
across countries (Vitols, 2001; Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). The stylized 
agency model of the Anglo-American system lays primary emphasis on 
shareholder value maximization, while other factors should be considered 
(Chizema & Buck, 2006), for example, the comparison study of the corporate 
governance structure between UK and Germany conducted by Vitols (2001) 
focuses on the embeddedness of national institutions as wells as the possibility 
of 'complementarities' among these institutions. Institutional theory suggests 
that corporate governance in transition economies is driven by factors in 
addition to agency theory which attempts to explain what institutions will lead 
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agents to systematically to ignore the interests of the principals (North, 1990); 
transition economies are experiencing institutional changes which ''results in 
fundamental changes in a society‘s political system, its legal and regulatory 
frameworks, its economic system, and its financial infrastructure'' (Newman, 
2000, p. 603). China, as an emerging economy with a socialist heritage and 
unique institutional context, is no exception. Table 2.1 outlines the major 
differences between agency theory and neo-institutional theory regarding 
corporate governance in transition economies. It should be noted at this point 
that, although agency theory and new institutional theory perspectives may 
lead to differing understandings of what factors influence organizational 
behavior, the two approaches are not necessarily mutually inconsistent. 
Agency theory, as a behavioral descriptor, is based on the behavioral 
assumptions of rational utility maximization by agents, and is therefore a 
theory of how conflicts arise and are resolved among stakeholders in an 
organization. Institutional theory is a theory relating to how behavior may be 
constrained within the confines of an institutional framework. That constraint 
may be viewed as operating through agents‘ conceptions of their own 
self-interest, and may thus be regarded as part of the environment in which 
agency conflicts arise. 
  
 
 
 
Table 2. 1: Major differences between agency theory and neo-institutional 
theory regarding corporate governance in transitional economies 
  Agency theory  Neo-institutional theory 
Motivation of 
individuals 
Rational self interest Social conditioning 
Assumptions 
regarding 
market 
institutions 
Fully functioning market institutions 
that support corporate governance, 
such as market regulations, 
protection of property rights, market 
for corporate control and market for 
managerial talent. 
Formal institutions can be 
implemented quickly, but probably 
will not function as expected for some 
time due to lack of legitimacy and 
lack of understanding on the part of 
economic actors. 
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Goal 
incongruence 
Clearly delineated conflict of interest 
between self-interested managers and 
profit-maximizing shareholders. 
Market institutions clearly define the 
roles and responsibilities of the 
actors. Monitoring devices help 
achieve good corporate governance, 
of which primary goal is 
maximization of shareholder value 
  
Corporate governance differs 
according to national institutional 
context. In transitional economies, the 
State often plays an active 
behind-the-scenes role, making it 
difficult to determine where real 
control lies. Many conflicting 
objectives, such as social welfare or 
full employment, along with 
performance goals. 
Top 
management 
team 
Professional managers who often 
have made their way up through the 
ranks or are hired from outside after 
extensive search and scrutiny of 
qualifications through the managerial 
labor market. 
Typically cadres or former 
government officials who are 
appointed for political reasons. Often 
are politically motivated as much or 
more than performance motivated   
Boards of 
directors 
Legitimate legal and social 
institutions with fiduciary duty to 
safeguard shareholders‘ interests. 
Research focuses on factors that 
affect day-to-day operations such as 
insiders vs. outsiders, background of 
directors, committee structures, etc. 
In transitional economies, boards 
often operate as extensions of 
government control. Functioning of 
boards of directors depends on the 
national institutional context 
  
(Source: Lau, Fan, Young & Wu, 2007) 
  
2.2 Agency and Neo-institutional perspectives on taxation in China 
  
While economic theory and empirical evidence on how corporate governance 
should affect tax aggressiveness is relatively underdeveloped to date, Slemrod 
(2004), Crocker & Slemrod (2005), and Desai & Dharmapala (2006) lay the 
theoretical foundation for understanding tax sheltering within an agency 
framework. Most of the literature prior to these studies commence with the 
assumption that the firms make the tax decisions without agency 
considerations (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). The separation of ownership and 
control implies that if tax sheltering is a worthwhile activity, then the owner 
should structure appropriate incentive schemes to ensure that managers make 
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tax-efficient value-maximizing decisions (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). By tax 
efficient is meant tax sheltering activities that reduce transfers from 
stockholder to the government, which should generally enhance shareholders' 
after-tax wealth and increase firm value at the expense of other taxpayers. 
That is, shareholders prefer managers to avoid taxes and managers, once their 
incentives are sufficiently aligned, engage in tax sheltering (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2009). 
  
However, an emerging stream of literature (e.g. Desai, Dyck & Zingales, 2007; 
Desai & Dharmapala, 2006, 2009) which examines tax avoidance in an agency 
theory framework suggests that managerial diversion and tax sheltering are 
complements of each other, providing opportunities for managers to take 
advantage of the technologies of tax sheltering to advance their own 
managerial interests instead of shareholders' interests, and managers at well 
governed firms are more likely to pursue value-enhancing tax avoidance. 
Specifically, tax sheltering has the effect of making the financial issues of a 
firm less transparent to outsiders which makes managerial opportunism much 
easier; thus, managers often attempt to blur the underlying intent of tax 
avoidance transactions in order to shield income from tax authorities, which 
creates a shield which can potentially be used in appropriation of firm wealth 
by insiders such as managers and controlling shareholders (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2006, 2009). As such, the increase in managerial diversion may 
tend to accompany the increase in tax sheltering activity, thereby adding costs 
in addition to the costs associated with aggressive tax planning.  
  
As a result, it is suggested by the agency theory of tax avoidance that 
shareholders may not always desire tax avoidance due to the combined costs 
which include the cost directly related to tax avoidance activities such as costs 
incurred for tax planning, tax penalties assessed by IRS and additional 
compliance cost as well as nontax costs. Agency cost which refers to prices 
discounts imposed by shareholders in particular may outweigh potential tax 
savings from tax avoidance transactions that accrue to shareholders, if outside 
shareholders believe the obscure and opportunistic tax transactions are 
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accompanied by managerial rent extraction (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006, 
2009). In accordance with the agency cost view of tax avoidance, several 
recent studies find that investors do not always value corporate tax avoidance 
activities. Two recent studies investigate whether tax sheltering activities 
enhance shareholder wealth. Hanlon & Slemrod (2009) find that on average a 
firm's stock price reacts negatively to news about tax shelter involvement and 
the decline is more pronounced for retailing firms and for firms with low 
effective tax rates; moreover, the small sample event study also shows that tax 
aggressiveness does not always increase firm value. Although primarily 
focusing on firm characteristics of corporate tax shelter participants, Wilson 
(2009) also sheds light on whether tax sheltering creates wealth for 
shareholders or facilitates managerial opportunism via studying the stock 
return performance of tax sheltering firms. He finds that tax sheltering firms 
with low anti-takeover protection outperform non-sheltering firms during each 
of the 24-month periods: pre-sheltering, active-sheltering, and post-sheltering 
which is consistent with the notion suggested by Desai & Dharmapala (2009) 
that tax sheltering creates wealth for well governed firms.  
  
In discussing tax strategies, wealso adopt an approach based on 
neo-institutional economics which has been extended to the legal study of 
corporate players (Fama & French, 1998; Slemrod, 2004). The 
neo-institutional approach focuses on transaction costs to explain the choice 
between market and nonmarket solutions, and explains institutions as a 
framework in which transaction costs may be reduced. When this approach is 
applied to corporate tax strategies, it emphasizes time and uncertainty 
associated with the details of the environment in which transactions take place, 
which in turn gives rise to opportunism which is defined as the 'effort to 
realize individual gains through lack of honesty in transactions' and to the 
need for governance constraints that discourage parties from being 
opportunistic (Garbarino, 2011). It suggests that the introduction of these 
additional costs (e.g. government intervention, monetary costs and political 
costs; penalties by tax administration) should drive down the optimal level of 
tax aggressiveness from the perspective of firm shareholders while 
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simultaneously driving up the optimal level of tax aggressiveness from the 
perspective of managers (Moore, 2007). A firm‘s level of tax aggressiveness 
can be jointly determined by corporate governance structure, managerial 
discretion and the changes in tax regime. The optimal level of tax 
aggressiveness can be viewed as the profit-maximization level of tax 
aggressiveness which balances the benefits and costs associated with tax 
aggressive positions by the interest alignments of managers and shareholders 
and induce managers to take tax positions to enhance wealth of 
shareholders.Shareholders can implement incentives and controls through 
corporate governance mechanisms and should be able to minimize their 
agency conflicts related to the tax aggressive transactions in order to induce 
managers to achieve firms‘ optimal level of tax aggressiveness given 
prevailing tax environment. Therefore, the complementary relationship 
implies that managers may tend to over-shelter from the perspective of 
shareholders due to the increased prospects for opportunism (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2006). We place corporate tax strategies within this institutional 
framework and consider them as institutional arrangements generating 
transaction costs within the agency model of the firm.  
  
3.0 Literature Review 
 
3.1 Relevant Tax Research 
 
Although there are relatively few studies linking tax planning and corporate 
governance, reviewing the studies in each area would lay the appropriate 
theoretical foundation for our empirical study of the link between corporate 
governance and tax sheltering. This chapter reviews the extant literature in 
both areas to the extent that it is relevant to the present study. 
  
There are two alternative perspectives on motivations and effects of corporate 
tax sheltering activities. On the one hand, corporate tax sheltering is viewed by 
several studies as an extension of other tax-favored activity such as use of debt 
(Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). In particular, a study conducted by Graham and 
Tucker (2006) is representative of this common view that corporate tax 
sheltering activities are merely tax-saving strategies, without consideration of 
any other agency considerations. Graham & Tucker (2006) employ non-debt 
tax shield to measure firm's tax sheltering by using a sample of 44 corporate 
tax sheltering cases from 1975 to 2000, although they do not investigate the 
market's response to news of this sheltering; they find a positive relationship 
between features such as size and profitability and tax sheltering and that tax 
sheltering works as a substitute for interest deductions in choosing capital 
structure. It is predicted by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) that less debt in 
terms of its debt tax deductions is used by firms in the case of presence of 
large non-debt tax shields such as deductions from tax shelters. 
  
However, as indicated by Desai & Dharmapala (2006), the simple view of 
corporate tax sheltering as a resource transfer from the government to 
shareholders is incomplete given the agency problems featuring 
shareholder-manager relationships. Therefore, on the other hand, an 
alternative theoretical approach advocates the link between these tax 
sheltering activities and the agency problems that are inherent in publicly 
listed firms. From the perspective of this alternative view, tax sheltering can 
create a scope for the diversion of rents and managerial opportunism, which 
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significantly contributed to the literature by providing theory and predictions 
about cross-sectional variation in tax sheltering. Moreover, an emerging 
paradigm that emphasizes the link between firms' corporate governance 
mechanisms and their responses to taxes has arisen from this strand of 
literature. This view is evidenced by several recent studies including Desai & 
Dharmapala (2006, 2009) and Desai, Dyck and Zingales (2007);and Desai, 
Dharmapala & Fung, (2007). For example, Desai, Dharmapala & Fung (2007) 
stress the role of corporate governance practices and the role of tax authorities 
as external monitors in influencing tax compliance. They reiterate that the tax 
authority is the largest minority stakeholder in most publicly listed firms and 
incorporate this fact into thinking about the implications for governance 
structure and firm behavior. Moreover, Desai, Dyck & Zingales (2007) 
suggest that the quality of corporate governance plays an important role in 
affecting firms' responses to changes in corporate tax rates. They find that the 
underlying governance arrangements constitutes the major driver for the 
relation between tax revenue and tax rates with an increase in tax rate leading 
to more diversion lowering corporate tax revenues when governance is weak, 
and to higher tax revenues when governance is strong. Therefore, under the 
alternative view of corporate tax sheltering, shareholders, through the 
corporate governance system, have to employ incentives and controls that 
induce managers to take tax strategies that result in the profit-maximizing tax 
aggressiveness level 
  
This alternative view also emphasizes that corporate tax sheltering not only 
entails distinct direct costs but also these costs may actually outweigh the 
benefits to shareholders, given the fact that these devices provide the 
opportunities for diversion by corporate insiders (Desai & Dharmapala, 2008). 
Early theories on tax planning focused on tax minimization, namely the 
reduction of explicit taxes through operational and accounting activities with 
aim of maximizing after-tax returns without consideration of other dimensions 
of costs and transaction problems (Garbarino, 2011). As a result, Scholes, 
Wilson & Wolfson (1990) introduce the so-called 'theory of effective tax 
planning' which proposed that given the existence of uncertainty and 
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information asymmetry in the real world, the objective of maximization of 
after-tax return should encompass not only explicit taxes, but also implicit 
taxes as well as other non-tax costs, in order to ensure that tax minimization is 
not entirely offset by implicit and non-tax costs. The theory of effective tax 
planning therefore encourages firms to tradeoff the tax benefits against 
non-tax costs in their choice of financing, investment and compensation 
decisions. Beyond the necessary resource allocation costs (that opportunity 
costs where resources are spent on tax management that could have gone to 
capital expenditures or R&Ds), there are additional costs associated with tax 
management such as political costs, disclosure costs, agency costs and 
financing costs, these implementation costs include legal costs, planning 
advice and risk (Minnick & Noga, 2010). Take the agency costs, for example, 
given the fact that shareholders act as principals and managers act as agents in 
terms of the design and implementation of corporate tax strategies, an 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders in terms of tax 
planning can facilitate managers' pursuit of their own interests. It is argued the 
lack of transparency associated with taxplanning provides managers with a 
'screen' to hide self-interested actions, which facilitates moral hazard (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2006; Wahab & Holland, 2012). A decline in reported earnings 
may affect managers' compensation and other interests, potentially leading to 
inconsistencies between interests of managers and those of shareholders and 
therefore increase agency costs. Similarly, Hanlon & Slemrod (2009) suggest 
political and financial costs are associated with tax aggressiveness. A 
well-known example of political cost with tax management is the board of 
directors of Stanley Works, Inc. reversing a decision to move its headquarters 
offshore to save tax dollars after being attacked by local politicians and media 
for the move (Minnick & Noga, 2010). Desai and Dharmapala (2009) suggest 
that earnings manipulation can be facilitated when managers undertake efforts 
to reduce corporate tax obligations via their study of the link between tax 
sheltering and various types of managerial opportunism. 
  
It is worth noting that an implicit assumption underlying Scholes, Wilson & 
Wolfson's (1990) theory of effective tax planning is that the financial and tax 
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accounting methods conform (Smith, 2000), so that firms are sometimes 
willing to lower financial earnings to obtain tax benefits, at least to the extent 
that tax benefits exceed the costs of lowering the financial earnings (Scholes, 
Wilson & Wolfson, 1990; 1992), Cloyd (1995) and Cloyd et al. (1996) 
support this argument and find that firms are strongly recommended by tax 
preparers to adopt an aggressive conforming tax position rather than an 
aggressive non-conforming
1
 tax position.  
 
However, Mills (1998) expands this research by studying the aggregate 
non-conformity as measured by the size of firm's book-tax differences which 
is used as a proxy for a firm's aggressive tax position; they find that an 
increase in firms' positive differences between book income and taxable 
income leads to an increase in IRS audit adjustments. Meanwhile, Mills & 
Newberry (2001) find that firms with higher non-tax costs are associated with 
larger book-tax differences, and conclude that firms with higher non-tax costs 
will mostly choose non-conforming financial accounting methods despite the 
higher IRS audit adjustments. 
 
While it is suggested from the traditional view of corporate tax shelters that 
tax shelter activities should increase shareholder value, the alternative view 
provides predictions with subtle distinctions such as that of tax shelter actions 
to advance the interests of managers rather than shareholders. It indicates that 
applying the agency perspectives to corporate tax sheltering provides a more 
comprehensive and potentially more accurate picture of the motivations 
driving this phenomenon. In particular, a firm's corporate governance should 
be an essential determinant for valuation of corporate tax savings (Desai 
                                                             
1
Note: Book-tax nonconforming tax planning includes the utilization of research and 
development tax credits, locating operations in a low-tax foreign country, shifting income 
recognition from high-tax to low-tax locations, engaging in synthetic lease transactions (that 
are treated as operating leases for locating operations in a low-tax foreign country, shifting 
income recognition from high-tax to low-tax locations, engaging in synthetic lease 
transactions (that are treated as operating leases for financial reporting purposes and capital 
leases for tax purposes), and utilizing non-corporate entities to generate deductions or losses 
that reduce consolidated taxable income. Each of these transactions affects book and taxable 
income differently, generating temporary or permanent book-tax differences (Badertscher et al, 
2009:p16). While book-tax conforming tax planning affects both pre-tax book income and 
taxable income, thus will not create any book-tax differences. 
 30 
 
&Dharmapala. 2009). As we can find in Desai & Dharmapala (2008, 2009) 
which examines investors' valuation of managerial actions to minimize 
corporate tax payments and finds a negative relationship between after-tax 
firm value and the direct effects of tax sheltering; in particular, tax sheltering 
that is indicative of a higher possibility of managerial wealth diversion due to 
increased opportunities for managerial opportunism, and as a result firms with 
stronger and better governance arrangements should have greater net effect of 
firm value. 
  
The assumption is based on evidence from recent studies which suggests that 
tax aggressiveness is more pervasive in weak-governance firms; firms with 
strong governance structures should be able to minimize their agency 
problems with respect to the tax strategies and achieve the optimal level of tax 
aggressiveness by aligning managers and shareholders‘ interests. In contrast, 
managers should choose the position of tax aggressiveness in response to their 
own preferences that reduce shareholders‘wealth under weak governance 
structures. Moore (2007) extends Desai & Dharmapala‘s (2006) work and 
focuses on the association between tax aggressiveness and the composition of 
a firm‘s board of directors. Moore (2007) supports the view that stronger 
governance structures weaken tax aggressiveness with evidence of a negative 
relationship between audit committee independence and tax aggressiveness.  
 
 
3.1.1 Institutional background in China 
 
China's tax system is characterized by an uncertainty due to multiple-tier tax 
legislation and a range of tax incentives arising from strong political-economic 
objectives and interests of local governments (Tang & Firth, 2011). For 
example, the Chinese government offers favourable tax treatment including 
tax exemptions, tax holidays, decreases in tax rates and tax refunds to 
domestic firms operating in special economic zones and technology 
development zones(Wu et al. 2007; Zeng, 2010), meanwhile, local 
governments also provide various tax rebates to stimulate local economic 
development. The variation in tax liabilities within China as well as inefficient 
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tax administration provide opportunities for firms to engage in tax sheltering. 
Shevlin et al. (2012) demonstrate that the tax range among subsidiaries arising 
from the industry-specific and region-specific tax incentive provides a strong 
incentive for Chinese firms to save taxes through income-shifting among 
subsidiaries within China. In particular, Chan et al. (2010) find a negative 
association between the level of book-tax conformity and the tax 
noncompliance; more tax compliant firms are associated with high incentive to 
inflate book income after the departure from a tax-based accounting system 
since the year 1998. 
  
China listed firms have experienced the change in accounting and tax systems 
that weaken book-tax conformity. The change in financial reporting regime 
from a conforming or dependent system to a non-conforming system resulted 
in China's book-tax differences, before the changes, no book-tax differences 
were presented in China as the rules for measuring taxable income were the 
same as those for measuring accounting profit (Tang & Firth, 2011). 
  
There was no tax policy owing to any personal or enterprise income taxes 
before 1978. Profit-retention system was introduced by government in order to 
retain a portion of profits from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 1979. A 
modern tax system was first implemented in 1983 under which all SOEs were 
required to pay a progressive income tax expense. Since the year 1991 when 
the first listed firm came into existence in China, a more comprehensive tax 
reform was launched in 1994 under which all domestic firms were required to 
pay income tax expense at the flat tax rate of 33 percent. In March 2007, 
China equalized the rate to 25 percent for both domestic and foreign firms, 
effective from 1st January, 2008.   
  
Before 1998, there was conformity between book income and taxable income 
in respect that traditional tax-based accounting and fiscal budget as well as tax 
assessment were directly linked, with the result that financial reporting costs 
prevent firms from avoiding tax and tax non-compliance is treated as any 
significant shortage of taxable income below book income (Chan et al. 2010). 
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At that time, Chinese government regulations set restrictions on bad debt 
provision and limit on the selection of depreciation methods such the selection 
of useful life of fixed assets, which are unable to fully capture a firm's 
financial performance. After 1998,  a series of practical accounting standards 
with objectives differing in terms of financial reporting with those of tax 
reporting was implemented by Chinese government (Chan et al. 2010), these 
standards removed the rigid limits as mentioned before and they gradually 
relaxed the close link between book income and taxable income by permitting 
flexibility in selection of different methods for financial and tax reporting, 
which result in more aggressive earning and tax management for managers to 
report high book income and low tax income (See Table 3.1 for the examples 
of common items with book-tax differences before and after the departure 
from tax-based accounting). For example, the Chinese government revised the 
accounting standards for business enterprises, effective from 2001 since 
China's accession to WTO, which marked a further departure from a tax-based 
accounting system and reinforced management's incentive to apply different 
methods for financial and tax reporting with increased discretion. 
  
When the book income and taxable income are separated, book-tax differences 
can arise due firstly to mechanical differences between accounting standards 
and tax rules, secondly to managers' discretion in financial reporting to 
overstate book income and finally managers' incentive to understate taxable 
income by taking advantage of the ambiguity in tax rules (see section 4.3 for 
more detail)   
 
 
Table 3. 1: Examples of common accounting items with book-tax 
differences before and after the departure from tax-based accounting 
Accounting items Under 
tax-based 
accounting 
  After 
adoption of 
IAS/IFRS 
  
 BTD Book-tax treatment BTD Book-tax treatment 
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1.Useful life of fixed 
assets 
No Same useful lives 
for book and tax 
purposes 
Yes Different useful lives for book 
and tax purposed (e.g. a longer 
useful life for book purpose) 
2.Salvage value of fixed 
assets 
No Sane salvage value 
(5% of original 
cost) for book and 
tax purposes 
Yes Different salvage values for 
book and tax (e.g. 5% for tax 
but more than 5% of the 
original cost for book) 
3.Depreciation method No Same method 
(usually straight 
line method, 
accelerated 
methods allowed 
for certain plant 
assets) 
Yes Different deprecation methods 
for book and tax purposes (e.g. 
straight line method for book 
but accelerated methods for tax 
for certain plant assets) 
4.Inventory valuation No Based on historical 
cost and the same 
inventory costing 
method for book 
and tax purposes 
Yes Lower of cost or market for 
book only. Different inventory 
costing method for book and 
tax purposes (e.g. FIFO for 
book and average method for 
tax) 
5.Bad debt provision No Provision ranges 
from 0.3% to 0.5% 
of accounts 
receivable for book 
and tax purposes 
Yes No restriction on provision for 
book, but up to 0.5% of 
accounts receivable balance for 
tax purpose 
6.Intangible assets No Historical cost and 
amortize over the 
contract period or 
10 years (not more 
than 10 years for 
book, but at least 
10 years for tax, 
thus in practice 10 
years)
a
 
Yes Revalue or amortize over not 
more than 10 years depending 
on asset useful life for book, 
but amortize over at least 10 
years for tax purpose 
7.Organization costs No Amortize over 5 
years for book and 
Yes Amortize over not more than 5 
years for book but at least 5 
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tax purposes years for tax purpose 
a
. 
8.Short-term and 
long-term investments 
No Historical cost and 
no unrealized 
gain/loss for book 
and tax purposes 
Yes Lower of cost or market for 
book purpose and unrealized 
gain/loss recognized for book 
but not for tax purpose/ 
9.Interest income from 
government bonds 
No Interest income 
recognized for 
book but exempted 
for tax purpose 
Yes Same as tax-based accounting 
10.Revenue from transfer 
of technologies 
Yes Revenue 
recognized for 
book but exempted 
for tax purpose 
Yes Same as tax-based accounting 
11.Donation/income 
received for 
environmental protection 
and charitable projects 
Yes Donations/income 
recognized as 
income for book 
purpose but 
exempted for tax 
purpose 
Yes Same as tax-based accounting 
12.Government subsidies Yes/No Subsidies 
recognized as 
income for book 
purpose but 
exempted for tax 
purpose if the 
subsidies related to 
food, high-tech 
R&D and other 
allowed items as 
per relevant 
regulations. 
Yes/No Same as tax-based accounting. 
However, specific tax 
exemptions change over time/ 
a 
The difference in accounting and tax polices indicate that Chinese tax authorities do recognize the potential 
of firms overstating book income and understating taxable income. 
Source: Chan et al. (2010) 
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3.1.2 Tax reform in China 
 
In recent years, corporate tax policy in most industrialized countries has been 
characterized by a trend towards lower tax rates and broader tax bases, and 
china is no exception.  
 
A new Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law) was promulgated by the 
National People's Congress of China to be effective on 1 January 2008. It is 
the first law in Chinese history that imposes an general internationally 
competitive integration of income tax on all types of enterprises, regardless 
that are foreign-investment enterprises (FIEs) or Chinese-owned enterprises 
(Li, 2007). The long-term objective of the new EIT law was to effectively 
reduce the tax incentives provided to foreign investors and to lower the 
corporate tax burden (Lin, Lu & Zhang, 2012). 
  
In China, the tax system applies the proportional tax rates. According to the 
Art 4 EIT Law, the general rate to company profits is 25 percent, which was 
much lower than the previous effective rate of 33 percent applicable to 
domestic enterprises, but higher than that for FIEs who in some cases enjoyed 
concession that pushed their tax rate to 15 percent or lower (Article 4 of New 
EIT Law). For example, with the preferential treatment enjoyed by FIEs 
established prior to January 2008, their income tax rate will be gradually 
increased to 25 percent within five years, in terms of 18 percent in 2008, 20 
percent in 2009, 22 percent in 2010, 24 percent in 2011 and 25 percent in 2012 
(Article 79 of New EIT Law).  
  
However, there are exceptions that a lower rate of 20 percent applies to 
qualified small and low-profit enterprises, and a lowest rate of 15 percent 
applies to new and high-tech enterprises that are supported by the Chinese 
government as key enterprises, which are justified by the Minister of Finance 
that these tax-preference enterprises play a special role in the national 
economy and therefore can enjoy priority support from government, as 
indicated by the international practices (Article 4 of New EIT Law). For the 
comparison purpose, see the Table 3.2 as follows. 
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Table 3. 2: Comparison of New EIT legislation with old EIT legislation 
  
  
Tax rate   
  New EIT legislation starting in 2008  Old EIT legislation  
Domestic 
enterprises 
Article 4: general tax rate is 25 percent. The standard statutory tax rate was33 
percent, with preferential tax rate of 15 
percent, 18 percent and 27 percent for 
low-profit enterprises 
  Article 28: 20 percent for small and 
low-profit enterprises 
  
  Article 28: 15 percent for new and 
high-tech enterprises 
  
  Article 28: 10 percent for withholding 
income tax 
  
Foreign-investment 
enterprises 
Article 4: general tax rate is 25 percent, 
and 20 percent for non-resident 
enterprises. 
The rate was lowered to 24 percent or 
15 percent for FIEs in some special 
regions.  
Notes China-sourced income of non-resident 
enterprises without establishments in 
China (or where the income is not 
connected with the establishments): 
10% withholding tax 
There was a large disparity between the 
statutory tax rate and effective tax rate 
as a result of various tax incentives 
Source: Li & Huang (2008)  
 
3.1.3 Accounting standards for business enterprises 
 
The development of accounting standards for the People‘s Republic of China 
can be divided into four stages, namely 1949-1978, 1979-1993, 1994-2006 
and 2007-present (Li and Huang, 2008). The first stage (1949-1978) started 
with the establishment of the People‘s Republic of China in 1949 and ended 
with the ‗reform and open-up‘ policy which was implemented since 1978. The 
second stage (1979-1993) stared with the ‗reform and open-up‘ policy and 
ended before the major corporate accounting disclosure since 1994. The 
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measurement and disclosure of Chinese corporate income tax expenses are in 
the third (1994-2006) and the fourth stage (2007-present). It is of significant 
that the steps towards convergence incurred through the insurance of four 
successive Chinese GAAPs: 1992, 1998, 2001 and 2006, when the Ministry of 
Finance prescribed a series of four accounting regulations applicable to 
A-share listed firms (Peng and Smith, 2010). 
 
 Stage 1: from1949 to 1978 
The Revolution of 1949 had a long-lasting effect on accounting reforms in 
China for the next 30 years, and the primary aim of accounting reforms was to 
establish accounting regulatory framework in response to the emerging 
economy in China.  The Chinese government has been directly involved in 
accounting regulation since 1949. The Uniform Accounting System which was 
based mainly on the accounting system of Soviet Union (Heng and Noronha, 
2011), was developed to facilitate central control and adoption of economic 
policy for a socialist economy such as China. In particular, accounting practice 
in China had been dramatically influenced by economic and political events, 
characterized by the dominance of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) until 
the open-up policy since 1979, as  well  as  the  political  movements  
of  the  Great  Leap  Forward of  the  late1950sandthe  Cultural  
Revolution  of  the  mid-1960s(Graham and Li, 1997), which targeted 
accounting system for simplification. At this stage, there was no income tax 
levied on the SOEs but all their profits had to be contributed to the state before 
1979.  
 
 Stage 2: from 1979 to 1993 
The desire to expand the Chinese economy in the period of the 1980s led 
China to move from a centralized economy toward a more market-oriented 
economy, which marked the change of accounting system from providing 
information for state control and planning to provide useful information for 
managerial decision-making (Heng and Noronha, 2011). The accounting 
system is China had undergone fundamental change in response to the 
establishment of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange in the early 1990s 
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and increasing foreign investments in China. Consequently, the 1992 
accounting system was consisted of the Experimental Accounting System for 
Joint Stock Limited Enterprises (1992 GAAP) and the Accounting Standard 
for Business Enterprises (the Basic Standard), which was the first accounting 
regulation for listed firms and represented the first step that brought Chinese 
accounting systems in line with IAS and international practice(Sami and Zhou, 
2004). These varied set of accounting regulations were applicable to all 
Chinese firms regardless of ownership structure such as listed firms, 
state-owned enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs); In addition, 
Chinese listed firms should prepare their financial statements based on this 
Chinese GAAP as well as the IAS if they also issue B-shares, and are required 
to publish their annual reports at least of the authorized publications before 
April 30
th
 the following year.  
 
 Stage 3: from 1994 to 2006 
In the early period, the Chinese accounting system is subject to the rule of tax 
law, there are almost no differences between accounting system and tax law in 
terms of revenue, expenses, profits/losses, assets and liabilities. In 1994, the 
'interim provisions on the treatment of corporate income tax expenses' issued 
by the Ministry of Finance, has marked the beginning of measurable 
separation of accounting system from tax law, while the 'corporate accounting 
system' implemented in 2001 further the development of the separation. Prior 
to the issuance of new accounting standards, firms can choose either the tax 
payable method or tax effect accounting method with respect to accounting 
treatment of income tax expenses; if the latter is chosen, it should be stated 
whether the deferral method or the liability method is applied (Article 107, 
ASBE, 2005). These two approaches have no effect on the measurement and 
payment of current income tax payable, that is, have no effect on national tax 
revenue, the only difference is that different items shown under 'income tax 
expense' in corporate financial statements.It is worth noticing that this stage of 
standard development was characterized by the adoption of the Accounting 
System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises (1998 GAAP), which replaced the 
1992 Accounting System. Meanwhile, ten specific Chinese Accounting 
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Standards issued by MOF and general principle of freedom were brought into 
effect. Any accounting treatment resulting in an increase or decrease in profit 
was acceptable (Wang et al., 2012) given that the firm provided full disclosure. 
Financial statements of Chinese listed firms were also more commonly audited 
by independent auditors during this period. These standards were argued to 
improve corporate accounting disclosure both in terms of quantity and quality. 
However, since the year 2001, the 1998 Accounting System was replaced by 
the adoption of Accounting System for Business Enterprise (2001 GAAP) as 
well as 16 Chinese Accounting Standards, which included 6 newly issued 
standards, 5 revised standards and 5 original standards (Peng and Smith, 2010). 
It represented a further step toward the convergence with international practice, 
namely International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In most cases, 
2001 GAAP was based on the 1998 GAAP but more closer to IFRS.  
 
 Stage 4: after the year 2007 
A series of new revised 'Accounting standards for business enterprises' was 
issued by the Ministry of Finance in 15th February, 2006 (ASBE, 2006). The 
new accounting standards consist of 6 chapters and 25 articles such as general 
provisions, tax bases, temporary differences, definition, measurement and 
disclosure. The new accounting standard was effective on 1st January 2007 
firstly in Chinese listed companies and then applied through all companies. 
The issuance and implementation of new accounting standards has witnessed 
the convergence between Chinese corporate accounting system and 
international financial accounting standards (IFRS). 
  
In line with IFRS that requires companies to determine current income tax 
expenses in response to the sum of current income tax payable and deferred 
income tax, but not the tax effects of events or transactions that are directly 
recognized in the owners' equity, the revised 'Accounting standards for 
business enterprises Article 18: income tax expenses' was issued by the 
Ministry of Finance in February 2006, and it stipulates that firms should apply 
the balance sheet approach to treat the income tax expenses. That is,  
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Current income tax expense=tax payable + (ending deferred income tax 
liabilities- beginning deferred income tax liabilities) -(ending beginning 
income tax assets-beginning income tax assets) 
  
It can be seen that the system of income tax expense has gone through three 
phases of tax payable approach, tax effect accounting approach and balance 
sheet approach.  
  
 Tax payable method: 
  
Income tax expenses = (accounting book income for the year ±permanent 
differences ± timing differences) × applicable tax rate 
  
It is applied by an enterprise that deferred income tax is not recognized and the 
tax expense is equal to the provision for taxes payable in a particular period,  
the current income tax expense is calculated as a product of taxable income 
and application income tax rate. Under this method, income tax expenses are 
actually the income tax payable for the year. This approach actually reflects 
that fact that accounting system is subject to the rules of tax law, and 
enterprises can avoid the complicated tax adjustments. 
 
 Tax effect accounting method: 
  
Current tax payable= (accounting book income ± tax adjustments)× tax 
rate 
 
It is applied by an enterprise in determining current period income tax expense 
as a product of total amount of income tax payable for the year and the amount 
of tax effect of timing differences, with consideration of the tax effect of 
timing differences. Under this method, the amount of tax effect of timing 
differences should be deferred and allocated to subsequent accounting periods 
(Article 107: ASBE, 2005: p180). An enterprise that adopts the tax effect 
accounting effect may apply either the deferral method or the liability method. 
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Under the deferral method, where there is a change in the tax rate or a levy of 
a new tax, it is not necessary to make adjustments to the amount of tax effect 
of timing differences determined in prior years, but the amount of tax effect of 
timing difference reversing in the period should be calculated using the 
income tax rate originally applied. Under the liability methods, where there is 
a change in tax rate or a levy of a new rate, it is necessary to make adjustments 
to the amount of tax effect of timing differences determined in prior years, and 
the amount of tax effect of timing difference reversing in the period should be 
calculated using the income tax rate applied for the current period.  
  
In a simple way, it is an approach that takes income tax expenses into account 
during the period where the expenses are incurred, rather than the period 
where the income tax is payable, differing from balance sheet approach in that 
timing difference is based on income tax rate incurred in the year. 
 
 Balance sheet approach  
  
Current tax expense=taxable income × applicable income tax rate ±
deferred tax expense 
 
Current income tax expense= tax payable + [(ending deferred income tax 
liabilities- beginning deferred income tax liabilities)-(ending beginning 
income tax assets-beginning income tax assets)]×applicable tax rate 
  
Under this approach, income tax expenses for the year comprises both current 
tax and deferred tax (movements in deferred assets and liabilities), based on 
expected income tax rate back to the year, which was effective since 2007. 
Current tax and deferred tax are directly recognized in profit/loss account 
except to the extent that they relate to items recognized directly in equity, with 
the latter method the amounts of tax are recognized in equity or for goodwill 
arise from business combination. 
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The above formulae can be calculated in two steps. The first step is to obtain 
expected current tax payable calculated on the basis of taxable income at the 
applicable tax rate for the year with any adjustments to tax payable of previous 
years. While the taxable amount of income used in calculation of income tax 
expenses of current term is the result of adjusted accounting profit before tax 
of the current year according to the relative tax terms. The second step is to 
calculate the deferred tax expenses. The Article 18, ASBE (2006) stipulates 
certain regulations on the recognition of deferred tax expenses which will not 
be listed here, at the balance date, the amount of deferred tax expense 
recognized is measured as a product of settlement of carrying amount of assets 
and liabilities and tax rate applied in the period when the when the asset is 
realized or the liability is settled in accordance with tax laws.  
 
3.1.3.1 Article 18: income tax expenses, ASBE (2006) 
 
Disclosure on income tax expenses 
 
In this section, we will list the disclosure on notes to income tax expenses 
which will be directly related to the measure of tax aggressiveness and help 
understand measure applied.  
  
The new accounting standards have completely changed the original 
accounting treatment of income tax expenses and have achieved a major 
breakthrough on it. 
  
According to the No. 25, Article 18 on income tax expenses, the enterprise 
should disclose the following information in the notes to income tax expenses 
section: 
  
 The main components of income tax expenses (income) 
 The reconciliation between income tax expenses (income) and accounting 
profit 
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 The amount of deductible temporary differences and deductible losses of 
unrecognized deferred income tax assets (if there is a maturity , the 
enterprise should disclose the expiration date) 
 As for the each category of temporary differences and deductible loses, the 
amount of deferred tax assets or liabilities recognized during the period of 
presentation of financial statement, the enterprise should define the basis 
for the recognition of deferred income tax assets 
 Unrecognized deferred income tax liabilities, with respect to the amount of 
taxable temporary differences associated with the investments in 
subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates, where the timing of the reversal 
of the temporary differences can be controlled and it is probable that the 
temporary differences will not reverse in the foreseeable future. 
  
A reconciliation of tax-effect book income and current tax expense is present 
below (See the annual report of a Chinese listed firm 000625 for an example 
below). Despite the detailed information disclosure on income tax expenses 
increases the workload of enterprises on measurement of accounting; it will 
provide users of financial statements with more useful information in their 
decision-making. However, the accounting standards and their application 
guide do not regulate the ways of presenting the reconciliation between 
income tax expenses (income) and accounting profit, in practices enterprises 
can disclose the figure adjustments between income tax expenses (income) 
and the product of multiplication of accounting profit and the applicable tax 
rate, as well as the disclosure on the basis for definition of applicable tax rate 
(Deloitte, 2007).  
  
In general, the factors that are most likely to affect the reconciliation between 
income tax expenses (income) and accounting profit are as follows (Deloitte, 
2007): 
  
 Tax exempt income 
 Non-deductible expenses when determining the taxable income 
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 The effect of deductible losses such as utilization of prior years' 
unrecognized tax losses, or the recognition of previously unrecognized 
temporary differences in current year from the perspective of recovery 
 From the perspective of recovery, termination of other deferred tax assets 
or provision for the carrying amount of previously recognized deferred tax 
assets 
 Adjustments on the remaining deferred tax due to effect of changes in tax 
rates 
 The effects of application of equity method on investments on joint 
ventures and associates 
 The effects arising from differences in effective tax rate of subsidiaries or 
subsidiaries of foreign operation 
 Tax concession 
 Income tax credits or tax refund such as purchase of domestic equipment 
 Tax deduction on R&D expenditures 
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3.1.3.2 Comment on tax reform and the enforcement of tax rules 
The new enterprise income tax (EIT) law is applicable to all domestic Chinese 
enterprises and foreign enterprises as well as foreign-invested enterprises and 
they are all subject to a tax rate of 25 percent, which largely eliminated the 
preferential tax treatment to foreign and foreign-invested enterprises and to be 
phased out in five years, it suggest a shift of Chinese tax policy towards 
fairness and neutrality. Tax incentives are redesigned to subsidize all 
‗high-tech‘ firms and firms that invest in equipment for water conservation, 
environmental protection and production safety (Li, 2008).  
 
In the short term, the offsetting effect arises from the large decrease in income 
tax from domestic-invested firms and small increase in income tax from 
foreign and foreign-invested income due to their limited number, would lead 
to decrease in Chinese governments‘ tax revenues in the short term (Ruan et 
al., 2010), however, in the long-term, the new EIT law will promote the 
development of firms‘ performance and scale of operations, and will form a 
long-term stable revenue model for the fiscal revenues. Therefore, the new 
EIT law affects the tax rates, tax incentives and certain rules of foreign 
enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises, and achieves the guiding 
principles of the promotion of overall development of China‘s economy, 
convergence to international tax practices and norms as well as effectiveness 
in tax administration and simplicity in tax compliance (Li, 2007).  
 
General speaking, the implementation of the new EIT law has positive effects 
on firms, for example, it is expected to be beneficial to improve the 
competitiveness of domestic-invested firms, to optimize the industry 
restructuring and investment of foreign-invested firms, to help reduce the 
overall tax amount of Chinese listed firms and facilitate the regional economic 
development and the change in the pattern of economic growth.  
 
However, there are several issues associated with promulgation of the new EIT 
law which should raise the attention of tax administration and regulators. 
Firstly, there is problem associated with the consolidated tax payment system. 
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Since the year 2003, it is stipulated by the Chinese tax regulations that the tax 
revenues must be shared among different level of governments, which results 
in conflicts among them. The new EIT law still does not solve this problem 
and the different level of governments fight for the sources of tax revenues, 
and may motivate the respective level of governments to direct their firms to 
minimize tax payment to keep more resources in their controlled areas (Chan 
et al. 2013). Secondly, there is game theory between China‘s state tax bureau 
and local tax bureau and between tax authorities and taxpayers, and the latter 
plays a dominant role. Due to the information asymmetry between tax 
authorities and taxpayers, there is moral risk inherent and firms can take 
advantages of information advantages and other measures to avoid taxes or 
evade taxes, which results in losses in government revenues. Thirdly, the 
expression of the articles of the new EIT law is ambiguous and vague, for 
example, there is no detailed criteria on the tax preferential policies, in the 
articles, there is no clear and specific writing on the tax incentives that firms 
can apply and only use ambiguous words such as ‗rational‘, ‗some proportion 
of‘, ‗related‘ incentives, which increase the difficulty in the enforcement of the 
tax law by tax authorities. Meanwhile, partial important policies in terms of 
implementation of new EIT law have not been clearly defined such as the 
treatment of non-taxable income, treatment of equity transfer income and 
losses, tax treatment of deferred income and losses and tax treatment of loss of 
intangible assets. Therefore, the practical implementation of new EIT law still 
needs the supporting tax regulations of regulatory documents; otherwise, the 
law as well as the implementing regulations cannot ensure the effective 
enforcement (Ruan et al. 2010). Finally, In terms of tax shifting, Article 50 of 
the new EIT law specifies that ‗Unless otherwise specified by tax laws and 
administrative regulations, resident enterprises whose place of tax payment is 
the place of registration of the Enterprise but the place of registration is 
outside the territory, the place of tax payment shall be the place where the 
actual administration institution is located. Where resident enterprises 
establish business institutions in China without legal person qualification, it 
shall consolidate the calculation and payment of enterprise income tax‘, the 
implementation of this article transfers parts of tax revenues of northwest 
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China to eastern China, as Chinese firms start to establish their factories in 
northwest China and establish their headquarters in eastern coastal China in 
order to take advantages of cheap rents and labor forces of northwest China. In 
the long term, it will further increase the disparity between the rich and poor.  
 
Using a sample of A-share Chinese listed firms, study the effects of ownership 
structure and economic locations on the effective tax rates before and after the 
implementation of new EIT law, the results demonstrate that new EIT law 
effectively reduce the tax gap between Chinese listed firms with different 
controlling shareholding as well as different economic locations, with firms 
located in the economically developed regions of China, the tax gap is 
minimal (Luo and Yang, 2011). The results suggest that the enforcement and 
effectiveness of tax reforms, and provide important implications for the 
improvement of tax policy. It can be argued that the new EIT law can reduce 
the room for manipulation through the elimination of policy differences and 
standardization of tax system, and can restraint the behaviors of Chinese firms 
and governments to some degree, which in turn can promote the fair tax 
environment. Meanwhile, it is beneficial for the enforcement of new EIT law 
for firms located in more economically developed regions and regions with 
higher degree of marketization, therefore, the tax reforms cannot be separated 
from the measures, the effective enforcement of new EIT law depends on 
continuously improvement of the regional economic environment as well as 
other regional efforts. However, we should recognize the limitation that there 
is no prior literature that documented the enforcement of tax rules, and this is 
due to the very limited disclosures on tax enforcement and violations, which 
should raise the attentions from related tax administrations. 
 
In sum, the implementation of the new EIT law is argued to represent a 
growing confidence in China‘s global standing, and appear to be welcomed by 
investors and capital markets in China, as the large domestic enterprises that 
dominate the indexes of Chinese stock market such as the major banks, 
telecoms companies, oil and gas manufacturers can expect their after-tax 
earnings boosted by the tax changes; it is also welcomed by foreign investors 
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that search for a more transparent tax policy as part of their investment 
environment (Li, 2007). It is argued that the overall tax rate of 25 percent is 
competitive when compared with neighboring countries and the new law 
would have minimal negative impact on attracting FDI to China. The biggest 
concern is thus far that more details and transparency for the implementation 
of the new EIT law. 
 
3.1.4 Tax research in Chinese markets 
 
In terms of tax research in Chinese market context, most of research has 
focused on the earning management (e.g. Dai & Yao, 2006; Ye, 2006; Liu & 
Lu, 2007; Zheng & Liu, 2008; Lu et al. 2010; Zeng, & Lv, 2010; Chen et al. 
2011; Tang & Firth, 2011; Firth et al. 2013). For example, Dai & Yao (2006) 
empirically study the institutional factors of book-tax differences and the 
effect of the effort for conformity betweenaccounting system and tax rules, in 
order to study the tax aggressive behaviors of Chinese listed firms, they find 
that a significant relationship between the increasing book-tax differences and 
earning management behaviors of Chinese listed firms, and institutional 
differences and earning management factors account for a significant portion 
of changes in book-tax differences, which provide important implications for 
the cooperation among supervising institutions. Managers are provided 
incentives to manipulate non-taxable earning in order to avoid the tax 
obligation of earning management, Ye (2006) examines the relationship 
between book-tax differences and earning managements, and finds that 
book-tax differences are positively related with earning management, and 
further provide evidence that firms in the higher tax rate group have strong 
incentive to avoid tax obligation through non-taxable items and long-term 
accrue items, for one dollar earnings manipulated, only 1.8 cents are exempted 
from tax obligation, which implies that managers are more likely to pay tax for 
earning management in order not to be suspected by capital markets or tax 
authority. Tang & Firth (2011) provide evidence on the value relevance of 
book-tax differences in Chinese markets, using unique tax-effect book-tax 
differences data obtained from Chinese-B share listed firms, they find that 
book-tax differences are associated with both accounting and tax 
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manipulations induced by managerial opportunities, and can capture not only 
earning management but also tax management in China, a country with 
different institutional and regulatory market contexts from those in the 
developed economies. In addition, since the year 2002, it stipulated by the 
Chinese tax regulations that tax revenue collected from al local 
government-controlled firms and some central government-controlled firms 
must be shared among different levels of governments. For example, for 
corporate income tax paid by local government-controlled firms, the local 
government can only take 40 percent of the tax revenue. Due to the fact that 
respective local governments cannot take 100 percent of the tax revenue, local 
governments are motivated to direct their firms to minimize tax payment to 
keep more resources in their controlled firms. Mi & Huang (2012) find that 
firms with their income tax collected by local governments are more tax 
aggressive are compared to that firms with income tax collected by central 
government and state taxation bureaus; in addition, there is a positive 
correlation between the local government and the level of tax aggressiveness 
in the east regions, that is, the strength of the income collection by local 
governments is reduced for the abundant tax source. 
 
Prior studies provide mixed and inconclusive evidences on the effects of 
corporate governance characteristics on earning management and firm 
performance in China (Chen et al. 2006; Liu & Lu, 2007; Lo et al. 2010). For 
example, Liu & Lu (2006) investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and earning management in China from the perspective of 
tunneling, and they find that firms with higher level of corporate governance 
are associated with lower level of earning management, agency conflicts 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders can contribute to 
a significant portion of earning management in Chinese listed firms; Lo et al. 
(2010) also provide evidences on the role of a good corporate governance 
structure in constraining managers‘ opportunistic behaviors in earning 
management in the form of transfer pricing manipulations. 
 
As we can see that, prior studies that, on the one hand, are based on the 
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institutional factors that account for book-tax differences, on the other hand, 
are based on the relationship between book-tax differences and earning 
management or the earning quality. Recent studies have started to examine the 
role of state ownership that plays in firms‘ tax reporting practices in China. 
For example, Zeng (2010) investigates the relationship between ownership 
structure in particular, ownership concentration and state ownership and tax 
reporting practices of listed firms in China, and finds that 
government-controlled firms pay more (as proxy by higher effective tax rates) 
when compared to non-government-controlled firms. Wu et al.(2013) also 
provide evidence that local state-owned enterprises pay a higher effective tax 
rate than that of private firms, due to the preferential tax incentives from local 
governments associated with private firms in order to promote local economic 
growth. However, these studies do not deal with the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms such as ownership structure and executive 
compensations as well as their interactive effect on a firm‘s tax reporting, in 
this study, we will fill in the gap to take advantage of the institutional setting 
in China to specifically on several corporate governance characteristics and 
their impacts on the tax aggressiveness of Chinese listed firms. Minnick & 
Noga (2010) find that except that compensation contracts, board of directors 
characteristics do not have impact on a firm‘s tax management in the United 
States, therefore how corporate governance characteristics in Chinese context 
affect tax aggressiveness is yet to be explored.  
 
3.2Corporate governance in China: Overview 
  
It is argued that there are two competing views on the appropriate type of 
corporate governance, namely the market-based approach applied in the UK 
and U.S. and the control-based approach found most commonly in emerging 
economies and in continental Europe, although academic research hasn‘t 
arrived at a definite conclusion regarding the relative superiority of either type 
(Bai et al. 2004). The features of the market-based governance model include 
an independent board, dispersed ownership, transparent disclosure, active 
takeover markets, and well-developed legal infrastructure, specifically, the 
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largest shareholders play a passive role in the management of firms and do not 
intervene directly in the day-to-day business and the protection of minority 
shareholders is well established by law and regulations (Chen et al. 2006) ; on 
the contrary, the control-based model consists of a concentrated ownership 
structure, insider board, , large investor involvement in firm decision making, 
limited disclosure with family finance or the banking system for support (Bai 
et al. 2004). There are virtually no markets for corporate control as only a 
small proportion of shares are circulated on the market and is impossible to 
acquire sufficient shares to deprive of existing management teams (Chen et al. 
2006).  
  
It can be found that the corporate governance model applied in China can best 
be characterized as a control-based approach, where the controlling 
shareholders, in most cases being the state government, and a variety of 
governance mechanisms are employed to tightly control the listed firms. It can 
be seen that a management-friendly insider board, concentrated ownership 
structure, inadequate financial disclosure and inactive take-over markets have 
been the governance norms in China (Bai et al. 2004). In terms of this 
approach, stock market is heavily regulated by the Chinese government and its 
development is subject to constant government intervention. For example, the 
Chinese government might try to simulate recessionary market by relaxation 
of regulations and policies. So how has the control-based governance model 
emerged in China and what institutional determinants are driving its evolution 
over time?  
  
China has emerged as one of the largest economies in the world and its 
economics has grown rapidly since its beginning of economic reform. With 
the government introducing a great variety of privatization and economic 
reforms into the state-owned sectors, many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
have since been transformed into publicly listed companies on the Chinese and 
Hong Kong stock exchanges, with government remaining the major 
shareholder of SOEs through state-owned shares and state-owned legal person 
(institution) shares, accounting for two-thirds of the total shareholding 
 52 
 
(Cheung et al. 2008). Agency conflicts and moral hazard problems can be very 
severe in this setting, a new agency problem arise from the privatization of 
SOEs with dominant state ownership, which is a conflict of interest amongst 
stakeholders. It is possible that government has more comprehensive goals 
other than shareholder value maximization (Cheung, et al. 2008). For example, 
the Chinese government may view that social welfare is potentially more 
essential than that of value maximization; consequently, a controlling 
government stockholders can achieve their policy goals via listed firms as a 
vehicle, even though they may create conflicts with interests of shareholders. 
The corporate governance structure of listed firms in China will become a 
more critical issue as China continues to gradually open its financial markets 
to foreign investment. It is of significance to have a deeper understanding of 
the current corporate governance system in China and the corporate 
governance studies related to the Chinese market. What has been lacking in 
this process is a sound theoretical framework to embrace the unique 
social/practical/economic environment of China. 
  
Chinese listed firms have multiple classes of shares: shares that can be traded 
by domestic investors (A-shares), shares denominated in foreign currencies 
and reserved for foreign investors (B-shares), and shares of companies listed 
or cross-listed overseas (H-shares listed in Hong Kong). Approximately 5% of 
firms issue both A and B shares. A special feature of the ownership structures 
in China is the existence of non-tradable shares owned by the state to retain 
control over the listed firms which are classified as state shares and legal 
person shares, which are often also state owned. The state's shares are 
administered by government bodies, such as state asset management agencies 
or institutions authorized to hold shares on behalf of the state, such as wholly 
state-owned investment companies (Firth, et al. 2007a.b). There is a consensus 
in the existing literature that non-tradable shares are the major drivers of 
problems in Chinese stock market due to its restriction on the merger and 
acquisition activities of domestic firms through stock market. For example, the 
holders of non-tradable shares have the controlling power to determine the 
corporate policies but their wealth are unrelated to the market prices of 
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tradable shares. As a result, the market value as well as investor behaviors 
would neither reflect nor influence the fundamental values of these listed firms 
(Tong et al, 2012). It is argued by Wu (2004) that the settlement of stock right 
splitting issues would resolve 80 percent of the problems in the stock market, 
although Qiu & Yao (2009) suggest that the split share structure (tradable and 
non-tradable) has impeded the stock markets development and the 
transformation of the Chinese listed firms. 
  
A recent reform that has been taking place since 2005 deserves a particular 
mention, as it has the potential of resulting in a fundamental change in the 
ownership and control structure of Chinese listed firms, which is the so-called 
'share-structure reform' (Xi, 2009) or 'split-share structure reform' that phases 
out the restriction on the transferability of non-tradable shares by paying 
compensation either in cash or in shares to tradable shareholders, usually in 
average three shares for every ten tradable shares, despite that these 
compensation schemes were negotiated on an individual 
company-by-company basis. Table 3.3 briefly lists the main reform plan that 
most listed firms follow. As a consequence, a more dispersed ownership 
structure emerges and controlling shareholdings in many listed firms are being 
diluted. However, concentrated ownership structure remains a defining feature 
of Chinese listed firms as the sale of current tradable state-owned shares is still 
subject to administrative approval (Xi, 2009). In 2005, the 'Guidelines on the 
reform on non-tradable shares of state-controlled companies' was released by 
the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), specifying the requirements on the  percentage of state shares to 
be held by state-controlled firms (Yuen & Zhang, 2008). It states that the 
approval of the SASAC is required for any sale of state shares; however, a 
controlling stake in listed firms should be maintained by the state in the 
industries which are vital to the national economy or security. In particular, 
these firms are required to include a restriction on their proposal of reform that 
state shareholding cannot be a particular level. 
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The figure 3.1 presents the time line that a firm must go through a typical 
reform process. There are two trading suspension between the reform process. 
The first period of trading suspension starts on the day D0 when the listed firm 
announces the split share structure reform, during this time period, the holders 
of tradable shares are provided a satisfactory compensation plan by holders of 
non-tradable shares including cash, asset restructuring, warrants and 
frequently additional shares in order to vote with the reform plan (Li et al. 
2011; Tong et al, 2012). If both groups of tradable shares and non-tradable 
shares agree on the reform plan, the reform plan is revised and finalized; 
trading resumes on day D1 and continues until day D2. Investors have the 
voting rights against the reform during the second period of trading suspension; 
the compensation plan must be approved by at least two thirds of the 
shareholders of voting tradable shares. If the reform proposal is approved, it 
will be implemented before the trading resumes on day D3 and all holders of 
tradable shares would be entitled to the compensation in the final plan if they 
hold shares at the closing day D2 (Tong et al, 2012). 
 
Figure 3. 1: Reform process 
 
 Source: Tong et al. (2012) 
  
 
Due to the split share structure reform, both the A shares and B shares can 
further classified into two groups, the restricted shares and the tradable shares. 
Restricted shares are shares that can only be transferred privately or auctioned, 
usually at a discount value relative to that of freely tradable shares in the firm, 
and are not allowed to trade freely on the Chinese stock exchange (Hou, Kuo 
& Lee, 2012). However, it is worth noting that restricted are non-tradable for 
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only a period of time, The reform regulations require that non-tradable shares 
are not allowed to be sold publicly or transferred within a lockup period of 12 
months from the time the firm announced the split share reform 
implementation plan, and after the lockup period, the non-tradable shares can 
be actually traded with the restriction that (Hou, Kuo & Lee, 2012) 
  
1. A former holders of non-tradable shares with more than 5 percent of 
total shares of a listed firm are only allowed to sell at most 5 percent of 
the shares outstanding within 12 months upon the expiry of the lockup 
period 
2. With a maximum of 10 percent within 24 month after lockup period 
3. and then have the flexibility to sell all the non-tradable shares after 36 
months  
  
To date, more that 99 percent of Chinese firms listed on Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock markets have compensated tradable shareholders, the 
non-tradable shares of these firms are gradually becoming tradable; while the 
remaining firms are nominated as S-shares as they have not compensated their 
tradable shareholders and have been limited in their market prices to fluctuate 
no more that 5 percent on any trading day (Yang, Chi & Young, 2011). It is 
evidenced by Yang, Chi & Young (2011) that this reform resulted in 
statistically significant positive average market adjusted return as well as 
average abnormal returns for listed firms.  
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Table 3. 3: Split-share reform plans 
Plan classification  Plan details  
Compensation shares Mostly non-tradable shareholders make share compensations to 
the tradable shareholders and sometimes listed firms make the 
compensation  
Reverse stock split Non-tradable shareholders contract their share according to some 
ratio 
Cash compensation 
warrants 
Non-tradable shareholders issue warrants to shareholders 
Asset restructure  Major non-tradable shareholders make some asset restructure 
with the listed firms 
  Note: if the tradable shareholders did not get the compensation 
from non-tradable shareholders, they would suffer from a huge 
loss. 
 Source: Hou, Kuo & Lee (2012)  
  
In a word, China's stock market is in its infancy and was established under 
centrally planned economy, accompanied with value maximization is not the 
sole objective of these Chinese listed firms. The Chinese corporate governance 
system which is characterized by multiple goals of listed companies, highly 
concentrated ownership, expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders, strong insider board and a weak legal system for shareholder 
protection are found to be the most serious problems in China and has 
seriously impeded the development of an effective corporate governance 
system for Chinese listed companies. Therefore it is interesting to see how 
these unique features of Chinese market affect corporate governance practices 
as well as tax aggressiveness and their potential firm performance.  
  
3.2.1 Corporate governance regulations and issues in China 
 
As discussed above, regulations on the relationships among all parties with 
interests in a firm are covered by Chinese definitions of corporate governance; 
however, in practices the Chinese corporate governance system focuses almost 
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exclusively on agency problems and within only two types of firms: listed 
firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Clarke, 2003). As this study will 
discuss Chinese corporate governance in a narrow sense, some major 
corporate governance issues faced by Chinese listed firms are discussed in this 
section.  
 
In general, In China, properly dealing with the relationships among various 
stakeholders of a firm becomes perhaps the most important issue; in particular, 
with further development of the Chinese stock market, a new corporate 
governance system for listed firms is developing in China which includes both 
internal and external control. It is noted that information disclosure may play a 
dominant role in external control, whereas for internal control, a dual-board 
system namely the board of directors and supervisory board and the 
independent director system have been introduced.  
  
The legal reforms that have been put in place, especially the 2005 amendment 
of the Company Law provides a better legal basis for the corporate governance 
system. However, they have not yet effectively to address the fundamental 
agency problem facing Chinese listed firm that is the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by the controlling shareholders. Controlling sellers and buyers in 
the private sale of control have been able to extract large private benefits at the 
expense of the minority shareholders of the target firm. Institutional 
shareholders have to overcome many legal and regulatory barriers that hamper 
their ability to participate in the governance of their portfolio companies. 
Independent director have not yet to act with rigorous independence, and a 
change is necessary to provide effective insight for detecting wrongdoing of 
the management or the controlling shareholders to whom they owe their 
appointment (Xi, 2009). 
 
 
3.2.2 Legal framework for corporate governance 
 
The legal framework under which Chinese listed firms are governed is laid 
down by the 1993 Company Law. The overall framework has remained 
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largely unchanged since 1993, although important reforms were introduced by 
the revised 2005 Company Law (Xi, 2009). According to section 4 of the 
Company Law, Chinese companies including listed companies have been 
required to have three governance organs-the shareholders' general meeting, 
the board of directors and the supervisory board. The shareholders' general 
meeting is at the top of the power of a company, it is responsible for electing 
members of board of directors and the supervisory board, examining and 
approving reports from the two boards and making other important decisions 
for the company (Yuen & Zhang, 2008).  
  
In order to improve the corporate governance system in China, the 
independent director system has been introduced since 2001 (Yuen & Zhang, 
2008). The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) currently 
requires all the domestically listed firms to hire at least two independent board 
directors and similar requirements were also added into the revised 2005 
Company Law. However, yet Yang (2008) and Xi (2009) argue that the 
independent director system has not worked as effectively as expected so far. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in many cases independent directors in a 
listed firm cannot be really independent of management or the controlling 
shareholders to whom they owe their appointment. The exercise of corporate 
power by the senior managers and controlling shareholders in Chinese listed 
firms remains unchecked and unbalanced (Xi, 2009). Thus, a change that is 
necessary in order to provide effective insight for detecting wrongdoing of the 
management or the controlling shareholders to whom they owe their 
appointment. On the other hand, the supervisory boards in most Chinese listed 
firms are also ineffective in supervision of performance in terms of the board 
of directors and management (Yuen & Zhang, 2008; Xi, 2009). For example, 
the supervisory boards played almost no role in many disclosed cases of 
misconduct of the board of directors and management in China. It is indicated 
by Dahya et al (2000) that five causes for the ineffectiveness of the 
supervisory board in China, namely, a lack of independence, a lack of 
incentives, a lack of legal power and responsibilities, technical incompetence 
and information unavailability. The good news is that significant amendments 
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were made to address many of the issues identified with the 2005 amendments 
to the 1993 Company Law and there is a significant enhancement of the 
effectiveness of the supervisory board (Xi, 2009). Arguably, however, there is 
room for further entrenchment of the supervisory board, for example, 
provision could be inserted to help ensure that at least some of the supervisors 
are independent (Xi, 2009). It can be noted that the dysfunction of the 
supervisory board in practice can perhaps be attributed as much to its lack of 
independence as to its lack of effective powers. Another area of possible 
improvement is perhaps the addition of provision that create adequate liability 
incentives for supervisors to play a more active oversight role (Xi, 2009). The 
revised 2005 Company Law lay down the general rule that supervisors owe 
duties of loyalty and duties of due diligence to the company, however, they do 
not set out the substance of these duties.  
 
 
3.2.3 Institutional Investors 
 
Institutional investors have become increasingly important in the Chinese 
stock markets as equity holders. Institutional investors are viewed as more 
effective for good corporate governance performance in respect that they can 
take advantage of more resources to control managers as compared to other 
small individual investors. 
 
The share ownership of securities investment funds, insurance companies, 
pension funds, securities companies, commercial banks, and qualified foreign 
institutional investors has grown dramatically in recent years. As institutional 
ownership increases, the institutions' role as shareholders has also evolved. It 
is widely accepted that institutional investors play an active role in 
disciplining and monitoring managerial discretion as well as reduction in 
information asymmetry and help increase the protection of minority investors 
in decisions of listed firms. In general, institutional investors are usually 
capable of monitoring the performance of managers in an effective way, due 
to the fact that firstly, institutional investors have more expertise in finance, 
accounting and law to better discover misstatement than other investors; 
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secondly, institutional investors have better information access and on some 
occasions, are also willing to share that information with other shareholders; 
and finally, interests of institutional investors and other shareholders are 
largely aligned, both want to maximize a firm's profit and its stock prices 
(Yuen & Zhang, 2008). Therefore, minority shareholders could benefit from 
the efforts made by institutional investors in monitoring and participating in 
the operation of the company. 
  
At the end of June 2007, the presence of 343 open-ended mutual funds have 
grown their total net value to 1,796.9 billion Chinese RMB, however, the 
impact of mutual funds on corporate governance of Chinese listed firms has 
been few studied (Yang, Chi & Young, 2011). In effect, Xu and Wang (1999) 
and Qi et al. (2000) find that in general, corporate performance of Chinese 
listed firms is positively correlated with concentrated institutional 
shareholding other than state shareholding and is negatively associated with 
dispersed ownership. As we have discussed, state ownership may be subject to 
substantial political costs and agency costs in monitoring a company, the 
dominance of private institutional investors may improve the corporate 
governance of listed companies. In China, there are two types of institutional 
shareholders: those who hold legal person shares and those who hold common 
A-shares. Xu and Wang (1999) and Sun & Tong (2003) find a positive 
relationship between that firms' performance and the percentage of 
institutional legal person shares. It is expected that their impact will become 
more important as most legal person shares have just become tradable in the 
market.  
 
Nevertheless, the role of institutional investors holding common A-shares is 
limited at present (Yuen & Zhang, 2008). The shareholding of these 
institutional investors in Chinese listed companies is too low to provide them 
with an incentive to monitor corporate performance. However, the situation is 
changing after a series of liberalization measures in the Chinese stock market. 
In 2001,  the ban on social security fun was relived and six domestic mutual 
fund firms was selected by Chinese government, some of which have been 
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invested in domestic stock markets since 2003 (Yuen & Zhang, 2008). In 
December 2002, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) scheme was 
implemented to attract foreign institutional investors to invest their money into 
its domestic stock market. At the end of 2007, 52 foreign institutional 
investors were granted QFII status by the CSRS; the number of QFII increased 
by 73.3 percent compared with that in October 2005 (Yuen & Zhang, 2008). 
Therefore, domestic and foreign institutional investors are going to be 
important participants in the Chinese stock market. With more participation on 
the part of institutional investors in the Chinese stock market and the reduction 
of state ownership in many listed firms, it is expected that there will be a better 
corporate governance system, including stronger protection for minority 
shareholders in the near future. 
 
 
3.3 Developing a Corporate Governance and Tax Framework 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
The theory that corporate governance can affect corporate tax shelters is 
currently incorporated into many of the recent papers examining the 
determinants and consequences of tax sheltering. However, up to the present, 
the field does not have a comprehensive model or understanding of why some 
firms avoid tax more than others. Several recent studies investigate the 
intersection between firm-level characteristics and corporate tax shelters using 
a number of proxies such as average Effective Tax Rate (ETR). For example, 
Gupta and Newberry (1997) discuss the fact that there are a great variety of 
determinants of GAAP ETRs and Rego (2003) provide evidence that  more 
tax sheltering opportunities lead to lower GAAP ETRs are associated with the 
scale of international operations. 
  
In general, previous recent studies primarily explore tax aggressiveness across 
firms within one country, mostly within a US context, where all firms operate 
under the same tax system, financial accounting standards and institutional 
arrangements. A growing literature points to the fact that aggressive tax 
planning is affected by corporate governance attributes (Desai and 
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Dharmapala 2006; Wilson, 2009); and manager incentives (Phillips, 2003; 
Rego and Wilson, 2009;Armstrong et al. 2010;Gaertner, 2013). Furthermore, 
studies suggest that firms with industry expert external auditors are more tax 
aggressive (McGuire et al. 2012) but firms that decrease or terminate the 
purchase of tax services from their auditors are less tax aggressive. In addition, 
aggressive tax planning is associated with family versus non-family ownership 
(Chen et al. 2010), institutional ownership (Khurana and Moser, 2013) and the 
extent of private versus public ownership (Badertscher et al. 2013). Moreover, 
U.S. multinational firms are more tax aggressive than domestic-only U.S. 
firms (Rego, 2003; Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009) and firms that are more tax 
aggressive generally have lower leverage (Graham and Tucker 2006; 
Lisowsky, 2010). Finally, firms are less aggressive when they have federal 
government contracts or strong labor union presence (Chyz et al. 2013). 
  
This study endeavors to add to our understanding of the drivers of tax 
aggressiveness and firm performance in China, by extending, integrating and 
enriching the lines of work. The governance and performance of Chinese firms 
necessitate more research attention as China emerges a global economic power 
(Wright, et al. 2005; Hu, Tam & Tan, 2009). Earlier research has investigated 
how these factors affect firm performance (Figure 3.2), but given the 
uncertainty of China's institutional transition, previous research have not 
captured some Chinese unique characteristics, therefore, we will incorporate 
these characteristics in our research design. 
 
 Figure 3. 2: Existing research 
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One of the significant differences is the mixed ownership of shares between 
Chinese listed firms those of in other countries. The dominant shareholding (in 
many cases, controlling shareholding is the state, regional or local government) 
in most listed firms exerts substantial control through voting rights as well as 
board representation, which helps shape the policies and strategies of the listed 
firms (Firth et al. 2006). State-owned enterprises (SOEs, from which listed 
firms was carved out) or private-owned enterprises (that are not controlled by 
a SOE or the state) are governed differently in China (Peng et al. 2004), and 
different objectives are faced by the different types of controlling shareholding. 
For example, a different set of control and monitoring mechanisms are 
employed by CEOs in SOEs and private-owned enterprises, resulting in 
different incentives on how to most effectively apply tax aggressiveness. 
Managers in SOEs have little incentive to operate from a profit maximization 
perspective (Wang & Judge, 2010), even if firm profitability is considered in 
the management objective, the insignificant weight assigned to managerial 
effort lead to little incentive to maximize profits and make efficient use of 
resources. It has been argued that efficient executive compensation is not 
extensively applied from a profit-maximization perspective in China (e.g. 
Fleisher, 2001) and use of poorly designed performance contracts with little or 
no incentive for managers has been accused of significant losses generated 
(Shirley & Xu, 2001).  
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Figure 3. 3: An integrative framework for this study 
 
 
Advancing this research, wedevelop an integrative framework (Figure 3.3) to 
examine the determinants and consequences of tax sheltering activitiesfrom 
the agency and institutional perspectives. As a result, to address an important 
and previously underexplored question: how do corporate governance issues 
affect tax aggressiveness of listed firms and thus their potential firm 
performance with different ownership type? Our research question is related to 
the call by Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Hanlon & Heitzman (2010) for 
further research on the drivers of cross-sectional variation in tax planning. The 
extension of the theoretical foundation of tax planning activities in a 
principal-agent setting should contribution to the growing literature that 
analyses the role of corporate governance in controlling tax aggressiveness. 
Tax panning can be complex and obscure which allows for managerial 
opportunism. Understanding the role that corporate governance plays in the 
case of an opportunity for managers' actions that benefit themselves versus 
shareholders can shed light on how corporate governance works. Meanwhile, 
there is significant uncertainty associated with tax planning which may not be 
immediately beneficial to performance of a firm, understanding how corporate 
governance is related to tax sheltering can provide an insight into how 
corporate governance works in the short-term as well as the long-term. 
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As we will discuss below, the empirical findings in the corporate governance 
and tax management literature, albeit mixed, generally suggest that strength of 
corporate governance should be negatively related to tax sheltering activity or 
mitigate financial reporting aggressiveness. These finding may imply that tax 
aggressiveness can be viewed on balance as an undesirable management 
behavior. However, it is not clear a priori that the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and tax aggressiveness should be so 
straightforward. As this is due to the fact that tax sheltering activities provide 
earning benefits and real cash flow to the firm, but may also incur associated 
costs that may outweigh these benefits if tax avoidance activities are too 
aggressive (See Section 3.1 for more detail). Therefore, it is possible that more 
effective monitoring responsibility by the corporate governance mechanisms 
could have a positive or negative impact on tax reporting aggressiveness, 
depending on the relative preference for tax sheltering of firm managers and 
shareholders (Moore, 2007). As Jimenez-Angueira (2007) propose that, 
shareholders have to employ controls and incentives, through corporate 
governance mechanisms in order to induce managers to tax position that 
would result in optimal profit-maximizing tax aggressiveness level where 
marginal benefits of tax-aggressiveness activities are balance against the costs 
of those transactions. Firms with strong corporate governance structure should 
be able to minimize their agency problems with respect to tax position and 
achieve the optimal level of tax aggressiveness by interests alignments of 
managers with those of shareholders, while firms with weak corporate 
governance have unresolved issues related to tax position could allow 
managers to take advantage of uncertainty with tax system and their 
informational advantage to engage in tax aggressiveness that are beneficial to 
their personal gains at the expense of shareholders' wealth. This point of view 
has been evidence in recent studies (e.g. Desai & Dharmapala, 2006, 2009; 
Moore, 2007). As a result, following the previous theoretical research, we can 
expect that firms that are poorly-governed to be very tax aggressive and firms that 
are well-governed merely to be optimally tax aggressive (see Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3. 4: Interaction between firms' corporate governance strength 
and tax aggressiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Corporate governance mechanisms employed in China 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of mechanisms employed to resolve the 
conflicts in a principal-agent setting, in order to better evaluate the current 
corporate governance practices in China. The importance of effective 
corporate governance has been emphasized by various academics. The 
corporate governance system can vary widely depending on the mechanisms 
firms employ to influence the managers and to promote alignment of their 
interests and those of managers.Prior studies suggest that a good corporate 
governance can serve as an effective mechanism to mitigate the opportunistic 
behaviors of management, effectively alleviate agency problems-especially the 
agency conflicts between the controlling and minority shareholders, protect 
shareholders and ensure that investors get a fair return on their investment 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Denis & McConnell, 2003; Gillan, 2006). Agood 
corporate governance is also indicative of a more transparency which makes 
income sheltering more difficult and thus can reduce tax sheltering (Desai, 
Dyck & Zingales, 2007).  
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Early economist Adam Smith (1727-1790) has proposed the issue of the 
separation of ownership and stewardship in joint-stock firms in his book 
named 'the wealth of nations', and Berle & Means (1932) further argues that 
managers of a firm pursue their own interests rather than interests of 
shareholders in practice. Berle & Means (1932) highlights that the nature of 
the firm as well as the principal-agent problems has called for the development 
of the agency approach to corporate finance. Thus, a set of effective 
mechanisms to resolve the conflicts is necessary. Another conflict of interest 
arises as controlling shareholders take actions to benefit themselves at the 
expense of minority shareholders. The term tunneling is applied by Johnson et 
al. (2000) to describe the transfer of resources out of firms for the benefit of 
controlling shareholders, which is a serious agency problem in emerging 
markets, evidenced from the Asian financial crisis. Tunneling is also possible 
in mature economies with the evidences of recent scandals of Enron, Global 
Crossing and WorldCom. 
  
Agency theory and the corporate governance literature identify and propose a 
range of devices to protect investors from the self-interested motivations of 
managers and controlling shareholders. The first category of corporate 
governance consists of internal mechanisms including ownership structure and 
control, characteristics and composition of the board of directors, executive 
compensation, and finance disclosure; the second are external mechanism 
including the effective external takeover market, the legal infrastructure and 
state regulatory system, and product market competition (Bai et al. 2004). 
Ownership structure is vital to the maximization of firm value, of the four 
internal mechanisms. Concentrated shareholders can exerts an overpowering 
influence to exploit resources of the firms for their personal interests at the 
expense of other shareholders. 
  
Some literature have centered on how corporate governance shapes the 
behaviors of the CEOs and top managers, for example, company ownership 
and board structure have been used to help explain decision of management in 
the area of corporate restructuring (Bauguess et al. 2009) and pricing of 
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executive stock option. Some studies have focused on how corporate 
governance has prevented managers from opportunistic behaviors in a firm's 
financial statement (Chung et al, 2002; Park & Shin, 2004), related-party 
transactions (Lo et al. 2010) and corporate fraud (Chen et al. 2006). Of course, 
it is worth to noting that as pointed out by Rediker & Seth (1995) that the 
broader connections among various governance mechanisms and their joint 
impacts are often ignored when studies on a single corporate governance 
mechanism. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) agree this point of view and further 
propose that interdependence of various governance mechanisms cannot be 
detected with a focus on a single governance mechanism. For example, 
Berglöf & Claessens (2006) provide evidence that ownership concentration 
might exert a substantial discretional power especially in countries with weak 
legal enforcement and regulatory environment. 
 
3.3.3 Internal governance mechanisms 
  
In terms of the agency theory, separation of ownership and control leads to 
divergent interests between managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Thus, it is crucial for board of directors to monitor managerial decision 
in order to ensure protection of interests of shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). However, according to existing literature, the central agency problem 
for listed firms under a concentrated ownership structure in emerging markets 
is the exploitation of minority interests by controlling stockholder (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997), is not the conflict between management and shareholders 
usually under a diffused ownership structure as argued by Berle & Means 
(1932). For example, excessive executive compensation, loan guarantees, 
dilution by new share issue, transactions such as asset sales and purchases, 
intercompany indebtedness, and purchases and sales of goods and services 
between the listed firm and the private business interests of the controlling 
shareholder may be done at prices that are disadvantageous to the small 
shareholders (Bai et al. 2004; Firth, Fund & Rui, 2008). Johnson et al. (2000) 
identify it as tunneling to describe the transfer of resources out of firms for the 
benefits of controlling shareholders.  
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Firms with concentrated ownership have the influential power to appoint 
managers to be representative of interests of controlling shareholders instead 
of having divergent interests. The conflict of interests between controlling and 
minority shareholders was exacerbated in China due to the fact shares of listed 
firms being split into tradable shares held by minority shareholders and 
non-tradable shares held by controlling shareholders (Zou et al. 2008; Yang, 
Chi & Young, 2011). The internal corporate governance from boards and audit 
committees can serves a monitoring role in restraint of tax sheltering activities. 
In the following section, we will discuss how the various internal governance 
mechanisms shape or constrain the opportunistic behaviors of managers in 
terms of tax management.  
 
3.3.4 Characteristics and composition of board of directors 
3.3.4.1 Board composition 
  
Previous literature examining the intersection between corporate governance 
and tax aggressiveness (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Chen et al. 2010; Hanlon 
& Slemrod, 2009) does not attempt to decompose corporate governance into 
its major mechanisms such as board of director. The extant literature provide 
little discussion about responsibilities of directors involved in terms of tax 
compliance and tax governance (Owens, 2008), despite that it have been 
recognized by tax authorities that the significance of the board as an internal 
control mechanism for reducing tax aggressiveness (Lanis & Richardson, 
2011). As a matter of fact, the board of directors is held accountable for the 
tax affairs of the firm; the role of board of directors in corporate governance is 
important with its fiduciary obligation to shareholders and its ultimate 
responsibility to provide monitoring and strategic direction (Owens, 2008).  
 
From an agency theory perspective, board of directors serves as the primary 
internal mechanism for constraining managers' opportunistic behaviors, which 
help to align interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1993). 
Traditionally, studies on corporate board of directors has focused on 
relationship between board structure and firm value (e.g. Peng, 2004; Chen et 
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al, 2006), while board size and the independence of board from the 
management (e.g. Brick et al, 2006), the role of CEO duality (e.g. Goyal & 
Park, 2002), theoretical aspects of board structure (e.g. Raheja, 2005; Harris & 
Raviv, 2008) as well as evolution of board structure (Berry et al. 2006) play 
essential role in the literature to date.  
  
Shareholders can exert influence through the board of directors on managers' 
behaviors in order to ensure their interests being protected by the firm. 
However, this influence may be less effective especially when managers are in 
the domination of the board (Bai et al. 2004). Furthermore, a firm's board 
composition can be significantly influenced by its ownership structure, for 
example, large or controlling shareholders employ a variety of governance 
mechanism to exert tight control at expense of minority shareholders. 
Controlling SOEs can assign the CEOs or chairmen of listed firms to ensure 
their representatives on the board, which is particularly for listed firms with no 
independent nomination committees where SOEs can exert significant 
influence through economic or political power (Lin, Lu & Zhang, 2012). 
However, this practice significantly compromises corporate board 
independence (Liu & Lu, 2007) but provides a scope for controlling 
shareholders to pursue their own interests/objectives or to expropriate minority 
shareholders via tunneling (e.g. Johnson et al.2000; Claessens et al. 2000; 
Friedman et al. 2003; Liu & Lu, 2007; Lo et al. 2010; Lin, Lu & Zhang, 
2012).  
  
It is well evidenced that the board composition such as the board size and 
percentage of insiders on the board) can influence the effectiveness of 
monitoring, despite the fact that there are competing views as to how 
composition of the board affects monitoring which in turn affects the firm 
performance. Earlier literature show that firms with larger boards along with 
more inside directors lead to agency problems compared to firms with small 
boards and a higher percentage of outside directors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1991; Yermack, 1996; Core et al.1999), although recent studies document the 
vague connections between board composition and firm performance, which 
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varies with characteristics of the company (e.g. Coles et al, 2008). Relating the 
literature to the research question at hand, it is possible that it is possible that 
small boards may be more active in making decisions in terms of diverting 
resources to tax management (Park & Shin, 2004; Minnick & Noga, 2010).  
 
 
3.3.4.2 Independent directors   
 
' Guideline on the introducing independent directors to the board of directors 
of Chinese listed companies' was issued by the CSRC in August 2001 in order 
to improve the level of corporate governance of Chinese listed firms and offer 
better protection for minority investor. The guidelines are mandatory and 
require all listed firm in China to have at least two independent directors on 
their boards by 30 June 2002, and at least of one-third of independent directors 
by 30 June 2003. The independent directors on the board of directors can be 
viewed as a complement to the board of supervisors owing to the voting rights 
of independent directors on financial and managerial decisions in terms of 
M&A activities, related-party transactions, information disclosure and 
financial statements (Yang, Chi & Young, 2011).  
  
Independent directors perform an essential monitoring function in listed firms, 
they are viewed as having greater incentives than inside directors and more 
likely to employ their professional expertise and experiences (Beasley, 1996) 
to be effective in monitoring of management in order for their reputation 
preserve (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Board independence is supposed to provide 
defense against the explorative behaviors by the controlling shareholders and 
directors (Hu, Tam & Tan, 2009). Different definition of 'independence have 
been adopted by codes of corporate governance around the world, a common 
view of independence is defined by Mallin (2007: p102) as having 'no 
relationships or circumstances which could affect the director's judgment.' 
  
Empirical studies have demonstrated that independent directors are associated 
with greater monitoring and are an effective corporate governance mechanism 
and in developed countries (e.g. Beasley, 1996;Hermalin&Weisbach, 2003, 
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Peasnell, et al. 2005). However, existing studies provided mixed results on the 
effects of independent directors in China. Kato & Long (2006a) and Fan et al. 
(2007) reported that independent directors are positively correlated with CEO 
monitoring, in contrast, Qiu & Yao (2009) report limits on the effectiveness of 
independent directors and Liao et al. (2009a) report about 14 percent of 
independent directors are politically connected, which suggest that outside 
directors are not really independent. Liao et al. (2009b) further document that 
only in the case that board size in Chinese listed firms is effective only in the 
case that implement board independent by adding extra member instead of 
removing inside directors.  
  
Relating the literature to the research question at hand, it is possible that 
independent directors is effective in tax management from the knowledge of 
their own industry experience and expertise, and is willing to divert resources 
to tax management as a means of ensuring good firm performance (Peasnell et 
al. 2005; Klein, 2006; Firth et al. 2007a.b; Minnick & Noga, 2010). Lanis & 
Richardson (2011) provide empirical evidence that a higher percentage of 
outsider independent directors on the board of directors are negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of tax aggressiveness, it further suggests that 
more independent boards with its improved corporate governance discourage 
tax aggressiveness. Sarkar et al. (2008) suggest that is not the board 
independence but rather quality of board that is important for opportunistic tax 
management; its results show that diligent boards are associated with lower 
earning manipulation, while CEO-duality and presence of controlling 
shareholders on the board increase the probability of opportunistic behaviors.  
 
 
3.3.4.3 CEO duality 
 
It indicates that CEO of a firm also serves as chairman of the board of 
directors. From an agency theory, for board of directors to be an effective 
monitoring function, the separation of the positions of CEO and chairman of 
board of directors is essential in terms of an effective internal corporate 
governance mechanism (Cohen et al. 2002). CEO duality does have its 
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advantages of giving CEO multiple perspectives on the firm and empowering 
CEO to act with determination however, Such dual CEO-chairman system 
allows for little transparency of the CEO's behaviors and often yields 
considerable power over the operation and governance of firms (Ryan & 
Wiggins, 2001), their power to control often lead to self-interested 
decision-making at the expense of the outside shareholders. CEO duality may 
often lead to corporate fraud and corruptions due to lack of internal control 
checks for these two most powerful positions in the corporate decision-making 
process (Lin & Liu, 2009) 
  
Before privatization in China, SOEs didn't have board of directors and 
therefore CEOs were appointed and supervised by the state (Yang, Chi & 
Young, 2011), as a result, many CEOs of listed firms currently are strongly 
politically connected owing to the state in control of majority of listed firms 
directly or indirectly, which is evidenced by Fan et al (2007) that 
approximately 25 percent of CEOs were previously or are currently 
government officers. It is evidenced that whether the CEOs can also serve as 
the chairman of the board is an issue based on the Chinese Company Law or 
CSRC regulation (Yang, Chi & Young, 2011).  
  
Based on agency literature (Jensen and Mackling, 1976), weak corporate 
governance structure can result in diverse agency costs, meanwhile with 
separation of ownership and control, manager have incentive to distract 
corporate resources for their own benefits at the expense of shareholders. 
Agency problems are more severe when managers have a strong influence 
over board member and it is more likely when with CEO duality and when the 
board is mostly composed of insiders (Li et al. 2007), which is particularly 
crucial in Chinese listed firms given the dominance of executive directors. For 
example, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) propose that CEO compensation is mainly 
driven by rents extraction through CEO power and by failure in corporate 
governance; it is argued that most highly compensated CEOs have the ability 
to set their own pay through captured boards and remuneration committees. 
Therefore, As implied by the studies such as Masulis et al. (2007), Sarkar et 
 74 
 
al.(2008), Minnick & Noga (2010), firms with CEO duality will be more 
likely associated with  lower firm value and returns, a feature of which will 
be have less tax expenses and as a result less tax management.  
  
  
3.3.5 Ownership and Control 
3.3.5.1 Ownership structure of listed companies in China 
 
Of the four internal governance mechanisms, ownership structure is vital to 
the maximization of firm value. It can be argued that a concentrated ownership 
structure allows the largest shareholders to exert overpowering influences to 
take advantage of resources of firms for their personal interests at the expense 
of other shareholders. A study conducted by Claessens et al. (2000) further 
evidence that the presence of pyramidal and cross-holding ownership is 
common in Asian economies. This ownership structure facilitates tunneling 
much easier as it gives the controlling shareholders substantial discretionary 
power to acquire even more control for minimal capital expense. 
  
Chinese listed firms operate under a very unique ownership structure which 
makes them different from Western developed economies. For most listed 
firms in China, there usually exist three categories of shareholders: the state, 
the legal persons (institutions) and individual investors (including employees, 
domestic and foreign individuals), and on average, each group holding about 
one-third share of companies, resulting in only around 35 percent of total 
shares being freely tradable (Wei & Geng, 2008). In contrast, management 
ownership is much lower in China, averaging only 0.03 percent (Xia & Zhu, 
2009). For shares held by the former two groups of shareholders, they are 
non-tradable, and for shares held by individual investors, they are publicly 
tradable in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, including A share, B 
share, where tradable A share on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange 
refer to those are traded in Chinese currency RMB and are owned by Chinese 
domestic institutions or individual residents but are prohibited to be owned by 
foreign investors while the B share on the shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
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exchanges are traded in foreign currencies, in Shenzhen B shares are usually 
traded in HK dollar whereas in Shanghai they are traded in U.S. dollar. 
InitiallyB-shares were available exclusively tosome authorized domestic 
securities firms and foreign investors. Since 2001, domestic individuals were 
allowed to invest in B-shares. As foreign investors who buy B shares are not 
directly involved in the preparation of the company or the company operation 
and management, they become shareholders only through the subscription to 
these issued tradable shares. Meanwhile, foreign shareholders can change 
frequently the proportion of foreign shares due to free transferring of shares 
and high liquidity of the stock, as a result, B share companies are regarded as 
foreign-invested companies, they were not subject to the 'Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Income Tax ofEnterprises with Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Enterprises', instead being subject to the 'ProvisionalRegulations on 
Enterprise Income Tax' with a tax rate of 33 percent prior to 
theimplementation of the new company income tax law in 2008. In practice, 
these companies are still eligible for some preferential taxtreatment, for 
example their real tax rate was 15 percent, due to tax exemptions, or the 
so-calledpreferential policy of financial returns, from the income tax granted 
by local governments.  
 
A dominant feature of share ownership in China is the non-tradable state 
shareholding, either through direct investment or indirectly through holdings 
of domestic institutions (subsequently named legal persons) many of which in 
turn are partially or wholly owned by the central government or local 
authorities. This feature is the product of an ongoing process of partial 
privatization and corporatization of former SOEs which was initiated with the 
start of the economic reform process in 1978 but has gathered pace in recent 
years (Gunasekarageet al. 2007). This distinctive ownership structure, together 
with the influential state ownership which is non-tradable, provides a 
particular environment to test the relationship between ownership structure 
and tax aggressiveness. The figure 3.5 below shows the ownership structure of 
a typical listed company in China.  
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Figure 3. 5: Typical Chinese-listed company ownership structure 
 
Source: Wei & Geng (2008) 
  
 
3.3.5.2 State and Institutional Ownership 
 
There is a wide range of previous research studying the association between 
ownership structure and firm performance. Currently, much research focuses 
on the behaviors of controlling shareholders. The nature of corporate 
governance problems varies significantly among publicly listed firms with and 
without a controlling shareholder (La Porta et al. 1998; Bebchuk et al.2009). 
La Porta et al. (1998) point out that ownership is heavily concentrated in 
developing economies and Holderness (2003) reports that insiders control 
approximately 20 percent of the ownership of listed firms in the U.S. context. 
Claessens et al. (2000) reports that more than two-thirds of firms are 
controlled by a dominating shareholder in East Asian countries and 
family-controlled firms are very common; meanwhile, it is evidenced by 
Faccio et al. (2001) that ownership controlled by family in East Asia results in 
severe conflicts with other stakeholders and poor firm performance. However, 
Denis & McConnell (2003) argues that concentrated ownership is often 
positively related to firm value and that it can monitor and control to minimize 
agency costs. Anderson and Reeb (2003) further conclude that family owned 
firms perform better than non-family owned firms in the case of well regulated 
and transparent markets.  
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Two major problems have arisen with Chinese unique ownership structure. 
The first issue is associated with the one-dominant controlling shareholder 
phenomenon. The stock market in China has been criticized for market 
manipulation by controlling shareholders and highly speculation by extensive 
insider dealings, and the consequent agency conflicts have been evidences by 
the cases of corporate scandals. In China where interests of minority 
shareholders are exploited by controlling shareholders by the way of 
misrepresentation of financial statements as well as related party transactions 
(Hu, Tam & Tan, 2009; Lo et al. 2010). Empirical studies have frequently 
discovered the exploration of interests of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders in China as well as East Asian countries (Claessens et al. 2002; 
Tam & Tan, 2007). The second issue is related to the consequences of 
inefficient state ownership, a high degree of state shareholding is often found 
in transformed SOEs in China, exiting literature have shown that state 
shareholding does not produce superior firm values but is often associated 
with to efficiency (Bai et al. 2004; Yiu et al. 2005; Ding et al. 2007), which 
can be attributed to social and economic objectives of state shareholders in 
addition to firms' goal of profit maximization, weakening the monitoring role 
of the board. However, the relationship between state shareholding and firm 
value is not such simple and non-linear relationship is present, it is argued that 
firm's value increases when the state shareholding reaches a certain threshold 
(Liu & Lu, 2007; Tian & Estrin, 2007; Lin, Ma & Su, 2009; Qiu & Yao, 2009), 
although Chen, Firth & Xu (2009) find the present of an alignment effect: the 
larger the shareholding of the largest shareholders, the better the firm's 
performance.  
  
In China, as discussed above, the state and legal persons are likely to be the 
major shareholders, and the majority of publicly listed firms are 
state-controlled. Most of China's state-owned enterprises on the stock market 
are not very efficient, either during the IPO stage or the after-market stage 
(Chen, 2004) and the presence of domestic shareholders can improve firm 
performance. Prior studies have examined the relationship between state 
ownership and firm performance as measured by Tobin's Q in China, and 
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suggest the level of direct state shareholding has a negative effect on firm 
performance while the legal-person shareholding has a positive effect on firm 
performance (Xu and Wang, 1999; Hovey et al. 2003), which points to the 
need for a retreat of state ownership in public firms. It is worth noting that 
legal person shareholders tend to have strong state-related roots, are mostly 
often state-owned but with a mass of private investors. When the state controls 
the company, it is not surprising that state-controlling owners and authorities 
sit on most board seats, and is unlikely to find a director representing minority 
shareholders. It can be argued that guan-xi (personal relationships) still plays 
an important role in business practices in China, therefore the possible 
explanation of this phenomenon is that local authorities and government can 
use their guan-xi to influence both the market and firms can benefit from the 
services provided by them in creating economic rents and enforcing 
transactions (Claessens & Fan, 2002). 
   
It is also of importance to distinguish types of state-controlled firms due to the 
complex ownership structure. Different state-owned entities and government 
agencies hold the state-controlled shareholding and are faced with different 
objectives. Following the study of Cao et al. (2011), two categories of 
state-controlled firms can be classified on the basis of their ultimate 
controlling shareholders: state assets management bureaus (SAMBs), and 
SOEs. SAMB is a government agency responsible for controlling and 
managing and state owned assets but with no cash flow rights from the shares 
they hold, therefore, dividends as well as other payouts by firms are remitted 
directly to the local governments or Ministry of Finance (Firth et al. 2006). As 
a result, objectives of less emphasis on profit maximization as well as share 
price maximization make it low incentive to monitor the listed firms. 
Meanwhile, executive compensation scheme is not purely performance-based 
as CEOs work as the representative of the government in SAMB-controlled 
firms. In contrast, the publicized objective for SOEs-controlled firms is to 
maximize the firm's value and incentivize management and receive dividends 
from their investment. SOEs may be subject to the tunneling incentive, (e.g. 
Claessen et al. 2000; Bai et al. 2004; Liu & Lu, 2007; Lo et al. 2010), that is, 
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controlling shareholders' incentive to tunnel firm value by expropriation of 
minority shareholders, as many of listed firms in China are spin-offs of 
carve-outs from large SOEs and the parent SOEs demand significant returns to 
finance their unprofitable units (Liu & Lu, 2007). 
 
 
3.3.5.3 Ownership concentration and tax aggressiveness 
 
The degree of ownership concentration is the first institutional factor we will 
consider. Ownership concentration has the prominent influences on reduction 
in information asymmetry and improvement in corporate governance 
effectives (Shlerfer & Vishny, 1997). However, it is also argued by Shlerfer & 
Vishny (1997) that concentrated ownership structure may lead to 
expropriations of other stakeholders by the largest shareholder, and Berglöf & 
Claessens (2006) argue that ownership concentration might exert a substantial 
discretionary power especially in countries with weaker legal enforcement and 
regulatory environment. The majority of listed firms in China have a 
one-dominant shareholder and the more share they own the greater their 
influence on corporation decisions.  
  
Prior research summarizes that higher ownership concentration is associated 
with higher leverage and large private benefits of control, lower cash holdings 
and lower dividends (e.g. Dyck and Zingales 2004; Khan, 2006). On the one 
hand, it is argued that firms in countries with higher ownership concentration 
may be more tax aggressive because large shareholders can effectively 
monitor and incentivize managers to generate more tax savings, such as in the 
case of Khurana and Moser (2013) studying U.S. firms with higher 
institutional ownership which also have higher ownership concentration tend 
to be generally more tax aggressive. On the other hand, in contrast, firms in 
countries with higher ownership concentration may be less tax aggressiveness, 
may due to the costs involved such as implementation costs and agency costs, 
as mentioned above, in the U.S. context, Chen et al. (2010) reports that 
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family-owned firms with higher ownership concentration are less tax 
aggressive than non-family-owned firms.  
 
 
3.3.5.4 Institutional ownership and tax aggressiveness 
 
Academics, practitioners and regulators have witnessed a dramatic increase 
over the past 20 years in the difference between financial accounting income 
reported to the investors and taxable income reported to the government. 
Meanwhile, academics have further noted that the increased differences are 
due to firms' aggressive tax planning, which has led to a call for examining 
various aspects of tax aggressiveness including the role of ownership structure 
in the willingness of firms to avoid taxes (Shackelford & Shevlin 2001). 
However, Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) point out that little is known about 
the cross-sectional variations in the willingness of firms to undertake 
aggressive tax practices to minimize taxes; they further point out that 
ownership structure is one of organizational features that are probably 
important but an understudied factor that influences aggressive tax planning 
undertaken by firms. 
  
In the US context, Badertscher et al. (2013) find that firms with substantial 
private equity ownership (In his study, private equity firms are generally 
organized as limited partnerships that manage investment funds that generally 
buy mature businesses via leveraged buyout or management buyout 
transactions and take them private, usually these portfolio firms which are 
taken private are referred as 'PE-backed' firms engage in significantly greater 
tax aggressive behavior than non-private equity firms. Chen et al.(2010) find 
that family-controlled firms, which have higher ownership concentrations, are 
less tax aggressive than other firms. In the study of Moore (2012) that 
investigates the impact of institutional ownership on the level and time-series 
variability in book-tax differences, he provides evidence that institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with varied types of book-tax differences 
and is consistent with the role of higher levels of institutional ownership that 
plays in the effective monitoring of management. In contrast, Khurana and 
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Moser (2013) find that U.S. firms with higher levels of short-term institutional 
ownership, which also have higher ownership concentrations, are generally 
more tax aggressive. However, firms with higher institutional investors with 
longer-term investment horizons are less tax aggressive.  
  
Shleifer and Vishney (1986) propose that institutional investors by virtue of 
their large shareholdings and voting power play an essential role in 
disciplining, influencing and monitoring managers which can force managers 
to concentrate on economic performance and evade opportunities for 
self-serving behaviors, furthermore, to ensure that firms make corporate 
decisions that will maximize shareholder wealth (Bushee, 2001; David et al. 
2001).  
  
Prior research provides mixed empirical evidences on the effect ofinstitutional 
ownership on firm behaviors. Several studies such as McConell and Servaes 
(1990) document a positive relationship between firm performance and the 
percentage share ownership of institutional investors, whereas studies by 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Parrino et al. (2003) report no relation 
between corporate performance and institutional shareholdings applying 
accounting and stock return measures. In terms of the relation of the 
institutional ownership with the quality of financial reports, Chung et al. (2002) 
emphasizes earning management and managers in firms with greater 
institutional ownership are prevented from fully pursuing opportunistic 
earnings through discretionary accruals and Ajinkya et al. (2005) study 
voluntary disclosures and report that firms are more likely to issue  more 
specific, accurate, and less optimistically biased forecasts when institutions 
own a large percentage of shares outstanding.  
  
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of institutions to monitor managers is 
also mixed. On the one hand, it is argued that institutional shareholders can 
effectively discipline and monitor managers to ensure maximization of 
long-term firm value by discouraging tax aggressiveness, mainly due to 
differences in risk preferences between shareholders with large stakes in the 
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firm and shareholders with more diversified portfolios (Chen et al. 2010). 
These agency conflicts lead to higher leverage which may substitute for tax 
aggressiveness (Givoly et al. 1992). This view is also supported by Del 
Guercio (1996) that several types of prudent shareholder standards may 
influence firms to be less tax aggressive to avoid future costs and Bushee 
(1998) that managers are deterred from reducing research and development 
expenditures in quarters in case of firms failing to meet short-term earning 
goals when institutions own a large percentage of shares outstanding. On the 
other hand, institutional shareholders may monitor managers more closely and 
influence firms to be more tax aggressive in an effort to maximize after-tax 
cash flows and after-tax earnings. For example, Laverty (1996) finds that 
institutional shareholders with a focus on short-term performance may 
influence managers to make decisions to boost short-term earnings. However, 
as pointed out by Chen et al. (2010) that tax aggressiveness may not increase 
firm value; it can result in tax savings but also expose a firm to potential 
penalties imposed by the IRS which entails implementation costs as well as 
agency costs.  
 
Therefore, there are conflicting predictions on how institutional ownership can 
affect tax aggressiveness and it remains an open empirical question whether 
greater institutional ownership affects tax aggressiveness.  
 
 
3.3.6 Incentive contracts and manager equity incentives 
 
Another major issue of corporate governance is that of determining the levels 
of the compensation of senior management teams, and the means by which 
they are made. As this study will develop a simple theoretical framework that 
embeds the tax sheltering decisions within managerial agency context in China 
and emphasizes the significance of the factors determining the interaction 
between tax sheltering and incentive compensation and corporate governance 
arrangements, in this section, we briefly review these literatures, emphasizing 
recent studies that are most closely related to our study. 
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There are at least two views of executive compensation in the literature. The 
'optimal contracting view' that considers executive compensation 
arrangements as the product of arm's length contracting between executives 
and boards; as a result the contracting provides efficient incentives for 
reducing agency problems (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010). As a result, a strong 
positive association between executive compensation and firm performance 
can be predicted from the perspective of optimal contracting approach as 
managers have less control in determining their compensation. An alternative 
'managerial power view' raises the questions about whether the so-called 
compensation arrangements are the product of arm‘s length contracting and 
argue that such arrangements as part of the agency problem itself rather than 
as a solution to it (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003, 2004). 
  
Incentive alignment between managers and shareholders rely heavily on the 
use of equity-based payment including stock and option-based holdings to 
align interests of managers, however, tax rules include both personal and 
corporate taxes have the potential to influence the nature of optimal 
contracting and hence the power of managerial incentives by changing the mix 
between the nature of incentives (stock vs. options), cash and incentives (cash 
vs. stock),  and the timing of compensation (deferred benefit plans vs. current 
compensation) (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006) which raise the attention of board 
of directors. For example, personal and corporate taxes can affect the choice 
among non-qualified and incentive stock option and the decision to defer cash 
payment compensation (Hanlon, & Heitzman, 2010). Personal taxes can affect 
insiders' decision to divest equity shareholding at all or through a sale or gift. 
Moreover, measuring portfolio incentives on a pre-tax basis would differ that 
of after-tax basis since different tax rates are applied to stock and option gains. 
Prior research provides evidence that equity-based compensation is associated 
with managerial risk-taking, in particular in terms of financing and investing 
decisions (Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al. 2006).  
 
Despite the high returns for shareholders are associated with risky tax 
planning or corporate tax aggressiveness, there can be significant costs 
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involved which increase the risk of engaging in such transactions. For example, 
Wilson (2009) find that interest charges paid by firms to tax authorities 
account for 40 percent of tax savings in 14 cases of tax sheltering transactions 
and there may be reputational penalties for firms if their participation in a tax 
shelter becomes public. 
  
Therefore, in the absence of equity-based incentives, there will be significant 
difference in risk preference, for example, risk-neural shareholders are in 
preference of positive NPV tax strategies to being undertaken by managers, 
while risk-averse managers are more likely to engage in less risky tax planning 
(Rego & Wilson, 2012). If firms use incentive contracts to align incentives of 
managers with those of shareholders, it can be predicted that greater 
equity-based incentives will induce manager to undertake risky but positive 
NPV projects and to be more aggressive to increase firm value via tax 
sheltering activities. Few prior studies examine the relationship between 
corporate tax aggressiveness and executive compensation practices, these 
studies investigates the determinants of the level of total compensation and 
whether equity-based incentives influence managers' investment and financing 
decisions. 
 
The growth of equity-based incentive compensation is among the most notable 
developments in recent years and a mass of literature has investigated on its 
determinants and effects. Mehran (1995) studies the advantages of incentive 
compensation and reports that firms with a higher presence of outside 
independent directors on the board are more likely to apply incentive 
compensation which in turn improves firm performance. In contrast, 
researchers are concerned about the potentially negative effects of the 
application of greater incentive compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003), 
Erickson et al. (2003) report that the possibility of firm's accounting fraud 
increase significantly with the use of equity-based incentive compensation by 
study the sample of firms that were accused for accounting fraud by the SEC 
during 1996-2004 .  
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Shackelford et al. (2007) develop a simple model of how taxes influence the 
firms' accounting decisions; they identify at least two reasons of the 
importance of accounting information to managers. firstly, incentive 
compensation contracts rely on firms' accounting information including 
after-tax net income; secondly, if it is difficult to distinguish between low 
earnings arising from tax planning that leads to increase in cash from at the 
expense of earning as compared to from pure poor profitability, then managers 
are not willing to minimize actual taxes paid, which indicate that managers 
may not engage in tax aggressiveness that would reduce their expected 
compensation. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) more directly study the impact of 
taxes on designing incentive compensation contracts to align managers' 
interest with those of shareholders, in order to so, They state that ''it may be 
appropriate for the tax officer's salary to depend (inversely) on the effective 
tax rate achieved'' (p. 1595), which means that compensation schemes can be 
designed by directly or indirectly incorporating tax costs into them.  
 
In recent empirical studies that directly investigate the link between various 
measures of tax management such as tax aggressiveness and non-compliance 
and compensation at different level of management positions (such as CEOs) 
in the firm, Phillips (2003) finds greater effectiveness of tax planning and 
lower effective tax rates is associated directly with that compensating division 
managers directly (but not CEOs) on an after-tax basis. Hanlon et al. (2005) 
see that the level of equity incentives from exercisable stock option is 
positively related to proposed IRS deficiencies, and Erickson et al. (2006) find 
equity-based incentives are positively related to non-compliance. 
  
Slemrod (2004) develops a model that shareholders choose the level of tax 
aggressiveness by linking compensation of tax managers with stock price or 
effective tax rates and further suggest that corporate tax noncompliance could 
be the product of incentive compensation plans. However, the problem with 
type of incentive compensation is that inappropriate aggressive actions by tax 
managers entail a ''hidden action'' (Crocker and Slemrod, 2004) that 
shareholders cannot either observe whether managers are engaging in illegal 
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tax evasion or  legal tax planning or to adjust the compensation scheme until 
the firm is penalized. 
  
In addition, in the most recently work, Rego and Wilson (2012) study 
relationship between compensation of CEOs and CFOs and tax reporting 
aggressiveness as well as its relationship to firm performance, they find a 
positive association between incentive compensation and aggressive tax 
reporting but they find no evidence that tax aggressive is the result of weak 
governance or results in deteriorating future firm performance. In a follow-up 
study, Rego and Wilson (2012) find a positive association between the level of 
CEO and CFO equity-risk incentives and corporate tax aggressiveness, after 
control for firm performance and board of directors' characteristics. Armstrong 
et al. (2012) directly investigate the interaction between the incentives of tax 
directors and their measures of tax sheltering, and find that incentives of tax 
directors are significantly negatively associated with financial effective tax 
rate which implies that such incentives might induce them to produce a 
favorable influence on the financial statements. 
  
In contrast, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a model linking tax 
aggressiveness and equity-based compensation and document an ambiguous 
effect of managers' compensation on tax planning activities. On the one hand, 
higher-powered compensation schemes directly induce managers to engage in 
tax planning activities in order to increase after-tax firm value; On the other 
hand, high-powered incentives prevent manager‘s opportunism that may be 
complementary with tax sheltering, which reduce tax avoidance activities. 
Generally, they find that increased incentives result in less tax sheltering and 
suggest that the role of quality of corporate governance that play in this 
relationship. As equity-based incentives align managerial interests with those 
of shareholders, it is expected that managers are provided with such incentive 
to reduce rent diversion that can accompany aggressive tax sheltering. 
Moreover, their model are tested across well-governed and weak-governed 
firms and argue the presence of complementarities between rent extraction and 
tax sheltering which imply that better governed firms will be associated with 
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more tax sheltering behaviors. Although equity incentives can motivate 
managers to increase tax sheltering, they conclude that interest alignment of 
managers with those of shareholders by incentive compensation reduces 
opportunistic tax sheltering. As a result, the relationship between tax 
sheltering and equity-based compensation is theoretically ambiguous. 
  
In a similar vein, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) examine the effects of the 
measures of tax sheltering on firm valuation. They predict that governance 
arrangements of firms should be an important factor in determining managers' 
efforts to avoid corporate taxes, in consistent with their prediction, they find 
that better-governed firms is associated with greater impact of tax sheltering 
on firms value, and suggest that the simple view of corporate tax sheltering as 
a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete given the 
inherent agency problems. The result is robust to a wide range of control 
variables and different extensions to the model. 
  
While the research's predictions for the effect of higher-powered incentives on 
tax sheltering are ambiguous, the effect of managerial incentives on tax 
sheltering is an empirical question. 
 
 
3.3.6.1 Executive compensation in China 
 
Compensation policies chosen by board of directors can play an important role 
in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. In general, publicly 
listed firms are managed by executives rather than directors or shareholders, 
the decisions made by executives are influenced by monitoring of shareholders 
as well as by the incentives provided by the way of executive compensation 
arrangements, including salary, bonuses, perquisites and stock-based 
incentives. Tirole (2006) suggests the increasing sensitivity of compensation 
to performance since the early 1980s and that stock options are becoming the 
most prevalent component of CEO compensation in the U.S, which is also 
supported by the evidence from other developed economies (e.g.Bryan et al. 
2002).  
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In Chinese listed firms, compensation plans for directors are determined by the 
board and approved at shareholder meetings, while the compensation scheme 
for CEOs are currently designed by the board of directors (Yang, Chi &Young, 
2011). Before the economic reforms began in the 1978,  managers of SOEs 
were representatives of government with their appointment were completely 
controlled by communist party bureaucrats and administrative, and 
compensation was determined by manager's ranking within the civil service; 
there was no incentive scheme to motive managers of SOEs nor were 
managers allowed to the profit-sharing scheme generated by the enterprises, 
all profits made by the enterprises were repatriated to the state (Firth et al. 
2006). As a result, there was fairly small pay differential between CEOs and 
workers (see Qian, 1995; Zheng, 1998). 
  
More incentive reward systems were introduced to SOEs since the early 1990s 
and the most popular system was CEO's compensation that consists of a cash 
salary and a performance bonus(Firth et al. 2006), although the bonus system 
was not sufficiently flexible in practice due to the fact that method of bonus 
payment was not clearly defined and the formula for determining payment was 
not disclosed. Article 52, Section 6, Chapter 3 of 'The code of corporate 
governance for listed companies in China', which was issued by the CSRC on 
7 January 2002, requires listed firms to establish remuneration committee 
(CSRC, 2002a). Chinese listed firms have been encouraged to adopt a more 
practical performance-based approach (CSRC, 2002a, Articles 69–72, Section 
1, and Chapter 5 of the code). 
  
However, it is worth noting that executive stock option schemes which are in 
the design of long term incentive systems that align the interests of managers 
and investorsintroduced in Chinese firms are relatively few (Li et al. 2008), 
and the lack of stock options as a reward mechanism is exacerbated by the 
very low shareholding by top executives CEOs (Firth et al. 2007).  
  
With the establishment State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003, many regulations have 
been released to evaluate SEO performance and tie this to CEO compensation. 
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In particular, ‗Interim regulations on the evaluation of the top executive 
operating performance‘ in SOEs affiliated to the central government (SOECGs) 
was promulgated by SASAC in 2003, which stipulated that the design of top 
executive pay should be on the basis of total sales and profits and described 
how to evaluate executive performance. SASAC update this regulation in 
2006 and 2010 by adding some extra rules such as the punishment of top 
executives when they were underperforming. SASAC announced two 
'supplementary provisions' of this regulation in 2007 and 2008 which made 
further efforts on alignment of executive pay to firm performance in 
SOEs.Obviously, the aims of these regulations and reforms of executive 
compensation in SOE controlled firms are at aligning the interests of managers 
with those of shareholders, in practice, it has been enacted by SASAC that 
profitability should be the primary measure of firm performance as to which 
CEO pay should be linked. Meanwhile,  'Instructions on regulating top 
executive ‗on-job‘ consumptions in SOECGs' was issued by SASAC in 2006 
in order to prevent CEOs from expropriation of shareholder wealth through 
excessive perquisites. 
  
CEO compensation with its positive effects on firm performance in developed 
countries has been recognized as an effective corporate governance 
mechanism, although a body of studies regarding performance-based 
approaches have provided mixed empirical results and inconclusive evidence 
on the effect of incentive-based compensation on firm performance in China 
(e.g. Mengistae & Xu, 2004; Liu & Otsuka, 2004; Firth et al. 2006, 2007a.b; 
Kato & Long, 2006b;Rui et al. 2006). Kato and Long (2006b) find top 
executives' compensation is significantly associated with shareholders' value 
as well as sales growth rate in China. Rui et al. (2006) document that CEO 
compensation is significantly correlated with return on assets rather than stock 
returns, although this relationship mainly holds in firms with foreign 
shareholding and in firms with dominant state shareholding. In addition, CEOs 
are more compensated in firms with foreign shareholding than firms with 
highly concentrated ownership and high government shareholding, which may 
illustrate a tendency for foreign shareholders to be more pro-active in 
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soliciting the best available managers in the market so that the remuneration is 
higher. However, Mengistae and Xu (2004) find little evidence of a 
relationship between performance and compensation and Liu and Otsuka 
(2004) also argue that the new incentive system has not brought the expected 
improvements in productivity, while Firth et al. (2006) argue that CEO 
compensation policy can be more applied as a device to achieve the objective 
of dominant shareholders under concentrated ownership structure, but find that 
on average the sensitivity of pay to performance is low, which raises questions 
about the effectiveness of incentive systems in China. Firth et al (2007a) find 
that different objectives on the application of CEOs incentive compensation 
for the different types of controlling shareholders, and suggest that a lower 
CEO compensation is associated with firms with substantial government 
ownership than private-owned enterprises or firm with higher private 
ownership and the magnitude of the incentives is too small to be effective. 
However, as Tian & Estrin (2007) indicate that, most of available perquisites 
such as dinning, transportation housing provision and entertainment for a 
senior manager's family are not reported as part of the annual income.  
 
 
3.3.6.2 Executive compensation and tax aggressiveness 
 
The corporate governance view of taxation yield the distinct prediction that 
the characteristics of a tax system will affect managerial action and hence the 
extent of the agency problem, in addition, managers may capture benefits of 
tax sheltering as tax shelters may not indicate a simple transfer of resources 
from the state to shareholders (Desai & Dharmapala, 2008).  
 
Consistent with the agency cost view of tax aggressiveness, the simple 
intuition is that shareholders prefer managers to avoid taxes and engage in tax 
sheltering and managers once their incentive are sufficiently aligned with 
those of managers, which has resulted in increasing incentive compensation 
and increased levels of tax sheltering over past years (Desai & Dharmapala, 
2009). For example, several studies argue that tax sheltering serves as a 
substitute for interest deductions in choosing capital structure or as proxies for 
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similar tax reduction techniques (Graham & Tucker, 2006), it would be only 
true if corporate tax minimization activities were costless. 
  
However, Several studies have indicated that market reaction of tax sheltering 
appear not to be in line with this view, For example, Desai and Hines (2002) 
study determinants of corporate inversions or expatriations by making the U.S. 
parent company becomes a subsidiary and the foreign subsidiary become the 
parent company, although inversions are presumably motivated by tax saving, 
market reactions are not typically positive. Similarly, Hanlon & Slemrod 
(2009) investigate stock price reactions to news reports about firms' tax 
sheltering activities, and find little evidence but a small negative reaction to 
news about tax sheltering, but it is more positive for firms with better 
governance which is in line with the theoretical framework developed in Desai 
& Dharmapala (2006). This view appear not to be validated in the data, and 
does not incorporate all the dimensions of major conflicts between 
shareholders and managers, as managers may behave opportunistically in 
other ways that not in the interests of shareholders. This is due to the fact that 
actions engage in the corporate tax sheltering can be mixed up with the 
underlying diversionary activities (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009), such as the 
complementarity between amount of tax savings from sheltering and resources 
diversion by managers as portrayed in the Desai, Dyck, & Zingales (2007) 
model., they further indicate that this complementarity may be particularly 
salient in emerging markets where the possibilities of managerial diversion are 
more dynamic.  
  
It is expected that firm compensate managers for some level of tax 
aggressiveness but not for those tax aggressiveness that cause firms to incur 
additional costs that reduces shareholder wealth. Despite considerable prior 
research, there is no consensus on whether executive compensation aligns 
interests of managers with those of shareholders or whether they instead 
influence managers to manipulate accounting information for personal 
interests. For example, Bergstresser & Phillipon (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) 
report that managers are provided equity-based incentives to manipulate 
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accounting earnings whereas Erickson et al. (2006) and Armstrong et al. 
(2012) find no evidence for an interaction between accounting irregularities 
and equity incentives.  
   
3.3.7 Audit Committee 
 
In many countries, listed firms are required to have audit committees and there 
are rules on the membership of such committees. The audit committee 
strengthens a firm's corporate governance by overseeing the accounting and 
auditing processes. From an agency perspective, an effective audit committee 
fulfills its oversight role when it is independent of management, has a level of 
financial and industrial experience to carry out its duties and actively monitor 
internal controls and financial reporting (Carcello et al. 2006). The monitoring 
role of the audit committee is of significance in China due to its weak legal 
protection where minority shareholders are subject to the expropriation by 
dominant shareholders such as the State.  
 
Audit committees were introduced to Chinese listed firms by 'The code of 
corporate governance for listed companies in China' in 2002, Article 52, 
Section 6, Chapter 3 requires the convener of these committees must be an 
independent director and the majority of members of nomination, 
remuneration and auditing committeemust be independent directors. However, 
an audit committee is required by the Code to be on a 'comply or explain' basis. 
Chen and Cheng (2007) report that many listed firms have utilized this 
voluntary compliance and only a few listed firms set up an audit committee 
within the first year after the issuance of the Code and Lo et al. (2010) further 
suggest that until now, there was no legal requirement for a Chinese listed 
company to have an audit committee although they were encouraged to do so. 
The debate about the effectiveness of audit committees in China is mainly to 
the degree of independence of the committee. With a sample study of top 50 
Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong from 2006 to 2007, Lin et al. (2009b) 
found that on average 27.7 percent of audit committee members were 
government officer and 67.4 percent of the 50 listed firms had at least one 
government officer. These governance offices are more likely to be politically 
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connected with the state, although they are classified as 'independent' members 
of the board (Lin et al. 2009a). 
 
Empirical finding in the literature, although mixed, generally suggest that 
Greater independence on the auditor committee is associated with more 
effective monitoring, which can mitigate earning management, indicating the 
role of more effective monitoring plays in controlling tax aggressiveness, at 
least with respect to financial reporting (e.g.Larcker & Richardson, 2004; 
Carcello et al. 2006; Klein, 2006).  
  
Klein (2006) finds a non-linear association between tax management and audit 
committee independence, in particular, a significant association is found only 
when the audit committee has less than a majority of independent directors, it 
suggest that audit committee is structured to be independent of the CEO are 
best able to performance its independence oversight function and may be more 
effective in monitoring the financial accounting process of the firm. Moore 
(2007) documents a negative relationship between tax aggressiveness and 
audit committee independence, in line with the argument that stronger 
governance structure reduces tax aggressiveness. Moreover, Competence of 
audit committee members are also relevant, independent members of audit 
committee with both accounting and certain types of non-accounting financial 
expertise can play a role in mitigating tax aggressiveness and are effective in 
improving the quality of financial reporting (Bédard et al. 2004; Krishnan, 
2005; Carcello et al. 2006). Prior research on the relationship between audit 
committee and tax aggressiveness in China is limited to publication in the 
Chinese language and has produced mixed results (Liu & Ma, 2008; Zheng & 
Liu, 2008). The scant and mixed result on the effectiveness of the audit 
committee in constraining tax aggressiveness in Chinese listed firms provides 
motivation for further study on the impact of audit committees.  
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3.3.8 Supervisory Boards 
 
In China the two-tier board model is predominantly used, the main 
characteristic of this structure is the existence of a board of supervisors. 
Supervisory boards represent an additional control layer in the governance 
structure of Chinese firms, whose purpose is to monitor managers and 
directors in the best interest of the company and to keep the interest of all 
relevant stakeholders aware of when doing so. Listed firms are required to 
establish a board of supervisors and reports to the general shareholders 
meeting, since the enactment of Company Law in 1994. A key difference 
between the board of directors and the supervisory boards is that the member 
of the supervisory board are no senior executives so that they can play an 
monitoring role in the performance of the board of directors and the senior 
management in a relatively impartial manner (Lin & Liu, 2009).  
 
The board of supervisors should be independent of the board of directors, 
officially, the key responsibilities of supervisors include: (1) to examine the 
company's financial affairs, (2) to monitor managerial behaviors and decisions 
made by managers, directors and other executives and to ensure the legal 
compliance of them with laws, regulations and the articles of firms, (3) to  
review and audit the reports provided by directors; and to oversee firms' assets; 
(4) to propose provisional shareholder meetings whenever they think 
necessary, (5) to request directors and managers to alter their personal actions 
if they are in conflict with the firm's objectives (Dahya et al. 2000, 2003; Tam 
& Hu, 2006; Lin & Liu, 2009; Yang, Chi & Young, 2011). In addition, in 
accordance with 'The code of corporate governance for listed companies in 
China' issued by the CSRC in 2002, the primary responsibility of the board of 
supervisors is the supervision of corporate finance and ensure the accuracy 
and appropriateness of financial statements; and member of the supervisory 
board should have professional experience or expertise in areas such as 
accounting and law. However, the board of supervisors has not been given the 
voting right on corporate or merger and acquisition strategies and the election 
of managers, directors or financial officers, which weaken its supervisory 
duties. In addition,most chairmen of supervisory boards in 
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government-controlled listed firms are communist party secretaries who 
usually are lack of professional expertise and appropriate experience (Yang, 
Chi & Young, 2011). Thus, a few studies have consistently reported the 
inefficiency of performance of the supervisory board (Dahya et al. 2000, 2003; 
Xiao et al. 2004; Chen, Firth & Xu, 2009). However, some researchers 
advocate that supervisory boards have a positive effect on corporate 
governance of a firm, Firth et al. (2007a) provide evidence on the vital role of 
themore and larger active supervisoryin controlling agency problem between 
managers and shareholders arise due to earning management, as it can leads to 
an increase in the quality of financial information. 
 
The board of supervisors for listed firms should consist of at least three 
members, of which at least one member is representative of shareholders and 
at least one member is elected by employees. A typical Chinese supervisory 
board have three groups of supervisors, which are (1) executive supervisors 
(company employees),(2) controlling supervisors (full-time employees of the 
largest shareholder of the listed firm), and (3) outside supervisors (Hu, Tam & 
Tan, 2009). In the study of supervisory board, Xu & Wang (1999) found that 
the majority of Chinese supervisory boards are executive or controlling 
supervisors; almost none of them are individual shareholders. Therefore, it is 
suggested by Dahya et al. (2003) and Tam & Hu (2006) that supervisory 
boards are not likely to play an operative role in Chinese corporate governance 
due to its lack of independence from the its firm and controlling shareholders. 
In the Chinese context, Tam & Hu (2006) further suggest that despite the fact 
Chinese supervisory boards are overwhelmingly controlled by the insider 
supervisors, outside independent supervisors are more effective in their 
monitoring function than insider supervisors. Therefore, it can be argued that 
supervisory board can help achieve better governance in the case of high 
ownership concentration and weak external governance mechanisms in China, 
(Hu, Tam & Tan, 2009). However, whether or not supervisory board can 
perform its monitoring function effectively lies on its independence, and in 
terms of tax planning activities. In the absence of independent supervisory 
board at current stage of corporate governance development (Hu, Tam & Tan, 
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2009), we posit that outside supervisors may play a role in protecting interests 
of minority shareholders by discouraging tax aggressiveness. 
 
 
3.3.9 External GovernanceMechanisms 
 
In this section, takeover market, product market, legal infrastructure will be 
discussed with the focus on the latter. An active market for corporate control is 
considered to be essential for the efficient allocation of resources among the 
external governance mechanisms which allows competent managers to obtain 
control of sufficient shares to remove inefficient managers in the short term 
(Bai et al, 2004). As no studies in the specific issues directly focus on this area, 
recent papers investigate the relationship between various aspects of 
governance and the market for corporate control (e.g. Gomper et al. 2003; 
Gaspar et al. 2005; Ryan, 2009).  There are few studies about the effect of 
takeover market as a corporate governance mechanism in China due to special 
feature of Chinese M&A caused by the share segmentation system and less 
developed external corporate control market in China, although the latter has 
been shown to an effective mechanism in western countries (Yang, Chi 
&Young, 2011). We can expect studies of a more positive impact of active 
corporate control market on corporate governance in China as a result of the 
non-tradable share split reform starting in 2005 as mentioned in section 3.2.  
  
Competition in product market might be a powerful mechanism for resolving 
agency problems, the increased competition might reduce managerial slack 
and limit waste of resources, and moreover, it might restrict the tunneling 
activities of controlling shareholders (Bai et al. 2004). A range of studies 
focus on product market competition and its relationship with different aspects 
of corporate governance including CEO turnover and compensation structure 
(e.g. de Bettignies & Baggs, 2007). It is much more related to the extent of 
state's regulation environment is supportive of competition in markets for 
goods and services, and the overall level of product market regulation is still 
restrict in international comparison.  
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3.3.9.1 Legal Framework: Law and Regulation 
 
Aspects of the legal and regulatory environment are integrally related to 
corporate governance, and a great of literature studies the link among 
corporate governance, law and finance (e.g. Coles & Hoi, 2004; Daouk et al. 
2006). For the purpose of improvement in corporate governance, the Chinese 
governance must strengthen laws for interests‘ protection of shareholders and 
increase enforcement of such laws and regulations. Firms must also take 
actions to advance the situation at the same time. Bai et al. (2004) advocate 
that legal framework is an effective external mechanism to discipline 
managers and controlling shareholding's opportunistic behaviors and to ensure 
a fair return on investment for investors, however, they also argue that Chinese 
listed firms are regulated by a uniform legal system that this external 
mechanism plays no role in explaining cross-sectional variation in governance 
practices. It has been severely and widely criticized for the lack of an effective 
law enforcement and sound legal framework in China (e.g. Zou et al. 2008). In 
order to provide better protection for investors, the Company Law and the 
Security Law which was effective in 1994 and 1999 were revised in 2004 and 
the changes became effective in 2006. however, it is often argued the interests 
of shareholders especially minority shareholders cannot be well protect  in 
absence of a truly independent legal system and in terms of state in 
performance of both role of market participant and regulator (e.g. Allen et al. 
2005).  
  
Lu et al. (2010) investigate the influence of state tax policy change on firms' 
tax aggressiveness along with corporate governance mechanisms of ownership 
structure and board composition. Under the setting of China's issuance of New 
Enterprises Income Tax Law in 2007 to change in corporate income tax rate 
from 33 percent to 25 percent with effect from 2008, Lu et al. (2010) find that 
firms that were more likely to benefit from the tax rate reduction are found to 
have more tax incentives to minimize their tax payments, while such activity 
is less prevalent in firms with a greater percentage of shares owned by 
state-owned enterprises which are primarily motivated by the tax revenue 
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generation incentive, and is also less marked among firms with an audit 
committee on the board.  
  
Desai, Dyck and Zingales (2007) propose a situation in Russia in which the 
impact of the features of a taxation system on size of private benefits those 
self-interested managers are able to extract. The increase in the amount of 
income a manager would divert is associated with a high tax rate, while 
stronger tax enforcement provide additional monitoring and reduce it, and thus 
the incentive of outside shareholders are aligned with the tax authority to 
reduce resources diversion, but weak enforcement may increase managerial 
diversion from outside shareholders as well as tax authority. The study also 
points out external corporate governance affects firms' response to change in 
corporate tax rate, with an increase in corporate tax rate leads to more 
diversion, which as a result have smaller or even negative effects on corporate 
tax revenues in firms with more concentrated ownership structure and weaker 
corporate governance. 
  
Jimenez-Angueira (2007) also study the level of tax aggressiveness are 
influenced by recent changes in tax environment given firms' ex ante 
governance strength, it suggests that in general firms with low level of 
efficient investor monitoring and/or low shareholder protection and/or weak 
board of directors reduced their tax aggressiveness in the period after the 
change in tax environment such as in the period of high regulation. This 
finding is in line with changes in tax regime which influences adjustments to 
the managers' opportunities for tax function that reduced the tax-related rent 
extraction. However, the results from tests on the relationship between 
book-tax differences and market prices of firms do not find the resulting 
increase in valuation of tax aggressiveness in the post-regulation period due to 
the influences of tax environment changes to take tax strategies that 
enhanceshareholders' wealth is higher for ex ante weak-governance firms 
relative to other firms. 
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Hanlon, Maydew and Shevlin (2008) provide evidences that tax-induced 
changes in financial reporting behaviours (increasing the conformity between 
accounting earnings and taxable income) have adverse effects on the 
informativeness of financial accounting earning and cannot curtail aggressive 
tax planning as it planned, even absent actual changes to the financial 
accounting rules, which may arise from managers' intention to report earnings 
to minimize taxes rather than reporting earnings that convey reliable 
information of firm performance (Hanlon, Laplante & Shevlin, 2005). Atwood 
et al. (2010) examine the whether tax system characteristics impacts corporate 
tax aggressiveness across countries and find that firms are more tax 
aggressiveness with higher corporate tax rates, lower required book-tax 
conformity, and weaker tax enforcement and under territorial tax systems.  
 
 
3.3.9.2 Auditor quality: Big 4 auditors and auditor opinion 
 
Since the Enron bankruptcy in 2001 and the related collapse of Arthur 
Anderson in 2002, it has been of significance to and to question the quality of 
audits being conducted by accounting firms and to criticize auditing, 
especially by the large international Big 4 accounting firms. The separation of 
ownership and management control in listed firms makes the independent 
external auditing especially significant in terms of corporate governance and 
the supervision of such companies. Audit quality is positively related to 
earning quality, auditors are expected to be an important corporate governance 
mechanism that can detect and correct corporate fraud (Beck et al. 1998; 
Francis, 2004). In this section, the audit quality of a firm we discuss include 
auditor type, auditor opinion as well as auditor fee. We use Big 4 accounting 
firms to measure auditor type; a firm‘s decision to hire a Big 4 auditor is likely 
to be associated with internal controls. The ‗Big 4‘ international auditors are 
argued to provide high-quality and more independent audits as they have 
established brand name reputations and therefore have incentives to protect 
their reputations (Francis, 2004); meanwhile, Big 4 auditors are expected to 
have better trained employees and technologies that facilitate them to better 
detect errors and irregularities, and are more likely to incur higher litigation 
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costs if there is an audit failure (Francis, 2004). In examining the audit 
reporting of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors using ex-Anderson clients, Lai 
(2013) provide evidence that Big 4 auditors had a higher propensity to issue 
going concern modified opinion in order to restrict the level of discretionary 
accruals of their clients, which reflect the monitoring role of auditors in their 
client firms under agency theory. Yu et al. (2014) investigate the intra-industry 
spill-over effects of corporate scandals in China and find that the quality of 
auditors is more relevant and important for reducing the contagion effect of 
financial scandals. Prior studies that sought to link audit quality to earning 
management (e.g. Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999) and suggest that 
large audit firms are more effective in constraining managerial 
opportunisticbehaviors in terms of accruals-based earning management and in 
restraining the ability of their client firms to manipulate earnings, therefore, 
are able to give greater credibility to the reported earnings of their client firms. 
For example, Becker et al. (1998) find lower abnormal accruals for Big 6 
client firms than for non-Big 6 audit clients, while Francis et al.(1999) find 
significant differences in abnormal accruals across all three auditor group (Big 
6, mid-tier firms and other audit firms) for the sample during 1988-1994. In 
essence, prior literature suggests that large auditors provide higher quality of 
audits relative to other counterparties.  
 
Audit opinion can be applied in an effort to increase auditor independence, 
which further increase audit quality. Audit opinion reflects the informativeness 
of earnings and  can be viewed as a proxy for financial disclosure in 
constraining managerial opportunistic behaviors, However, Tsipouridou and 
Spathis (2014) find no relationship between audit opinion and earnings 
management as measured by discretionary accruals, which implies that 
investors would not be altered by auditors with respect to the potential future 
problems experienced by firms with high discretionary accruals as the 
information in accruals are not incorporated into the opinions. Therefore, the 
efficacy of audit opinion as a governance mechanism to curb corporate 
fraudulent behaviors needs further study, especially in Chinese context, 
empirical evidence suggest that Chinese listed firms that with a greater degree 
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of earning manipulation are associated with a greater probability of regulatory 
enforcement actions against corporate fraud (Chen, et al, 2013) 
 
A higher audit fee implies higher audit quality, either through more audit effort 
(more working hours) or through greater expertise of auditor, it is documented 
by prior studies that Big 4 audit always carry a premium relative to the audits 
of other firms around the world after controlling for other clients 
characteristics that affect audit fees (Francis, 2004), on average the premium 
of Big 4 audit has been around 20 percent. It can be argued that auditors would 
need to exert more efforts on firms with higher aggressive tax activities if they 
are proxied by larger book-tax differences or greater complexity, which in turn 
increase the level of audit fees when compared to the counterparties with 
smaller book-tax differences (Hanlon, 2005; Donohoe & Knechel, 2009; 
Hanlon, Krishnan, & Mills, 2012). Hanlon, Krishnan &Mills (2012) provide 
evidence that larger book-tax differences are associated with higher audit fees 
and it can be expected that audit fees to be higher in order to compensate for 
higher expected losses and higher audit efforts due to loss of reputation or the 
risk of legal actions (Krishnan &Visvanathan, 2008). Meanwhile, Donohoe & 
Knechel (2009) and McGuire, Omer & Wang (2012)also find a positive 
relationship between the level of a firm's aggressive taxactivities and audit 
fees. 
 
In sum, audit standards have evolved rapidly although the independent audits 
are quite new in China (Chen et al. 2006), the effectiveness of auditors as an 
external governance mechanism to alleviate corporate opportunistic behaviors 
among Chinese listed firms have been raised attention recently, China, with 
weak legal environment and weaker investor protection along with tight 
control of the media (Chen et al, 2013), it provide a suitable setting to study 
the contribution of auditors to corporate fraudulent behaviors. Under Chinese 
institutional setting, auditors can serve as one of the few credible sources of 
external governance mechanisms which are capable of deterring managerial 
opportunistic behaviors; other external governance mechanisms such as media, 
investors and employees are expected to be less effective indiscouraging 
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managerial opportunism in China when compared to their counterparts in 
developed economies.  
 
  
  
4.0 Review of Methodology 
 
This section reviews and evaluates the measures of tax avoidance encapsulated 
in previous studies, and introduces and justifies the tax avoidance measure that 
will be adopted in this study. The methodology of the empirical section of the 
study will also be introduced and discussed.  
 
 
4.1 Measure of corporate tax planning 
 
There is widespread concern and interest over the determinants and 
consequences of corporate tax aggressiveness. For example, Shackelford and 
Shevlin (2001) advocate research on the determinants of tax aggressiveness, 
and Graham (2008) calls for research to examine why firms do not pursue tax 
benefits more aggressively. These are definitely important research topics, but 
an important related issue is that there is no universally accepted empirically 
operational definition of tax ‗aggressiveness‘. In this section, discussion will 
be focused on the measurement of tax aggressiveness, primarily from financial 
statement data. As a broad range of proxies are currently applied in the 
literature, and the precise nature of the proxy used in tax aggressiveness 
research will have important policy and business implications, careful 
consideration needs to be given to whether the measure chosen in this study is 
appropriate for the particular research questions to be addressed. 
  
In studying corporate tax planning and tax avoidance/evasion using publicly 
available information, it is difficult to obtain direct information about practices 
that may be proprietary in nature, sensitive or perhaps even illegal or 
bordering on illegality. Tax returns of individual corporations are not publicly 
available, and financial statements do not disclose the nature of underlying 
sheltering structures, which limits policy analysis and research on tax 
avoidance and aggressive tax strategies based on publically available data 
sources (Garbarino, 2011). Because of this, attempts to measure the extent to 
which a corporation engages in tax sheltering must use indirect measures, 
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centered upon publicly-disclosed levels of tax expense, profitability and other 
accounting variables. 
  
Several measures of tax aggressiveness are available in the literature (see the 
table 4.1 'measure of tax avoidance), and in the following section we first 
evaluate different proxies for tax sheltering that are widely applied in prior 
literature, and consider the extent to which these measures are able to capture 
the magnitude of the underlying construct of ‗tax aggressiveness‘. Much prior 
research relies on total effective tax rates to measure corporate tax planning 
effectiveness such as Stickney and McGee (1982); Gupta and Newberry 
(1997);Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998). More recently, research has 
relied on alternative measures of tax aggressiveness, including total book-tax 
differences (Wilson 2009), cash ETRs (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008), 
and discretionary book-tax differences (Desai and Dharmapala 2006, 2009). 
 
 
4.1.1 Effective tax rate measures (ETR) 
 
Commonly used measures of tax avoidance in the existing literature are listed 
in Table 4.1, and several of them measure variations of effective tax rates 
(ETRs), which are computed as dividing some estimate of tax liability by a 
measure of pre-tax accounting profits or cash flow, indicating the average rate 
of tax burden levied on firms' income or cash flow. Different inferences are 
possible with various numerators. For example, the GAAP ETR is defined as 
total income tax expense divided by pre-tax accounting income (Stickney & 
McGee, 1982; Gupta & Newberry, 1997), which reflect permanent book-tax 
differences and other statutory adjustments, while  tax strategy such as tax 
deferral (e.g. accelerated depreciation for tax purposes) will notaffect GAAP 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). The cash effective tax rate (CASH_ETR), on the 
other hand, introduced by Dyreng et al. (2008) can be calculated as the ratio of 
cash income taxes paid to pre-tax book income after special items. It is 
claimed by Dyreng et al. (2008) this measure has several advantages over the 
traditional ETR measure. Firstly, cash ETR is not affected by change in tax 
cushion of a firm such as tax contingencies, therefore, no matter that a tax 
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cushion is recorded in a firm's financial statement, the lower cash tax 
payments associated with tax aggressiveness will have a lower cash ETR 
(Dyreng et al. 2008; Badertscher et al. 2013). Secondly, measure of Cash ETR 
provide a better estimation of a firm's true tax liability than traditional measure 
of ETR as it captures tax benefits associated with employee stock options 
(Dyreng et al. 2008). Despite these advantages, some measurement errors are 
associated with cash ETR as it does not capture non-discretionary items of 
BTDs and is biased downward for those firm that consistently manage pre-tax 
book income upward (Badertscher et al. 2013). 
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Table 4. 1: Measure of tax avoidance 
Measures Computation Reflect 
conforming 
avoidance 
Reflect 
non-conformi
ng avoidance? 
Reflect tax 
deferrals 
Examples of tax avoidance 
activities 
Abnormal current 
accruals 
Residual from 
 
Y N Y Accelerated or deferral of 
revenue and expenditures. 
  or 
 
        
GAAP ETR 
 
N Y N Tax incentives; transfer 
pricing; super-deduction of 
R&D expenditures. 
Cash ETR 
 
N Y Y Tax incentives; transfer 
pricing; super-deduction of 
R&D expenditures; accelerated 
depreciation. 
Current ETR  Current income tax expense 
Pre-tax accounting income 
N Y Y Tax incentives; transfer 
pricing; 
ETR differential Statutory ETR- GAAP ETR N Y N Tax incentives; transfer 
pricing; 
DTAX Residual from regression ETR differential=αit+ 
βcontrolsit+εit 
N Y Y Tax incentives; transfer 
pricing; 
Total BTD Total book-tax differences N Y Y Super-deduction of R&D 
expenditures; accelerated 
depreciation. 
Abnormal total BTD Residual from 
 
N Y Y Super-deduction of R&D 
expenditures; accelerated 
depreciation. 
Abnormal permanent Residual from N Y N Super-deduction of R&D 
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BTD  expenditures. 
Imputed/reported 
profits gap 
Gap between Imputed profits (from statistics 
data) and reported profits 
Y N N Income under-reported for 
accounting purpose. 
Import/export gap Gap between import and export statistics data Y N N False declaration with the 
Customs. 
 
(Source: Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010) 
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Depending on research questions, researchers must be cautious when making 
inferences about tax planning activities in terms of ETR measures. Firstly, 
ETR measure is not available whenever the pre-tax accounting income is zero 
or negative and even if it is available, it is not a reliable measure for the 
relative tax burden in the presence of implicit taxes and net operating loss 
carry-forwards (Wilkie & Limberg, 1993). Furthermore, with pre-tax 
accounting income being applied as denominator in most ETR measure, only 
non-conforming tax planning activities can be captured (e.g. tax benefits of 
interest deductions will not be reflected in ETR measures)  (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010: see Table 4.2). Take private firms for example, a lower level 
of importance are placed on GAAP accounting incomes, they are more likely 
to avoid most of explicit taxes by reporting lower accounting income as well 
as lower taxable income (e.g. conforming tax planning activities). This 
weakness is also the one associated with book-tax differences measures.  
  
Thirdly, all variants of ETR measure reflect the effect of firms' explicit tax 
liability, and do not directly capture implicit taxes which reduce pre-tax 
accounting earnings and are the differences between pre-tax returns on 
partially or tax-exempt investments and pre-tax returns on fully-taxed 
investments (Scholes & Wolfson, 1992; Wilkie, 1992).  Implicit taxes arise 
directly related to the existence of tax preferences such as  government bond 
interest, pre-paid income, non-deductible expenses, accelerate depreciation 
and tax credits for investments (Wilkie, 1988; Scholes &Wolfson, 1992) and 
can be also applied to reflect an indirect cost (broadly any non-tax costs 
incurred to reduce explicit taxes) that results from government policies. In 
general, lower explicit taxes (increases in tax subsidies) will give rise to higher 
implicit taxes (decreases in pre-tax return) and vice versa.  For example, 
without consideration for implicit taxes, GAAP ETR will be higher to the 
extent the implicit taxes reduce pre-tax accounting income, such as lower 
return on tax-advantaged assets arising from tax subsidies in China (Chen 
&Hung, 2010). A common measure of corporate tax preference provided by 
government is to compare the resulting effective tax rate (ETR) above to the 
statutory tax rate. Wilkie (1992) and Wilkie and Limberg (1993) develop an 
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alternative measure to the ETR for the evaluation of relative tax burdens, in 
consideration of both corporate tax preferences and implicit taxes, called as 
the tax subsidy on equity (TSE) measure. TSE is calculated as difference 
between multiplication of statutory tax rate and pre-tax accounting income and 
the current tax expenses, scaled by stockholders' equity (Wilkie, 1992; Wilkie 
& Limberg, 1993) and is an improvement over ETR as it is easy to interpret 
even when current tax payment or pre-tax accounting profit is negative. In the 
case of firms engaging in tax planning activities through investments in 
tax-favored assets or other tax incentive related transactions (e.g. Berger, 
1993), implicit tax measure are relevant for studying tax sheltering. 
 
 
Table 4. 2: Tax strategies 
 
Source: Moser, Khurana, & Raman (2011); Tang & Firth (2011) 
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4.1.2 Book-tax Differences 
 
It is worth noting that our ability to draw inferences or make meaningful 
comparisons across prior research studies in the area of corporate tax burdens 
is hampered by the fact that wide variations exist in the definition of tax 
burden measures in general, and book-tax differences in particular, and in the 
ways in which they have been applied across different studies. For example, 
some papers lay emphasis on total pre-tax book-tax differences (Mills and 
Newberry, 2001), while others emphasize on temporary differences (Phillips, 
2003; Hanlon, 2005), and yet others focus on ―total‖ after-tax book-tax 
differences (Lev and Nissim, 2004), with the latter applying a 'tax-based 
fundamental' as the ratio of estimated net taxable income to net book income 
which captures all book-tax differences along with tax accruals. For 
classification, we need to identify the differences among the above definitions. 
Total book-tax differences, which arise from the differences between 
accounting income under accounting rules and taxable income computed 
under tax laws, are designed to measure the extent to which a firm is able to 
avoid paying tax on its accounting income. Book-tax differences consist of 
three components including permanent differences temporary differences and 
tax accruals. In the calculation of a 'total' difference between book income and 
taxable income, many items that are not actually book-tax differences are 
included such as tax credits that do not affect either measures of book income 
or those of taxable income, meanwhile, some items included that are after-tax 
accruals (e.g., tax contingency reserve) that do not affect pre-tax earnings at 
all (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Temporary differences (identified by deferred 
tax expenses) are driven by the accounting accruals process and the main 
component of these, timing differences, capture expense or income items that 
are recognized (partially or wholly) in different time periods in the accounting 
and tax accounts, such as depreciation, bad debt provisions, warranty expense, 
etc. It is worth noting that not all temporary differences are timing differences, 
and in most cases temporary difference or timing difference approach would 
be similar as to the deferred tax outcome. These temporary differences can 
offer outsiders some insight into the discretionary accounting decisions made 
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by firms; however, it must be borne in mind that temporary differences are 
also partially driven by the tax policy environment: not all temporary 
differences are driven variations from economic income reporting of financial 
accounting income. Rather, favorable tax treatments given to, for example, 
encourage investment may also lead to temporary book-tax differences. As a 
result of this, even in the absence of an intention to ‗plan‘ taxes on the part of 
the firm, so-called ‗mechanical‘ temporary differences will still exist. 
Permanent differences arise from differences in income recognition as well as 
differences in the deduction rules for costs and expenses between GAAP and 
tax laws, in so far as these differences are permanent in nature, i.e. they arise 
as a result of items of income or expense/deduction that appear in one or other 
of the income statement and tax computation, but not both. These items affect 
the current portion of the tax expense reported in the financial statements, and 
hence also the total tax expense, and include items such as restructuring 
charges, goodwill write-downs and a portion of dividends received from other 
firms, which can be measured by removing temporary differences from total 
BTDs (Jackson, 2009). Example of permanent differences in China include 
exemption of government bond interest income, limited deductions of 
advertising and entertainment expenses, R&D expenses deduction and credits 
for investment in certain areas (See Appendix II). 
 
There are two ways to measure total book-tax differences. On the one hand, 
the income-effect total book-tax differences are calculated as differences 
between after-tax book income and an estimate of taxable income (or the ratio 
between them) or, equivalently, the difference between what a firm would 
have paid, had all of its book income been subjected to tax, and what it 
actually paid. This measure usually includes all pre-tax book-tax differences, 
tax accounting accruals, research and development tax credits and other items 
which do not affect either income number but will affect (and cause errors in) 
estimates of taxable income from financial statements operating in 
jurisdictions with different tax rates (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Managers 
have different incentives in the reporting of book and taxable income due the 
different purposes and stakeholders served by the two incomes. Managers are 
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provided with incentives, according to conventional wisdom, to manage tax 
downwards whilst reporting higher financial reporting income due to 
compensation contracts, bond covenants and (in the case of banking 
organizations) regulatory capital requirements (Fields et al. 2001) and the 
presumed objective of maximization of returns to shareholders, whilst 
attempting to decrease risk of tax scrutiny and political costs (Fields et al. 
2001) as well as satisfaction of tax-based contract motivations such as 
after-tax compensation schemes (Phillips, 2003). In contrast in terms of tax 
purposes, managers are provided with incentive to report lower taxable 
income. As a result, these two measures of income are the informative 
performance measures for uses of financial statements and tax authorities 
respectively.The majority of studies employ 'income-effect' BTDs; however, a 
common measure to estimate BTDs in most studies in US context is to 
estimate taxable income by grossing up the extracted firm‘s reported tax from 
financial statements by a ‗relevant‘ tax rate (e.g. Manzon & Plesko, 2002; 
Khurana & Moser, 2013; Atwood et al. 2010; Armstrong, Blouin & Larcker, 
2012; Rego & Wilson, 2012).Outside observers cannot obtain the income 
reported to tax authority departments directly, and this measure must therefore 
be inferred indirectly from financial statements data (for studies using actual 
tax return data, see Mills & Newberry (2001) and Plesko (2003). 
 
On the other hand, the so-called 'tax-effect' BTDs will be discussed in the next 
section and the numerical example for comparison between these two 
measures can be seen in Tang & Firth (2011). BothManzon & Plesko (2002), 
Desai (2003) and Boynton et al. (2005) provide evidences on the growth of the 
book-tax gap in the U.S. over time. The measure of the 'book-tax gap' have 
already been extensively addressed (Hanlon, 2005; Hanlon, Laplante, & 
Shevlin, 2005; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Plesko, 2007).A wide range of 
existing literature suggests book-tax differences can be used as a signal of tax 
sheltering activity. As we can see evidences in McGill and Outslay (2004) and 
Badertscher et al. (2013), it is suggested that due to the discretion and 
flexibility available in financial accounting rules, the ultimate tax planning 
technique provides managers with opportunities to reduce taxable income 
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without affecting book earnings. Similarly, Mills (1998) and Desai (2003) 
illustrate that the growingbook-tax differences appears to be in line with 
aggressive tax planning, as Miles (1998) finds that a positive relationship 
between large positive book-tax gaps and proposed IRS audit adjustments, and 
Desai (2003) stresses that the increased level of tax sheltering activities are the 
major drivers of the expanding book-tax differences during the 1990s. Wilson 
(2009) reports that a positive association between book-tax differences and the 
actual cases of tax sheltering. Moreover, Phillips et al (2003), Hanlon (2005), 
and Ayers et al (2006) argue that the difference between financial and tax 
reporting is also attributable to earnings management. Finally, the evidences in 
both Phillips et al (2003) and Frank et al. (2009) indicate that firms that with 
earnings management are also associated with tax aggressiveness.  
 
However, despite the above evidences that large BTDs are associated with tax 
sheltering activities, this measure has inherent limitations. Firstly, the 
difficulty of identifying aggressive tax reporting arises in part from the 
ongoing uncertainties with respect to the causes of BTDs. On the one hand, 
previous studies have documented that aggressive financial reporting is the 
partially driver of large positive BTDs. It is suggested by Hanlon (2005) that 
firms with large positive temporary BTDs are associated with less persistent 
GAAP earnings and concludes that investors appear to view large BTDs as an 
indication of low quality earnings, while it is supported by Lev and Nissim 
(2004) who report that earnings growth to be predicted by ratio of tax-to-book 
income for up to five years ahead. However, on the other hand, some literature 
suggests that large positive BTDs are a signal of tax aggressiveness, which we 
have already discussed above, additional supports are provided by Heltzer 
(2006) who reports results are in line with view of BTDs in providing insight 
into the relative level of tax reporting aggressiveness of a firm, rather than that 
of relative level of financial reporting aggressiveness and Desai and 
Dharmapala (2008) who find a positive relation between BTDs and tax 
sheltering in the cases of 14 firms involved in tax sheltering activities. 
Secondly, the difficulty in examining BTDs as a sign of aggressive tax 
planning can arise due to the fact BTDs can also be caused by firm-specific 
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characteristics that are independent of aggressive tax or book reporting 
strategies (Wilson, 2009). For example, firms with significant BTDs can arise 
from large capital expenditure due to depreciation but these differences are not 
reflective of aggressive tax strategies. Firm-specific features such as the level 
of capital expenditures or the extent of a firm‘s foreign operations can lead to 
large BTDs that could be not necessarily reflective of corporate tax planning 
as evidenced by Manzon and Plesko (2002) and Hanlon (2003). Finally, the 
book-tax gaps do not necessarily reflect corporate tax avoidance activity, they 
can be attributable to earnings management, cash flow adjustments, tax 
avoidance, and other techniques in combination(e.g. Mills and Newberry 2001; 
Phillips et al. 2003; Hanlon 2005; Badertscher et al. 2009), for example, 
studies in Phillips et al. (2003) and Hanlon (2005) suggest temporary BTDs 
are related to activities of earnings management;Using the data from the 
English-version financial reports of Chinese B-shares listed firms and the 
Chinese capital market, Tang& Firth (2011) provides evidence that BTDsare 
incrementally informative for future earnings and stock return, and are a useful 
proxy for both earning management and tax management as it contains 
mechanical information about inconformity in book and tax reporting 
requirements.Moreover, in Wilson‘s (2009) study permanent BTDs arise from 
the majority of cases of tax sheltering activities. To the extent that earning 
management and independent firm-specific characteristic are the primary 
determinants of BTDs; the proxy will be invalid for tax planning activities. 
This fact should be taken into account in any study that attempts to isolate tax 
aggressiveness using a BTD measure.Therefore, any measure of tax sheltering 
must control for other factors (Garbarino, 2011).  
 
Up to present, there are still many unanswered questions remained about the 
gap between book and taxable income and the prior literature has not reached 
a consensus on the causes of it. It is an important issue to recognize the 
difference in inferences in papers applying different measures of book-tax 
differences (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Meanwhile, identifying the drivers of 
causes of book-tax differences is a potentially important area for future work 
which would shed light on why it is informative and why the finding varies 
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across those measures.Therefore, for example, in our study, the examination of 
the link between corporate governance practices and the book-tax gaps can 
provide new insights into whether managers are provided incentives in a 
manner that potentially induces a wider book-tax gap.  
 
 
4.2 Critique of tax aggressive measure in China 
 
Individual studies often use different terms to describe that tax reporting 
behaviors such as tax sheltering, tax aggressiveness, tax evasion, tax 
avoidance and tax non-compliance and so on, actually they can be used 
interchangeably, in attempt to minimize the confusion, we will, for the most 
part, discuss the literature using the term tax aggressiveness. It is broadly 
defined by Hanlon & Heitzman (2010:p81) that tax aggressiveness is the 
''reduction of explicit tax per dollar of pre-tax accounting earning or cash 
flow'', which reflect all transactions that might have effects on the firm's 
explicit tax liability (Dyreng et al. 2008).  
  
Although a variety of problems associated with inferring taxable income from 
the financial statements are identified by Hanlon (2003) and Hanlon,et al. 
(2005), Plesko (2003) examine how well financial statement data are 
correlated with actual tax return and provide some supports for it when 
examining correlation between financial statement data and the actual tax 
return. Due to the confidentiality of tax return data in China, most Chinese 
studies use public financial statements to estimate taxable income and obtain 
measure of factors that might be responsible for the causes of BTDs. Among 
the measures of BTDs based on financial statements, the BTDs with taxable 
income calculated as current income tax expenses from consolidated 
companies grossed up by the current applicable tax rate is the widely used in 
existing Chinese literature (Dai & Yao, 2006; Ye, 2006; Zeng, & Lv, 2010). 
Although Hanlon (2003) criticize several measurement errors in estimating 
taxable income from financial statement disclosures in terms of employee 
stock option, consolidation, tax position reserves, foreign operation, tax credits, 
as well as negative taxable income, It is evidenced by Plesko (2007) that this 
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measure of taxable income is significantly and highly and significantly 
associated with firms' actual taxableincome, thus some assurance is provided 
as a reasonable proxy for a firm's actual taxable income.  
 
However, it is difficult to identify the appropriate tax rate to be applied when 
grossing up income tax expenses in China, and most Chinese literature use the 
tax rates applicable from parent companies.  
  
Taxable income=Current income tax expense/applicable tax rate  
 
Hanlon (2003) and McGill & Outlay (2004) criticize the extent of a firm's 
BTD to draw inferences about the degree of tax aggressiveness 
(non-conforming tax aggressiveness).  It is recognized by Wilson (2009: p7) 
that there is an difficulty in examining BTDs as a sign of tax aggressive 
behaviors due to the facts that BTDs can be caused by firm-specific 
characteristics that are independent of aggressive tax or financial reporting 
strategies such as normal temporary BTDs in terms of differences in the 
depreciation methods between accounting rules and tax laws, and normal 
permanent BTDs in terms of interests on tax-exempt government bonds that 
are reported in book income but excluded from taxable income.  
  
Variant of this BTDs measure has been used in a variety of studies in 
examining the sources of differences in firms' effective tax rates (ETRs). 
ETRs are calculated by dividing some estimate of tax payment by a measure 
of cash flow or pre-taxprofits or, which capture the average rate of tax per 
dollar of income or cash flow (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Following the 
study of Zimmerman (1983), Porcano (1986), Shevlin & Porter (1992), and 
Gupta & Newberry (1997), firm's ETR as the ratio of current tax expenses to 
net income has been widely studied as the proxy for the measure of corporate 
income tax burden. Various forms of ETRs are developed in existing literature. 
The above 4 forms are widely used in Chinese existing studies (Wu et al. 2007; 
Zheng & Han, 2008; Zeng,2010;Wu et al. 2012a), while the final form not 
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applicable due to fact that Chinese tax laws base the measure of income tax 
expenses on accrual-based profit rather than operating cash flows.  
  
 ETR= (Current income tax expense-deferred tax expense)/pre-tax 
book income (Porcano, 1986)  
 ETR= (Current income tax expense/pre-tax book income (Porcano, 
1986)  
 ETR=Current income tax expense/Pre-tax book income-(deferred 
tax expense/statutory tax rate) (Stickney & McGee, 1982) 
 ETR=(Current income tax expense-deferred tax expense)(Pre-tax 
book income-(deferred tax expense/statutory tax rate) (Shevlin, 
1987) 
 ETR=(Current income tax expense-deferred tax expense)/operating 
cash flow (Zimmerman ,1983) 
  
Hanlon (2003) and Dyreng et al. (2008) identified a number of limitations 
associated with ETRs as a proxy for tax aggressiveness, which have been 
discussed in previous section.Most ETR measure use the pre-tax earnings as 
denominator so it can only capture the non-conforming tax aggressiveness and 
cannot capture differences caused by the tax preference and specific tax 
incentives through lobbying activities (Hanlon & Hertzman, 2010) such as the 
tax benefits of interest deductibility. Under the institutional background in 
China,  the central and local governments will normally apply the tax 
preference policy in order to attract investments, such as building up economic 
development zones to give special tax incentives to high-tech firms, resulting 
in effective tax rates are lower than statutory tax rate. Therefore, due to the 
presence of the numerous tax incentives in China, especially in coastal and 
economically developed areas, there will be measurement error in using ETRs 
to measure tax aggressiveness in the context of China. 
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4.3 Tax-effect BTDs in China 
 
As discussed before, book-tax differences can be due to mechanical difference 
between tax rules and accounting standards; they can also be the result of a 
firm's tradeoff between the financial reporting incentive to increase book 
income and the tax incentive to lower taxable income.  
  
Tang& Firth (2011 and 2012) demonstrates that BTDs is value relevant for 
China's emerging market, and the current BTD literature suggest that BTDs 
may inform users of financial statements the extra unobservable information 
about managerial manipulation other than mechanical information about the 
divergence in accounting rules and tax laws (e.g. Mills 1998, Mills 
&Newberry 2001, Plesko, 2004, McGill &Outslay 2004). Furthermore, the 
study of earning management conducted by firms to balance tradeoffs among 
various tax incentives, tunneling incentives and financial reporting incentives 
on the choice between book-tax conforming and non-conforming tax 
management, which in turn influence opportunistic behaviors of managers in 
corporate reporting (Firth, Lo & Wong, 2013), suggest that book-tax 
differences are associated with upward tax management, which further 
validate the informational content of book-tax differences in tax planning.  
  
As indicated by Tang & Firth (2011), there are two ways to measure BTDs. 
Firstly, the 'income-effect' BTDs which we have discussed in detail before, the 
income-tax effect method can introduce measurement errors arising from tax 
loss carry forwards, tax rate differentials and business consolidation (Hanlon, 
2003 for a detailed discussion). Secondly, the so-called 'tax-effect' BTDs, 
which employ prima facie income tax expense (such as the multiplication of 
statutory tax rate by the book income) minus current tax expense (or the sum 
of the multiplication of the statutory tax rate by the temporary and permanent 
BTDs). These two measures of BTDs only differ in the matter of the statutory 
tax rate if a single statutory rate is applied; however, problems arise from the 
presence of multiple statutory tax rates in a jurisdiction. For example, firms in 
China are normally taxed at 25 percent since 2008, but those operate in certain 
tax-favored zones or industries benefit from the lower statutory tax rates.  
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Wefollow the method of tax-effect BTDs suggested by Tang & Firth (2011) as 
she evidences that tax-effect BTDs are particularly appropriate in China due to 
the fact that firms are subject to variation in tax rates arising from differential 
favorable government tax treatment and are required to declare corporate 
income tax on an individual firm tax reporting basis. Meanwhile, Shevlin et al. 
(2012) claim that tax-effect BTDs enable researchers to evaluate those tax 
strategies in order for reduction in overall tax burden without influence on 
total taxable income and book income such as income shifting. In Contrast, the 
application of income-effect BTDs can capture only those tax strategies that 
affect book income or taxable income may have restriction on empirical tests, 
as evidenced by the test conducted by Tang and Firth (2011) to confirm 
whether tax-effect BTDs are superior to income-tax BTDs in capturing tax 
management and earning management. But what is difference from Tang and 
Firth (2011) is that we focus on total tax-effect permanent BTDs rather than 
total BTDs with the former are categorized by hypothesized drivers of 
permanent BTDs.   
  
We are able to use tax-effect BTDs from 2006 to 2012 because they are 
disclosed in the notes to income tax expense part in the listed firms' financial 
statements. A reconciliation of pre-tax profit and tax expense allows us to 
avoid the measurement errors inherent in estimating BTDs which is relevant 
for income-effect BTDs.  
 
 
4.4 Dataset and sample selection 
4.4.1 Dataset and methodology 
  
The major source of data collection for this study is Chinese firms' annual 
reports from different sectors of the economy; it starts with all A-shares and 
B-shares firms listed on either Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange 
(excluding the firms in the growth enterprise market and SME board). The 
advantage of using financial statements to examine the difference between 
financial and taxable income is that financial statements provide data that 
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make it possible to examine a broad range of potential explanations for 
differences between the two incomes (Manzon & Plesko, 2001). Financial 
statements with their additional notes provide greater detail on expense and 
revenue recognition methods and cash flows as well as about the past and 
cumulative effects of many accounting decisions. The availability of financial 
data is used as a basis for the selection as to which firms are included in the 
dataset, as there exists no publicly available tax return information at the firm 
level that can be used in this study. The data for the measure of tax 
aggressiveness is extracted from details about income tax expense from the 
'additional notes to financial statements' in the firm's annual report, all these 
data have to been done manually; while for other variables, we adopt the 
database prepared by GTA (CSMAR), a Chinese-based research company for 
our analysis with the WIND database another Chinese-based research 
company as a supplement. This database consists of data on the trading of 
Chinese stock markets and data from published annual reports of the sample 
firms, and the database have been applied in many research, such as Sun & 
Tong (2003) and Kato & Long (2006a.b), and it is considered very reliable. 
Then wematch this initial sample of selected firms with other data of variables 
available. Some variables are missing for some firms thus these firms are 
dropped when model is run. If the other variables included in the model 
substantially decrease our sample size, then we exclude them from equation to 
maximize the sample size (Rego & Wilson, 2012).  
 
 
4.4.2 Analysis of primary data 
 
The analysis of primary data has mainly been conducted using the Stata 
version 12 and Microsoft Excel version 2007. Microsoft Excel is used for the 
data sorting and basic calculations which describe the characteristics of the 
sample, while Stata is a complete, integrated data analysis and statistical 
software that has been widely applied in many business and academic 
institutions around the world. It is used firstly to examine the linearity, 
homogeneity of variance, outliers and missing values. Secondly, it is used to 
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analyze the difference in mean valuesand correlations between variables; it is 
also used to construct the regression models we need.   
 
 
4.4.3 Sample selection 
 
Panel A of Table 4.3 outlines the sample selection procedures. Our sample 
includes Chinese firms that were listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges Markets during 2006-2012. As indicated, before 2005, tax payable 
is recognized as the income tax expenses in most Chinese listed firms due to 
the absence of accrual accounting for income tax expenses in China (called the 
―Tax Payable Accounting Method‖).New accounting standards were enacted 
by the Chinese Accounting Standards Committee in2006 that were 
implemented beginning in 2007. We use the data of 2006 as starting point that 
was restated in 2007.We obtain our main sample from tax notes on listed 
firms' annual reports manually; we retain firms for which we are able to 
compute the tax aggressiveness measure. To have complete data for the 
measurements of tax aggressiveness, wedelete firm-year observations for 
missing data on the selected variables. Except in the year 2011 and 2012, the 
number of firm-year observations increased over the sample period, in line 
with the growing trend of stock markets in China. All the data for the 
institutional variables unrelated to the tax planning, control variables and 
corporate governance variables are matched with the resulting tax aggressive 
firm observations, which were obtained from CSMAR database, with WIND 
database as a supplement. Some data fields are rarely missing such as total 
assets, while others especially those from the income tax expense note, rarely 
contain the all the data we needed. It is expected that the data for the number 
of firms with non-missing fields for all relevant variables would have 
consecutive two or more years' observations. The criteria applied for sample 
selection are the same across all parts of the study in order to provide 
continuity to the analysis and facilitate the evaluation of the findings 
collectively for the study. Each empirical chapter would provide descriptive 
statistics related to the variables applied in the empirical regression tests in the 
chapter respectively. 
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The sample by year and by industry is shown in panels B and C. Panel C 
shows that approximately 41 percent of observations are in the manufacturing 
industry. We pooltogether the successive cross-sectional data for the seven 
year period; it is a panel data due to the short time series dimension. Panel data 
are better suited to study the dynamics of change, increase the degrees of 
freedom and reduce the co-linearity among explanatory variables (Gujarati, 
2009), therefore improve the efficiency of the econometric estimate. Panel 
data allow us to formally recognize the possible presence of unobservable 
heterogeneity in our model. 
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Table 4. 3: Sample selection 
Panel A: pooled sample   
Firm-year observations for both A share and B share firms between 2006 and 2012 10640 
less observations without annual reports 315 
Less B-shares observations have the same data with A shares 294 
less observations with insufficient data to calculate book-tax differences (firms did not  
disclose the tax reconciliation in their notes to financial statements) 
8818 
Less observations in financial and insurance industries 133 
  1080 
Panel B: sample by year   
2006 106 
2007 127 
2008 156 
2009 170 
2010 195 
2011 193 
2012 133 
 1080 
Panel C: Sample by CSRC Industry Classification    
Farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 0 
Mining 67 
Manufacturing 491 
Utilities 71 
Construction 36 
Transportation and warehousing 133 
Information technology 54 
Wholesale and retail trade 43 
Finance and insurance 0 
Real estate 106 
Social service 46 
Communication and cultural industries 16 
Conglomerates 17 
  1080 
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4.4.4 Descriptive statistics of BTDs trend 
A growing aggregate book-tax gap in a country will be consistent with 
manipulation of reported earning to the capital markets, tax aggressiveness or 
some combination of the two.  Both Mills (1998) and Desai (2003) in a U.S. 
context, suggest that expanding book-tax differences are consistent with 
aggressive tax planning. The existing literature suggests that the ultimate tax 
planning technique is the one which reduces taxable income without affecting 
book income (non-conforming tax aggressiveness) (see McGill and Outlay, 
2004). 
  
We follow the method of tax-effect BTDs suggested by Tang & Firth 
(2011).Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the pattern of total tax-effect BTDs, 
total permanent BTDs as well as temporary BTDs over time. Three major 
features of Chinese BTDs can be identified. Firstly, In general, the overall 
trend is approximately the same, with the aggregate Chinese BTDs being 
positive in all years except in 2012, that is book incomes are more than taxable 
incomes, which is consistent with most U.S. studies and some Chinese studies 
such as Dai & Yao (2006), Ye (2006) and Zeng & Lv (2010), but contrasts 
with Tang and Firth‘s (2011) studies where aggregate Chinese BTDs are 
negative during 1999-2004. It is worth noting that due to thefact thatas 
indicated in Tang and Firth (2011) study, Chinese income tax rules have more 
conservative expense recognition relative to Chinese GAAP and IFRS (which 
allows managers' discretion in implementation of income for financial 
reporting purpose while tax rules are stricter), the book income is usually less 
than tax income, however, in our sample selection, book income is more than 
tax income, which reflect that Chinese listed firms have much more parts of 
profits untaxed. Secondly, the temporary BTDs are all negative, while 
permanent BTDs are all positive and decrease dramatically since the year 
2008, which may due to the tax regulatory environment changes that are 
associated with the increased assessment of tax compliance in light of new 
Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law) to be effective on 1 January 2008. 
Finally, it is difficult to determine that Chinese BTDs are solely driven by 
changes in accounting and tax rules in our sample period as they fluctuate over 
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time. Appendix II details the major differences between Chinese GAAP and 
corporate income tax laws as reflected in permanent and temporary differences. 
However, the fluctuation of Chinese BTDs cannot solely be explained by the 
changes in Chinese GAAP and tax rules during our sample period, and it is a 
good opportunity to study how management practices explain the variation in 
the BTDs. 
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tax-effect BTD 39,417 39,774 2,154, 57,279 29,558 9,108, -7,186
current tax expense 229,98 323,47 258,40 304,70 383,37 478,83 508,36
pre-tax income 983,77 1,321, 1,140, 1,538, 1,679, 1,979, 2,026,
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Figure 4.1 Aggregate tax-effect BTDs from 2006-2012
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Permanent BTDs 46,226,9 50,927,8 57,695,5 57,335,5 49,521,4 46,081,8 40,080,8
Temporary BTDs -6,809,7 -11,153, -55,540, -55,508, -19,962, -36,973, -47,267,
Total tax-effect BTDs 39,417,1 39,774,6 2,154,64 57,279,9 29,558,6 9,108,06 -7,186,6
-80,000,000,000.00
-60,000,000,000.00
-40,000,000,000.00
-20,000,000,000.00
0.00
20,000,000,000.00
40,000,000,000.00
60,000,000,000.00
80,000,000,000.00
Figure 4.2 The comparion of permanent BTDs,  temporary 
BTDs as well as total tax-effect BTDs  from 2006-2012
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  5.0 BTD model: A residual approach 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This study advances a new, refined method of separating firm book-tax 
differences (BTDs) into ‗normal‘ and ‗abnormal‘ components. Prior literature 
has used a residual approach to separate the different components in BTDs. 
For example, Desai & Dharmapala (2006) use the residual from a regression 
of total BTDs on total accruals to estimate a measure of tax planning; Frank et 
al. (2009) construct a tax aggressiveness measure by regressing total 
permanent BTDs on nondiscretionary permanent items due to the difference 
between accounting and tax rules; Tang & Firth (2011) develop a 
cross-sectional regression to divide total BTDs into normal and abnormal 
components using all Chinese B-share listed firms over the period 1999 to 
2004. By doing so, they restrict their measure to tax aggressiveness that does 
not generate temporary BTDs.Tang & Firth (2011 and 2012) define normal 
BTD (NBTDs) as the mechanical differences arising from the divergent 
reporting rules for book and tax purposes, signaling the extent of 
accounting-tax misalignment; alternatively, abnormal BTD (ABTDs) reflect 
the opportunistic differences due to managerial choices in accounting and tax 
reporting. The potential components of BTDs are estimated by regressing 
BTDs on factors associated with normal BTD and are used to forecast normal 
NBTDs, and the unpredicted residual component considered to represent 
abnormal BTDs (Tang & Firth, 2011 and 2012). In our study, we follow their 
concepts and disentangle BTDs into NBTDs and ABTDs that take account of 
the uniqueness of Chinese accounting and tax systems. This provides a 
motivation for our research which is based on the knowledge of unique 
institutional Chinese setting in term of the differences in tax laws between 
China and that of developed countries. Using a sample of Chinese A-share 
firms listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006 to 
2012 and data drawn from the Accounting Standard18 Income Taxes (ASBE, 
2006) tax reconciliations, wetake a detailed look at the determinants of BTDs 
in Chinese context to determine a 'normal' level of BTDs that arise as a result 
of divergence between Chinese GAAP and tax rules, and to deduct this from 
the total BTDs in order to arrive an 'abnormal' BTD which is presumed to 
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arise a result of earning management and tax planning. The refined proxy for 
tax planning is examined against the measures of firm value as a further 
analysis of shareholders‘ valuation of corporate tax planning and a consistent 
negative association between them is found; which provides implication for a 
tax-related manager-shareholder relationship. The contribution of this study is 
three fold. Firstly, this study follows the approach of Tang & Firth (2011) by 
using tax-effect BTDs and taking advantage of information available in the 
notes to tax reconciliations to model the book-tax differences and decompose 
between mechanical differences (NBTDs) and opportunistic differences 
(ABTDs). Previous studies have generally relied on a lower level of 
disaggregation such as Desai & Dharmapala (2006) and Frank et al. (2009). 
Secondly, by applying recently available tax reconciliation data required under 
Accounting standard 12 Income Taxes (ASBE, 2006) and a sample of Chinese 
A-share listed firms in contrast to the study of Tang & Firth (2011),this study 
provide a new insight into the differences between income for financial 
reporting purposes and income for tax reporting purposes and non-conforming 
tax planning activities. Finally, to our knowledge, this is one of the few studies 
that investigate the shareholders‘ valuation of corporate tax planning; the 
conclusion suggests the tax-related institutional and policy differences 
between China and most recent U.S research when interpreting existing 
research.  
 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides the 
institutional background in terms of modeling book-tax differences in China 
including a discussion of related prior literature. In particular, we discuss 
Chinese book-tax differences in terms of its characteristics and measurement. 
Section 5.3 outlines detailed research design that successfully separating 
book-tax differences into normal and abnormal components. Section 5.4 
presents empirical results and further analysis as well as shareholders‘ 
valuation of tax aggressiveness are in section 5.5 and 5.6. The last section 5.7 
provides a summary of conclusion of the study.   
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5.2 A model of Normal book-tax differences 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
This section examines the misalignment between accounting standards and 
enterprise income tax rules in terms of the differences between taxable income 
and book income, and prior models for the measure of BTDs are examined. 
 
In decomposing BTDs into a normal component, the component that is 
thought to be the proxy for tax avoidance (and/or earning management), the 
standard approach has been conducted as the items thought to generate 
mechanical BTDs shown in the right-side regression (e.g. Mills & Newberry, 
2001; Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009; Tang & Firth, 
2011). For example, Tang & Firth (2011) regress BTDs on the following 
variables: change in investment in gross property, plant & equipment and 
intangibles, change in revenue, two variables related to tax losses and the tax 
rate differential between consolidated firm's applicable tax rate and the 
average tax rate for the group. However, the existing research ignore the 
information that is provided in the notes to the published financial statements 
in decomposing BTDs. ASBE 18 Income Taxes (ASBE, 2006) provides 
guidelines for various disclosures in relation to the tax expenses. In particular, 
ASBE 18 require firms to provide a reconciliation between the actual tax 
expense provided in the income statement and the notional tax expense which 
is the product of the pre-tax accounting profit and the applicable tax rate, 
however, it is not compulsory for all the listed firms in Chinese context. The 
reconciliation therefore effectively provides a breakdown of the major sources 
of a firm's BTDs. In practice, there is certain extent of commonality in the 
categories disclosed although the ASBE 18 does not provide guidelines about 
the precise categories of breakdown that a firm should report in the tax 
reconciliation. Common categories include the effects of (see details in 
chapter 3): 
  
 Income not taxable 
 Non-deductible expenses for tax purpose 
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 The effects arising from differences in effective tax rate of subsidiaries 
or subsidiaries of foreign operation 
 Prior year adjustments 
  
As a result, the tax reconciliation provisions of ASBE 18 provides users with 
additional information on the composition of BTDs. Prior studies has not 
generally made use of this information, however, the information obtained 
from these disclosure, although not entirely consistent from firm to firm, 
would allow researchers to break down BTDs into useful normal mechanical 
components, which facilitate a more detailed understanding of the drivers of 
BTDs across firms and over time.  
 
 
5.2.2 Prior model for measure of BTDs 
 
BTDs are designed to measure the extent to which a firm is able to avoid 
paying tax on its accounting income. It is argued that the divergent rules 
between GAAP and tax laws is the most basic factor the drives BTD, the 
differences between GAAP and tax laws are both temporary and permanent, 
leading to temporary BTDs and permanent BTDs. The detailed review of 
temporary and permanent BTDs can be seen in section 4.1.2. These two 
differences can be known as mechanical BTDs, which arise whenever income 
or expenses appear in the income statement but not in taxable income or vice 
versa, without firms making any particular efforts to tax avoidance. For 
example, depreciation for GAAP purpose may be 5 years, while for tax 
purpose it is 10 years as a minimum. 
  
However, besides the mechanical differences between GAAP and tax laws, 
BTD could also arise from tax avoidance and/or earning management 
activities. Managers have the opportunity to apply the ambiguity in accounting 
and tax rules due to the fact that both rules do not specify tax and accounting 
treatments for every business transactions due to complex and continually 
changeable business activities. That is, firms with efforts to manage earnings 
that involve change to book income that do not result in corresponding 
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differences in taxable income or with efforts to manage taxable income 
downward in order to minimize tax liability without affecting book income. A 
more comprehensive analysis of BTDs would make BTDs as arising from 
following three sources: 
  
BTDs=difference between book income and taxable income 
= mechanical BTDs + income due to non-tax conforming earning 
management + income from tax sheltering 
  
Since BTDs are argued to be a function of mechanical differences, earning 
management and tax avoidance, the literature to date has made various 
attempts to adjust BTDs, in order to develop a purer measure of tax avoidance 
(Mills & Newberry, 2001; Desai & Dharmapala, 2006, 2009; Frank et al. 2009; 
Wilson, 2009; Chan et al. 2010; Tang & Firth, 2011; Armstrong et al. 2012; 
Badertscher et al. 2013). Some studies have attempted to decompose BTDs 
into 'normal' BTDs (mechanical differences between tax rules and financial 
accounting standards) and 'abnormal' BTDs (residual from total BTDs result 
from opportunistic differences due to managerial choices in accounting and 
tax rules). For example, the U.S.-based studies by Desai & Dharmapala (2006, 
2009) define abnormal BTDs as the component of the BTDs not attributable to 
accounting accruals in order to measure corporate tax avoidance activities. It is 
obtained by regressing scaled BTDs on scaled total accruals, where total 
accruals is applied to control for earning management and the residual is the 
abnormal BTDs to represent a firm's level of tax sheltering. Their regression 
equation can be cast in the following form: 
  
 
  
Where: BTDi,t is BTD scaled by total assets; 
TAi,t is total accruals scaled by total assets; 
And: the i subscript indicates firm i and t represents time period 
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In this case, Desai and Dharmapala (2006,2009) treat the causes of book-tax 
differences as non-book-tax conforming earning management and tax 
sheltering activities, and the validity of this measure rests on two assumptions. 
First, that BTDs are a constant proportion of total accruals both over time 
within a firm and cross-sectionally across firms, which would not be true, in 
cases such as fixed asset depreciation is merely a function of differences 
between accounting and tax depreciation rules, rather than a function of 
accruals. Second, the remaining BTDs are entirely due to tax sheltering, which 
would not be true, as mechanical BTDs are involved and may give misleading 
estimation.  
  
Milles and Newberry's (2001) study, unlike most studies examining BTDs, 
utilize confidential tax return data over the period 1981 -1996 to examine 
issues of whether certain firm characteristics cause managers to focus on 
tax-conforming transactions thus lowering measured book-tax differences. 
Milles & Newberry (2001) first scale BTDs by beginning total assets, in 
common with Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Jimenez-Angueira (2007); Frank 
et al. (2009); Armstrong et al. (2012)and Badertscher et al. (2013); and then 
regress scaled BTDS on a dummy variable of whether the firm is public or 
private and a variety of control variables in order to capture both opportunistic 
behavioral of firm and mechanical differences. This study evidences that there 
is a tradeoff between tax and non-tax costs of financial versus tax reporting 
and make a contribution to the division between aggressive tax behaviors and 
mechanical differences. 
  
Tang and Firth (2011) adopt a similar methodology in Chinese context and 
argue that abnormal BTDs are indicative of earning and tax management, after 
controlling the mechanical differences generated by the disparity between 
financial and income tax reporting. Normal BTDs are estimated by running the 
following regression:  
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where BTDi,t is book-tax differences for firm in year , scaled by the lagged 
value of total assets; INVi,tis the sum of gross property, plant and equipment and 
intangible assets, proxies for investment scale; ΔREVitis the changes in revenue from 
year t-1 to year t, proxies for economic growth; NOLitis the value of accounting loss, 
proxies for tax loss; and TLUi,tis the value of tax loss utilized for firm i in year t. 
error term of the regression is defined as abnormal BTDs. The one issue with 
Tang & Firth (2011) is that book-tax differences examined may not reflect the 
tax avoidance at all in its hypothesis. For example it is hypothesized that there 
is a positive relationship between abnormal BTDs and the number of tax rates, 
as they argue (p19) that ''Chinese listed firms have strong incentives and 
opportunities to shift income from subsidiaries with a high tax rate to those 
with a low tax rate'' by way of manipulated transfer pricing; however, it is a 
conforming tax avoidance activity by profit shifting and does not create BTDs. 
  
Frank et al. (2009) investigate the association between aggressive tax and 
financial reporting, and find that firms exhibiting financial reporting 
aggressiveness also have a tendency to exhibit tax aggressiveness. Frank et al. 
(2009: p9) argue that total BTDs and Desai and Dharmapala's (2006) measure 
does not control for nondiscretionary items (e.g., intangible assets and 
property, plant and equipment) that cause temporary and/or permanent BTDs. 
The Desai and Dharmapala's (2006) measure use total accruals does explicitly 
control for earnings management but this control would potentially eliminate 
any relationship between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness. Their 
measure of tax aggressiveness involves permanent BTDs, which they adjust to 
remove the effect of non-discretionary items (i.e. those items that lead to 
mechanical BTDs). Frank et al. (2009) do not include temporary differences in 
their measure of tax aggressiveness, as they argue that temporary BTD reflect 
earning management via pre-tax accruals (Phillips et al. 2003; Hanlon, 2005) 
and thus would be spuriously correlated with measure of financial reporting 
aggressiveness. Moreover, they argue that aggressive tax sheltering is more 
likely to be associated with permanent rather than temporary book-tax 
differences. As we can see from the estimation equation below, they remove 
the effects of non-discretionary items that are known to cause permanent 
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differences (e.g. intangible assets) and other statutory adjustments (e.g. state 
taxes) but are unrelated to tax planning by regressing permanent BTDs on 
various items. 
 
 
 
They control for goodwill and other intangible assets (INTANG), income or 
loss attributable to the equity method (UNCON), and to minority interests (MI), 
current state tax expense (CSTE), changes in net operating loss carry forwards 
(ΔNOL) and non-discretionary permanent differences that persist through time 
(LAGPERM) such as municipal bond interest and tax credits. The residual 
from this regression form is the discretionary permanent BTDs.  
  
Frank et al. (2009) model in terms of overall approach can be representative of 
the way that BTDs have been analyzed in the literature, that is, regress scaled 
BTDs on a set of variables thought to influence BTDs mechanically (see 
Milles & Newberry 2001; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Rego, 2003; Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2006; Jimenez-Angueira, 2007; Dyreng et al. 2008; Khurana & 
Moser, 2013; Chan et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2010). The Frank et al. (2009) 
methodology could be a useful measure of corporate tax avoidance if the 
non-discretionary BTDs could be removed by the underlying determinants 
they chosen not driven by aggressive tax sheltering. However, the choice of 
the variables in the literature lack of theoretical supports, such as in Frank et al. 
(2009) model, their inclusion of goodwill and other intangible assets as an 
explanatory variable for permanent BTDs as follows: 
  
''[W]e control for goodwill and other intangible 
assets…because differences between the financial and tax 
accounting rules for goodwill and other intangibles frequently 
create permanent differences unrelated to tax planning.'' 
(2009: p473) 
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The inclusion of other variables may follow the similar fashion, and the 
measure of discretionary permanent BTDs may less likely to reflect current 
aggressive tax planning by inclusion of persistent permanent differences 
through time such as municipal bond interest and tax credits. Moreover, as 
pointed by Frank et al (2009), the measure of discretionary permanent BTDs 
do not directly reflect tax planning activity that generate temporary differences 
which could also be a significant component of corporate tax sheltering 
activities. As a result, with different sources of permanent BTDs across 
different jurisdictions, researchers should be careful in the choice of control 
variables for estimating the nondiscretionary portion of BTDs. 
  
In sum, as we can see from above discussion, the methods employed to date 
have tended to suffer from drawbacks that only give limited insight into how 
firms manage their tax liabilities and failed to link the measure of normal BTD 
with the characteristics of the tax system. Therefore, we improve upon the 
existing literature, the purpose of our next step in measuring the extent of tax 
avoidance is to determine the a 'normal' level of BTDs in Chinese context that 
arise as a result of systematic differences between financial and tax reporting 
in order to arrive at an 'abnormal' BTDs by deducting this from total BTDs, in 
a way that takes the known features of the corporate tax system into account. 
After that, we attempt to explain these abnormal BTDs by relating to corporate 
governance characteristics.  
 
5.2.3 Measuring normal book-tax differences in Chinese context 
 
BTDs are designed to measure the extent to which a firm is able to avoid 
paying tax on its accounting income and arise from the differences in income 
recognition as well as the deduction rules for costs and expenses between 
GAAPand tax laws. As shown in the tax reconciliation disclosed in annual 
financial reports,they represent the difference between prima facie income tax 
expense and those tax expense derived from consolidated income statement 
which has discussed in section 4 which has discussed in section 4.Under the 
Chinese tax laws, Book-tax differences arise principally as a result of(ASEB, 
2006):  
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 Non-deductible expenses such as losses caused by penalties and fines, 
overrun donation, sponsor costs, fines for delaying tax payment 
 Income not taxable such as interests on government securities 
 Prior year adjustment to tax payable 
 Income generated arising from differences in effective tax rate of 
subsidiaries or subsidiaries of foreign operation 
  
Examination of tax reconciliation for the Chinese listed firms revealed that the 
above four categories of book-tax differences were disclosed by the vast 
majority of firms. An examination of the tax disclosure of the Chinese firms 
listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange over the period 2006 to 2012 
reveals that a range of categories are disclosed. Other commonly utilized 
categories include: the effect of changes in statutory tax rates on deferred tax 
balances, utilization of brought forward tax losses, current period tax losses 
carried forward, unprovided deferred tax, withholding tax on dividends, effect 
of taxation of associates and joint venture, R&D tax credits, tax concession 
and tax refund such as purchase of domestic equipment. In this study, we 
break down book-tax differences into several categories in terms of the tax 
reconciliation. Except item 7, 8 and 11, all other items are present in the 
annual reports of Chinese listed firms. The hypothesized drivers for these 
BTDs take into account of the tax adjustment items on tax forms of Chinese 
income tax laws and are listed in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5. 1:Hypothesized Drivers ofBTDs 
  Category of 
Permanent BTD 
Hypothesized Drivers 
of Category 
Proxy variables Prior Literature 
1 Income not taxable Investment income 
(dividend income) 
Finance income 
 
INVit 
INTERESTit 
Dai & Yao 
(2006); 
Ye(2006); New 
EIT law (2008) 
2 Expenses not 
deductible 
Industry membership; 
operating expenses. 
OPEit Dai & Yao 
(2006); 
Ye(2006); Tang 
& Firth (2011) 
3 The effect of the 
application of a 
different tax rate to 
income, either 
because it is 
generated abroad or 
because it is subject 
to a different 
domestic tax rate 
Profit before 
exceptional items; 
turnover; total assets all 
by geographical 
segment. 
TURNOVERit 
ASSETSit 
OPEPROFITit 
 
Khurana & 
Moser 
(2013);Frank, 
Lynch & Rego 
(2009) 
4 Prior year 
adjustments 
Prior two years‘ lagged 
pre-tax profit. 
LAG1PROFITit 
LAG2PROFITit 
 
5 Utilization of 
brought-forward tax 
losses (Recognition 
of previous 
unrecognized losses) 
Current period pre-tax 
profit and two lags of 
pre-tax profit. Could 
also include a measure 
of group complexity 
(number of 
subsidiaries?) 
TOTALPROFITit 
LAG1PROFITit 
LAG2PROFITit 
Manzon & 
Plesko (2002); 
Wilson (2009); 
Zeng (2010); 
Tang & Firth 
(2011); 
6 Current period tax 
losses carried 
forward (Current 
period unrecognized 
losses) 
Current period pre-tax 
profit and two lags of 
pre-tax profit. 
TOTALPROFITit 
LAG1PROFITit 
LAG2PROFITit 
Desai & 
Dharmapala 
(2009); Frank, 
Lynch & Rego 
(2009) 
7 Withholding tax and 
similar effects of 
intra-group transfers 
Some measure of profits 
generated in foreign 
jurisdictions 
N/A  
8 Taxation of capital 
gains and losses 
Accounting gains on 
sale of fixed assets 
N/A  
9 Acquisitions and 
disposal of 
properties, 
subsidiaries and 
joint ventures 
(Non-taxable profit 
on the sale of 
subsidiaries and 
associates) 
Assume that it is related 
to the size of the firm, 
Normal BTD for this 
item = (Total fixed 
assets / Average total 
fixed assets  * average 
value of this BTD 
across firm-years) 
N/A  
10 Other permanent 
differences 
Try a combination of 
the previous drivers 
N/A  
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11 Exceptional items 
 
No driver N/A  
  
 
1. Income not taxable: 
According to the Article 26 of EIT law (2008), equity investment income such 
as dividend income and bonuses between qualified resident enterprises, are not 
taxed, which will be a driver of permanent BTDs. As financial statements of 
Chinese listed firms do not disclose information on dividend income 
separately, and it is conflated with category of investment income under equity 
method, then investment income will be a proxy for the non-taxable income. 
Another driver of income not taxable will be focus on finance income, which 
is applied as a proxy for interest on government securities (non-taxable 
interest) (Article 26, EIT law 2008). 
  
2. Expenses not deductible  
It is hypothesized that the normal level of non-deductible expenses will differ 
by industries but should be constant as proportion of total expenses within an 
industry. Therefore, it is hypothesized that industry membership and operating 
expenses will be the main drivers of non-deductible expenses. It is argued that 
there are differences in treatment of expenses under the accounting rules and 
tax laws, with the former understating expenses to users of financial 
statements and the latter overstating expenses to tax authorities (Tang & Firth, 
2011).  Therefore, operating expenses is included to control for different 
expenses recognition in accounting rules and tax laws. 
 
3.  Effect of different tax rates applied to income 
It can be expected that the application of different tax rates can arise due to the 
overseas tax rates or preferential subsidiary tax rates that are different from the 
domestic tax rates, or due to the individual domestic and foreign tax rates 
differing from the 'applicable' average rate which is applied in calculation of 
notional tax expenses in the tax reconciliation. The drivers of resulting 
permanent differences will include measures that capture mix of sources of 
overseas income, which can be derived from segmental reporting of each 
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listed firms, the best proxy measure of the extent of this effect is segmental 
operating income before exceptional items, segmental turnover, segmental 
total assets and net assets, all by its geographically segment, in order to control 
for differences between financial and tax accounting reporting which 
frequently create permanent differences unrelated to tax aggressiveness. 
However, in the case of Chinese annual reports, the segmental reporting is 
categorized by its downstream and upstream industry, with no disclosure on 
foreign income. As a result, we apply operating profit, turnover, total assets 
from consolidated profit and loss account, and use industry membership as a 
dummy variable. The turnover is included to control for the differences 
between tax and accounting rules in terms of revenue recognition under each 
system. Firms with higher levels of either fixed or intangible assets tend to 
have higher non-debt tax shields in the form of higher depreciation or 
amortization deductions for tax purposes than those for the book purposes 
(Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Khurana & Moser, 2013). Total assets is included to 
control for firms size and complexity effects, which is argued to be associated 
with level of tax noncompliance (Hanlonet al, 2005; Chan, Lin & Mo, 2010). 
As the variables would be deflated by total assets to control for any scale 
effects (Akbar & Stark, 2003), natural log form would be applied to minimize 
the spurious bias to the estimated effect of scale (see variable definitions).  
 
4. Prior years adjustments 
 The presence of prior years'  adjustments arise as a result of adjustments to 
prior year estimates of tax payment due, therefore it is hypothesized that there 
is a normal relationship between prior-year adjustments and the level of 
prior-year accounting pre-tax profits. It can be estimated by regressing current 
period prior-year adjustments on the previous two years of pre-tax accounting 
profits. 
  
5. Tax losses: 
 A factor that may limit the estimate of firms' taxable income derived from 
financial statement data is the presence of net operating losses (NOLs). A 
company that incurs a net capital taxable loss in a given year and is unable to 
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take advantage of the three-year carryback provision but is allowed to  carry 
the capital loss forward to offset against capital gains generated in future years 
but only limited up to five years. Both Amir & Sougiannis (1999) and Atwood 
& Reynolds (2008) recognize that current period utilization of prior period tax 
losses is value relevant. The presence of recognized and unrecognized tax 
losses and their subsequent utilization can produce potentially important 
distorting effects on both temporary and permanent BTD differences. As a 
result, it is of significance to take losses into account in deriving the normal 
level of BTDs across firms. Previous approach in the literature has 
predominantly been to exclude loss-making firm-years from the analysis (Dai 
& Yao, 2006; Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009; Atwood 
et al. 2010; Chan, Lin & Mo, 2010), due to its tendency to identify 
'loss-making' firms as those firms that report an overall accounting loss. 
However, it is mostly likely that a large number of unrelieved losses carried 
forward by firms are generated in cases that whose overall accounting profit is 
positive, given the complex structure of most large listed firms. NOL carry 
forwards can affect the incentives to engage in tax avoidance, due to its 
association with valuation allowance account (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). 
Firms with NOL carry forwards have less incentive to engage in current year 
tax planning. In Chinese context, When a firm generate a taxable loss in one 
year could carry the loss forward to offset taxable income earned in the 
subsequent 5 years (ASBE, 2006: Article 5). It is indicated by Willie (1992) 
that BTDs will be understated when a tax loss occurs and overstated when a 
tax loss is utilized. When a tax loss is utilized, the preceding year's tax losses 
are carried forwarded against current year's taxable income, leading to positive 
BTDs. As indicated by Manzon & Plesko (2002), the presence of NOLs carry 
forwards cannot make efficient use of tax deductions and benefits.  
  
The utilization of tax losses are derived by a combination of tax losses 
generated in prior period with sufficient off-settable profits in current period. 
When previously recognized tax losses brought forward is utilized by firms, 
temporary BTDs and therefore total BTDs will increase in the period of 
utilization, which is due to the reversal of previous negative temporary 
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differences generated by the recognition of the tax losses in deferred tax assets. 
As a result, the utilization of tax losses can be driven by the factors of 
sufficient off-settable profits in current periods in combination with tax losses 
generated in prior periods. Therefore, it is hypothesized that utilization of tax 
losses carried forward, on average, will be positively associated with profit in 
current period, but negatively associated with recent period reported profit, 
and we will apply two lags of prior period profits in the model. In terms of the 
current period unrecognized losses appear in the tax reconciliation note, it is 
recognized as permanent differences and will depend on the firm's assessment 
of the possibility of future recovery, as well as on the level of tax losses 
themselves. As a result, in consistent with the utilization of tax losses, it is 
hypothesized that this category will be related to current and prior year period 
pre-tax accounting profits, and is expected that such losses will be both 
negatively related to both current and prior period levels of pre-tax profits.  
  
6. Withholding tax and similar effects of intra-group transfers 
 Principally dividends that are declared by subsidiaries located in overseas 
jurisdictions fall in this category, and therefore it is hypothesized that the 
normal level of such taxes would be related to the amount of accounting 
income generated in foreign jurisdictions. As financial statements of Chinese 
listed firms do not disclose information on foreign subsidiaries or foreign 
investment, the category of drivers will not be examined, and will be included 
in the category of other permanent differences. 
 
7. Other permanent differences 
 This category includes items that do not naturally fall into any of the other 
categories, or that have been categorized as such by the firm. It is therefore 
possible that this category could be related to any of the drivers hypothesized 
for the other categories.  
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5.3 BTD model and variable analysis 
5.3.1 Estimating Abnormal BTDs from total BTDs 
 
The estimation equation is as follows: 
BTDit=α0+α1TURNOVERit+α2OPEit+α3OPEPROFITit+α4TOTALPROFITit+α
5LAG1PROFITit+α6LAG2PROFITit+α7INVit+α8ASSETSit+α9INTERESTit 
+Year +IND +εit(1) 
 
Where:  
BTDit =the reported tax-effect total permanent BTDs for firm i in year t 
TURNOVERit= the net sale for firm i in year t 
OPEit= the operating expenses for firm i in year t 
OPEPROFITit=the operating profit before interests and taxes for firm i in year 
t 
TOTALROFITit= the pre-tax profit for firm i in year t 
LAG1PROFITit= the prior one year lagged pre-tax profit for firm i in year t 
LAG2PROFITit= the prior two year lagged pre-tax profit for firm i in year t 
INVit=the total investment income for firm i in year t 
ASSETSit=the total assets for firm i in year t, which is measured by the log of 
(total assets divide by average total assets across the whole 
sample)  
INTERESTit=the finance interest income for firm i in year t 
 
YEAR is Year dummy variables and IND is Industry dummy variables 
 
All the variables are scaled by lagged total assets except for the ASSETS 
variable.We use robust standard errorsby clustering on each firm (Sun, Tong & 
Tong, 2002; Petersen, 2009; Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012). Year-fixed effects as 
well as industry fixed effects are included in all tests in order to control for 
differences across time and across industries.  
 
Due to fact that the BTD model is a measuring model where the residuals are 
derived as independent variable in the following two empirical chapters, and 
the residuals are supposed to contain the firm-specific effects, therefore it is 
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reasonable to use the OLS
2
 model to exploit the panel data features of the 
sample (Multiple observations per firm over time), although as argued by 
Robert & Whited (2012) that, a major advantage of using fixed effect model is 
to resolve or reduce the extent of a key econometric problem that occurred in a 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) in empirical studies, namely omitted 
variables that are correlated to explanatory variables. Estimates from 
fixed-effect model are also presented for comparison purposes 
 
 
5.3.2 Tax aggressiveness variables 
 
The first measure of tax aggressiveness we will use is the total BTDs, 
following the method of tax-effect BTDs suggested by Tang & Firth (2011), 
which is discussed more in the review of methodology chapter. The various 
seven categories of BTDs for the discussion in Table 5.1 are also examined to 
check any differencesfor further adjustments. Based on the income tax 
expenses regarding the reconciliation between tax expenses and accounting 
profit, we calculate the tax-effect BTDs for firms with such disclosures for 
years 2006 to 2012. A reconciliation of tax-effect book income and tax 
expense enables us to avoid the measurement errors inherent in estimating 
BTDs which is the case for income-effect BTDs. 
  
 
5.3.3 Institutional variables unrelated to tax planning to Control for 
normal BTDs 
 
Following Tang & Firth (2011 and 2012), the hypothesized drivers of each 
category of book-tax differences discussed in section 5.2 are examined in 
regression models. The accounting information is extremely informative for 
the BTDs and several variables from financial statements and their related 
disclosures are selected to capture the mechanical relationship. Specifically, 
                                                             
2
 Although Breusch-Pagan test and Hausman test suggest that there is significant firm effect 
and Panel data method is argued to better control for the magnitude of unobserved missing 
variables, especially under the fixed effect model (Robert & Whited, 2012). 
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we add variables TURNOVER
3
it, OPEit, OPEPROFITit, TOTALROFITit, 
LAG1PROFITit, LAG2PROFITit,INVit,  ASSETSit,  INTERESTit, to control 
for differences between financial and tax accounting reporting which 
frequently create differences unrelated to tax aggressiveness (e.g. Manzon & 
Plesko, 2002; Dai & Yao, 2006;Frank, Lynch & Rego; 2009; Wilson, 2009; 
Tang & Firth, 2011).   
 
Industry is a set of dummy variable for each industry classification, a major 
feature of Chinese corporate income tax is that the income tax rate varies 
across firms with different investors and firms established in different 
industries and locations. The applicable income tax rate (ATR) for listed firms 
ranges from 0 percent to 33 percent, and since a new Enterprise Income Tax 
Law (EIT Law) was promulgated by the National People's Congress of China 
to take effect on 1 January 2008, the ATR ranges from 0 percent to 25 percent 
(See Table 5.2 and 5.3). 
 
 
Table 5. 2: Tax rate for varying industries in China since year 2000  
Industry classification  Rate for taxable income starting from 
01/01/2000 
Transportation and warehousing, 
Industries and business 
7-20 
Construction and real estate 10-20 
Social service such as food and beverage 10-25 
Communication and cultural industry 20-40 
Other industries 10-30 
(State taxation administration, 2000) 
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Table 5. 3: Tax rate for varying industries in China since year 2007 
Industry classification Rate for taxable income starting from 
01/01/2007  
Farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 3-10 
Manufacturing 5-15 
Wholesale and retail trade 4-15 
Transportation and warehousing 7-15 
Construction 8-20 
Social service such as food and beverage 8-25 
Communication and cultural industry 15-30 
Other industries 10-30 
(State taxation administration, 2007; Notes: The detailed classification is 
based on CSMAR database) 
 
For every firm-year, regress BTDs on all the main variables that are thought to 
affect mechanical permanent BTDs. we estimate listed equations 
cross-sectionally each year and use the residuals from BTDs model as the 
measure of abnormal BTDs into stage 2 regression in the next two chapters. 
Variables are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent in order to get normal 
level of equation for the level of tax aggressiveness. Normal BTDs are the 
fitted values measured as the differences between the total BTDs and 
abnormal BTDs. The residuals cannot be aggregated across all firms to obtain 
the measure of aggregate tax sheltering in the year t (Desai & Dharmpala, 
2006), but can be identified as the proxy for the level of tax aggressiveness for 
each firm of our sample period. 
  
 
5.4 Empirical Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics for BTD model 
 
To test the significance of the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and tax aggressiveness, we use a regression analysis that control 
for major mechanical differences between financial reporting and tax rules we 
examine, and then apply the residuals calculated from cross-sectional extended 
 145 
 
model to estimate ABTDs
4
. 
 
Panel A, B and C of Table 5.4 shows the summary statistics and correlation 
matrix for the variables used in the BTDs model. Panel A shows that the mean 
(median) of BTD is 0.014 (0.0008), suggesting that aggregate Chinese BTDs 
are generally positive during 2006 and 2012 and is consistent with trend of 
aggregate BTDs in U.S. context (Hanlon, Laplante& Shevlin, 2005; Frank et 
al. 2009; Armstrong et al. 2012). The means (medians) of TURNOVERand 
OPE are 72.41 percent (64.89 percent) and 67.33 percent (59.42 percent) of 
total assets respectively. The mean (median) of INV is 1.04 percent (0.23 
percent) of total assets, which indicates that most listed firms can create profits 
via investing activities.  
  
We further divide the total BTDs into two subsamples that is, the subsample 
with positive BTDs and the subsample with negative BTDs. Panel B of Table 
5.4 shows that, regardless of the positive and negative BTDs, the mean BTD is 
biggest in 2008 which shows the effect of new accounting standards which 
                                                             
4
The main key assumptions for a standard regression model include the homoskedasticity 
(error term is constant), no serial correlation (covariance of error terms is zero) and exogeneity 
(no correlation between repressors and error term) (Gujarati, 2009). All the assumptions are 
directly related to error terms (residuals), which are important in the BTDs model regression 
as I am modeling BTDs and use its residual to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and tax aggressiveness The implication for these assumptions is in 
order to ensure the regression coefficients and standard errors are unbiased, and to ensure the 
p-value as well as significant tests trustworthy. Firstly, as one of the key assumptions for a 
standard regression model, Unit root tests ('xtfisher' command in Stata) for stationarity of both 
level values were applied and results show that all the variables passed the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test. In terms of issue of endogeneity, The Ramsey 
RESET test (Stata Command: ovtest) shows that the regression does not pass the test (P-value) 
and have this problem inherent in the regression; it may arise from omitted variables or 
error-in-variables. It is argued that taking endogeneity problem seriously will complicate the 
nature of empirical work, the omitted variable bias is not easily resolved by including 
additional proxy variables in the analysis or the method of instrumental variables, much 
empirical work appear to implicitly assume that endogeneity biases are a second-order 
concern, despite researchers recognize this concern (Duncan, Magnuson & Ludwig, 2004). 
Therefore, I would stay with the problem as it is difficult to find the instrument variables and 
the method to deal with endogeneity will reduce the sample size significantly (Chenhall & 
Mores, 2007) which is a big concern for running the models in following chapters. Finally, 
significance levels are based on robust standard error clustered at the firm level to control for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in all fixed-effect and OLS models. 
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was effective in that year. Meanwhile, the Chinese BTDs shows the pattern of 
decreasing differences between book income and tax income for the sample 
period, no matter positive or negative BTDs. 
   
The majority of the relationships between the BTDs and the explanatory 
variables are as expected in Panel C. The correlation analysis shows that total 
BTDs have a positive association with various types of profit except the prior 
two year lagged pre-tax profit, INV and ASSETS, and a negative relation with 
TURNOVER and OPE , which is consistent with study of Manzon & Plesko 
(2002). While the primary focus is on the ability to predict BTDs rather than 
on identifying the specific variables that generate the BTDs, the high degree of 
correlation between variables might suggest that the inclusion of each variable 
into the regression analysis is of significance to avoid a correlated omitted 
variable and inaccurate inferences in terms of relative explanatory power of 
any particular variable (Manzon & Plesko, 2002). 
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Table 5. 4:Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Panel A: Summary of hypothesized drivers of BTDs 
 
Variables Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Min Max Median  
 
      BTD 1080 0.014 0.288 -1.568 7.8 0.001 
TURNOVER 1080 0.724 0.488 0.001 3.604 0.639 
OPE 1080 0.673 0.489 -0.014 3.543 0.594 
OPRPROFIT 1080 0.061 0.067 -0.354 0.339 0.055 
TOTALPROFIT 1080 0.059 0.069 -0.373 0.665 0.05 
Lag1PROFIT 1052 0.051 0.072 -0.837 0.763 0.043 
LAG2PROFIT 1024 0.087 1.469 -0.899 46.981 0.038 
INV 1022 0.01 0.022 -0.029 0.279 0.002 
ASSETS 1080 -1.532 1.675 -7.973 3.738 -1.712 
INTEREST 1074  0.002  0.002  0.000  0.016  0.002  
 
Panel B: Subsamples of BTDs 
 
   
 
Full sample BTDs Positive BTDs 
(subsample 1) 
Negative BTDs 
(Subsample 2) 
Year Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
2006 106 0.0342 77 0.0495 29 -0.0064 
2007 127 0.0079 92 0.0135 35 -0.0071 
2008 156  0.0505 86 0.0959 70 -0.0053 
2009 170  0.0231 91 0.0478 79 -0.0055 
2010 195  -0.0048 125 0.0069 70 -0.0257 
2011 193  0.0011 119 0.0041 74 -0.0039 
2012 133  0.0003 70 0.0037 63 -0.0035 
2006-2012 1080 0.0145 660 0.0292 420 -0.0084 
 
(Note: for positive BTDs, the bigger the figure, the more the differences between book and tax 
differences, and for negative BTDs, the higher the figure, the less the differences between 
book and tax differences) 
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Panel C: Correlation Matrix  
 
BTD TURNOVER OPE OPEPROFIT TOTALPROFIT Lag1PROFIT LAG2PROFIT INV ASSETS 
TURNOVER -0.047 
         (-0.047) 
        OPE -0.042 0.991 
        (-0.013) (0.984) 
       
OPEPROFIT 0.029 0.035 -0.097 
       (0.288) (0.047) (-0.092) 
      
TOTALPROFIT 0.043 0.052 -0.063 0.873 
      (0.331) (0.079) (-0.052) (0.948) 
     
Lag1PROFIT 0.027 0.019 -0.045 0.474 0.41 
     (0.219) (0.042) (-0.064) (0.707) (0.735) 
    
LAG2PROFIT -0.166 -0.031 -0.036 0.031 0.024 0.024 
    (-0.177) (-0.001) (-0.091) (0.577) (0.598) (0.71) 
   INV 0.107 -0.059 -0.027 0.11 0.116 0.02 0.015 
   (0.276) (-0.062) (-0.035) (0.043) (0.054) (0.039) (0.052) 
  ASSETS 0.013 -0.025 -0.04 0.069 0.033 0.047 -0.116 -0.143 
  (0.047) (-0.076) (-0.093) (0.038) (0.017) (0.007) (-0.018) (-0.039) 
 INTEREST 0.075  0.149  0.140  0.077  0.107  0.116  0.0029 0.054  -0.042  
 
(0.033) (0.196) (0.194) (0.028) (0.094) (0.120) (0.069) (0.118) (-0.012) 
 
 
         
Note: Pearson correlation is at the top and the spearman correlation is at the bottom.
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5.4.2 Regression results for BTDs model 
 
Columns 1 to 7 of Table 5.5 show
5
 the results on individual categories of total 
permanent differences to provide a benchmark for the estimation of the full 
model and evidence regarding the effect of different factors on the book-tax 
gaps. The columns 8 and 9 of Table 5.5 report the results from estimated 
BTDs model for full sample with OLS model and fixed-effect model 
respectively, it shows that overall model is a good fit, the R-square for each of 
fixed-effect model and OLS model are 50 percent and 44.8 percent 
respectively. In terms of a fixed-effect model, we assume that differences 
across firms can be captured with firm-specific constant, but that the marginal 
effect of each explanatory variable is same across all firms and over time. we 
infer from this result that a relatively few variables that reflect the differences 
in accounting and tax approaches applied for book and tax purposes explain a 
significant proportion of the total BTDs. 
  
Six out of eight variables are significant in OLS regression, and four variables 
are significant in fixed-effect model, which suggest that other insignificant 
variables in fixed-effect model are proxying for firm-level characteristics, and 
it can be further argued that OLS model may be better for out-of-sample 
prediction and for the measurement of abnormal BTDs. 
                                                             
5
It is important to make sure that there is no multicollinearity problem among the independent 
variables which cause misleading problem. Rawlings (1998) suggest that VIF>10 as a 
benchmark for serious collinearity. I calculate the variance inflation factors for the regression 
variables, one variable (Variable ―Turnover‖ with extremely high VIFs is dropped out for full 
sample in regression, it can be argued that the rationale for the high correlation between 
turnover and profit measures is that profit measure is partially proxying for turnover effect. As 
a result, none of the individual variables exceed 10 and the their mean exceed 1, so there is no 
indication that multi-collinearity is a problem. 
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Table 5. 5: Estimated coefficients from BTD model 
        Year 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE model OLS OLS 
Dependent Variables BTD1 BTD2 BTD3 BTD4 BTD5 BTD6 BTD7 BTD BTD 
Positive 
BTD 
Negative 
BTD 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
OPE 
 
-0.0003 
    
0.000  0.000  -0.004  0.00019 -0.00053 
 
 
(-1.36) 
    
(0.73) (0.24) (-1.40) (0.41) (-0.36) 
OPEPROFIT 
  
-0.010  
   
0.013** -0.091*** -0.087*** -0.119*** -0.058** 
 
  
(-0.47) 
   
(-1.97) (-4.89) (-3.98) (-5.76) (-2.14) 
TOTALPROFIT 
    
0.067* 0.0517*** 0.008* 0.169*** 0.191*** 0.155*** 0.144*** 
 
    
(1.81) (3.80) (1.87) (8.71) (6.32) (7.48) (3.92) 
Lag1PROFIT 
   
0.001  -0.043** -0.016** 0.001  -0.017*** -0.016* -0.004  -0.022*** 
 
   
(0.74) (-2.36) (-2.30) (0.29) (-3.09) (-1.74) (-1.04) (-3.18) 
LAG2PROFIT 
   
0.000  0.000*** -0.000*** -0.011*** -0.020*** -0.020* -0.013** -0.016  
 
   
(-0.007) (2.57) (-19.05) (-3.74) (-2.77) (-2.51) (-1.96) (-0.77) 
INV 0.115*** 
     
0.002  0.063*** -0.104  0.049*** 0.004 
 (5.61) 
     
(0.16) (3.39) (-0.45) (3.28) (0.15) 
ASSETS 
  
0.006  
   
0.000  0.0007*** -0.0009 0.000  0.002*** 
 
  
(1.02) 
   
(0.37) (4.10) (0.71) (0.25) (4.47) 
INTEREST -0.009  
     
-0.123* -0.155  -0.096  -0.269*** -0.023  
 
(-0.17) 
     
(-1.79) (-1.55) (-0.56) (-2.58) (-0.15) 
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            Intercept 0.002*** -0.00012 0.021  0.0002 -0.002  -0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.000  0.004*** 0.000  
 
(4.15) (-0.35) (1.21) (0.33) (-1.32) (-3.00) (2.62) (1.82) (0.09) (2.94) (-0.03) 
            Observations 853  1028  657  538  585  811  621  958  958  586  372  
R-square 0.368  0.034  0.054  0.041  0.284  0.249  0.171  0.448  0.507  0.512  0.453  
Year dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
Industry dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled None controlled controlled 
 
Note:All variables are scaled by total assets except total assets itself. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results 
are based on robust standard error to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. Variable definitions are as follows: BTDit is the reported tax-effect total permanent BTDs for firm i in year t, which is adjusted 
for the change in tax rate since 2008; BTD1it is the reported tax-effect non-taxable income category of total permanent BTDs for firm i in year t; BTD2it is 
the reported tax-effect expenses not deductible category of total permanent BTDs for firm i in year t; BTD3it is the reported tax-effect different tax rate 
effect category of total permanent BTDs for firm i in year t; BTD4it is the reported tax-effect prior year adjustment category of total permanent BTDs for 
firm i in year t; BTD5it is the reported tax-effect utilization of tax losses category of total permanent BTDs for firm i in year t; BTD6it is the reported 
tax-effect current period unrecognized tax losses category of total permanent BTDs for firm i in year t; BTD7it is the reported tax-effect other permanent 
differences category of total permanent BTDs for firm i in year t; OPEit is the operating expenses for firm i in year t; OPEPROFITit is the operating profit 
before interests and taxes for firm i in year t; TOTALPROFITitis the pre-tax profit for firm i in year t; LAG1PROFITit is the prior one year lagged pre-tax 
profit for firm i in year t; LAG2PROFITit is the prior two year lagged pre-tax profit for firm i in year t; INVit is the total investment income for firm i in 
year t; ASSETSit is the total assets for firm i in year t, which is measured by log of (total assets divided by the average total assets across whole sample); 
INTERESTit is the finance interest income for firm i in year t.Year and industry dummy variables are also included in models. 
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In column 8 of Table 5.5,Operating expenses (OPE) is positively related to 
permanent BTDs, operating expenses themselves can be driven by the 
treatment of advertisement costs, as a proxy for political costs, which are 
supportive of  conclusions by Hanlon, Maydew & Shelvin (2008), Hanlon & 
Slemond (2009) and Minnick & Noga (2012), that tax management can be 
influenced by political costs, and are consistent with firms with greater 
proportion of non-deductible expenses and at greater risk from public attention 
tends to have more permanent BTDs. columns 10 and 11report the results 
from estimating BTDs model from subsamples positive BTDs and negative 
BTDs, each of coefficients on the variables have the similar results with that 
of full sample, except the operating expenses, which have a negative 
coefficient in subsample of negative BTDs. In terms of accounting treatment, 
costs such as advertisement costs and costs for business entertainment are 
reported as operating expenses in the financial reporting (ASBE 2006);  
however, with regard to tax treatment, the expenses for business entertainment 
or advertising insured by an enterprise shall be deductible to the extent of not 
more than 0.5 percent and 15 percent of sales revenue of the current year and 
the excess may be carried forward to future years for deduction (Article 43 & 
44, New EIT law, 2008), therefore, the variable operating expenses has an 
unpredictable effect on BTDs, either positive or negative. 
  
Specifically, total assets
6
 (ASSETS) is positively related to the total 
permanent BTDs, consistent with larger firms making relatively more 
advantage of tax-favored investments than smaller firms (Manzon & Plesko, 
2002). It is worth noting that coefficient on total assets (ASSETS) are 
significantly positive except in the subsample of positive BTDs, the rationale 
for the insignificance can be that firms with positive BTDs might also have the 
positive accounting income, which might have less incentive for income 
smoothing compared to that of loss firms, which further indicate listed firms' 
                                                             
6
Qualitatively identical results to those reported above in models are found in Table 5.8 when 
take log form of total assets directly instead of the variable ASSETS defined above. 
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tradeoffs between financial reporting and tax reporting decisions.  
 
As seen in both individual regressions for each category and full sample 
regression results (Column 5, 6 and 8 of Table 5.5), utilization of 
brought-forward tax losses is positively related to current period pre-tax profit 
(TOTALPROFIT), while are negatively related to the recent prior period 
pre-tax profits (LAG1PROFIT), which confirms our prediction that reversal of 
previous recognized tax losses have important effect on total permanent 
differences. Meanwhile, in line with our prediction, unrecognized current 
period tax losses is negatively related to prior period levels of pre-tax profits 
(LAG1PROFIT and LAG2PROFIT). The positive and significant coefficient 
on current pre-tax income are consistent with profitable firms making more 
significant investment in tax-advantages assets that generate differences 
resulting in greater book income relative to taxable income. Investment 
income (INV)
7
 is positively related to total permanent BTDs, consistent with 
increases in investment income and non-taxable interests will lead to increase 
in level of tax aggressiveness, as listed firms have incentives to create profits 
via investing activities to reduce income tax burdens, due to the Chinese 
accounting regulation on non-taxable income (Article 26, EIT law 2008). It is 
worth noting that investment income has different sign in fixed-effect model 
and OLS model, which can be argued that it can affect different BTDs 
                                                             
7
Some prior studies have their data set that were constrained to firms outside financial and 
insurance industries due to the unique reporting incentives and regulatory monitoring in these 
industries (e.g. Jimenez-Augueira, 2007; Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009; Chan, Lin & Mo, 2010). 
Therefore, in this part we include financial institutions into the sample. To validate our results, 
we re-estimate the results by adding a dummy slope term as which is the interaction of interest 
income and dummy variable as well as dummy intercept the dummy variable is 1 for financial 
and insurance firms and 0 for non-financial firms, due to the special characteristics of 
financial and insurance firms in terms of interest income variable. Therefore, we will apply 
the 1206 firm-year observations for the inclusion of financial and insurance firms. The results 
(untabulated) show that the tests do not qualitatively change our inferences, however, there is 
presence of multicollinearity, especially for the variables of interest income, which validate 
the exclusion of financial and insurance firms in the BTD model. 
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categories in different directions, as it can account for differences caused by 
lower of cost or market for book purpose and unrealized gain/loss recognized 
for book but not for tax purpose (Dai & Yao, 2006; Ye, 2006). 
 
We interpret these resulting residual BTDs as a more precise measure of tax 
sheltering activities. As the residuals are constrained by the regression 
procedures that cannot be interpreted as the amount of income sheltered from 
taxes by firm i in year t, and cannot be aggregated across all firms to obtain a 
measure of aggregate tax sheltering in year t (Desai &Dharmapala, 2006), it is 
only measured as proxy for variations in tax sheltering activities within a firm 
over time. This resulting residuals will contain abnormal tax planning and 
earning management, they can be regressed on variables designed to capture 
corporate governance characteristics that are thought be associated with 
aggressive tax planning and also on earning management variables.Figure 5.1 
plots the averaged residuals across all firms in the sample for each year from 
2006 to 2012 (also including one standard deviation from the mean residual 
for firms in each of these years). It is worth noting that this figure cannot be 
applied to address questions about whether the aggregate amount of aggressive 
tax activities has grown over time (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). The most 
important feature is the substantial increase in variation of this measure across 
firms since the year 2008. Despite the analysis relies only on within-firm 
variation, the explanatory variables for tax aggressiveness that identified 
within firms over time can also shed light upon this variation across firms.  
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Figure 5. 1: The evolution of tax aggressiveness residuals from 2006-2012 
 
  
(Note: The figure plots the average residuals for the measure of tax sheltering 
activities from 2006 to 2012 discussed in the above text along with the 
average plus and minus one standard deviation of that tax sheltering measure)  
 
 
5.5 Robustness tests 
5.5.1 Hold-out Sample Prediction 
 
It has been argued that it is better to use OLS model for prediction, therefore, 
to validate our results, we apply an out-sample test where we estimate ABTD 
in a different sample to the test period. Both Tang & Firth's (2011) model and 
our BTD model with the sample period from 2006 to 2012 are applied. In 
particular,we use the parameters estimate in the subsample 1 (samples are 
divided into two subsamples bases on the number of listed firms involved, 
subsample1 is the first half of total number of listed firms and the remaining is 
the subsample 2)to calculate the NBTDs for the subsample 2 and obtain the 
predicted ABTDs (predicted residuals). Then subsample 2 is estimated with 
the same BTD model variables to obtain the actual ABTDs (actual residuals). 
Finally, to calculate the sum of squares the distance between the predicted 
ABTDs using hold-out sample tests and actual ABTDs derived from 
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subsample 2, with our BTD model and Tang & Firth's model. It is worth 
noting that in our BTD model, the dependent variable is total permanent BTDs, 
while in Tang & Firth's (2011) model, the dependent variable is total BTDs, 
for comparison purpose, both total BTDs and permanent BTDs as dependent 
variable in Tang & Firth's (2011) model is applied. As we can see from the 
Table 5.6, our model has a smaller sum of squares between predicted ABTDs 
and actual ABTDs, which indicate our BTD model is more accurate in 
measuring the level of tax aggressiveness.   
  
Table 5. 6: Sum of Squares between predicted ABTDs and actual ABTDs 
    Sum of squares 
Tang & Firth's (2011) model with total BTDs 0.007408921  
Tang & Firth's (2011) model with total permanent BTDs 0.000872256 
Our BTDs model 0.0000507 
  
 
5.5.2 The explanatory power of tax management and earning 
management 
 
The raw BTD is not a pure measure of tax avoidance, with the residual 
approach applied in BTDs model, the ABTDs can be argued to be a function 
of earning management and tax avoidance. Following the approach of Tang & 
Firth (2011), weestimate the relationship between absolute ABTDs derived 
from our BTDs model and the incentives for earning management (EM) and 
tax management (TM) using set of variables that are proxy for various EM and 
TM incentives from Tang & Firth (2011)'s model. TM incentives variable is 
ATR is the applicable tax rate for the sample listed firms disclosed in the tax 
notes, EM incentives variables include SEON which is a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 when consolidated entity has a rights issue or public offering in 
year t+1 and 0 otherwise, and LOSS which is also a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 when a consolidated entity has a loss in the current year t and 0 
otherwise. TM and EM variable is the SOELG which is a dummy variable that 
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equals to 1 when a consolidated entity is a state-owned enterprise controlled 
by a central or local government and 0 otherwise.  
Table 5.7 represents the extent to which different factors affect ABTDs 
derived from our BTDs model. The results from the four models indicate that 
EM account for 0.76 percent of ABTDs, TM explain 1.6 percent of ABTDs, 
and the combined EM and TM incentives explain 2.26  percent of ABTDs. 
The results are consistent with tax and non-tax cost literature review that TM 
and EM are dependent and interactive (Tang & Firth, 2011), and suggest that 
ABTDs account more for tax sheltering activities than earning management, 
as a result, in the next two chapter, EM variable will be included in regression 
to control for effects of earning management.    
 
Table 5. 7: The explanatory power of earning management and tax 
management 
Factors Model Adjusted R
2
 
EM factors (SOEN,LOSS) ABTD=α0+ΣEM+ε 0.76% 
TM factors (ATR) ABTD=α0+ΣTM+ε 1.6% 
Combined TM/EM factors (SOELEG) ABTD=α0+ΣTM/EM+ε 2.26% 
EM, TM and EM/TM factors ABTD=α0+ Σ EM+ Σ TM+ Σ
TM/EM+ε 
4.68% 
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5.6 Shareholders' valuation of corporate tax planning 
  
Tax planning activities is of significance to both shareholders and firms. 
Traditionally, shareholders would like to minimize corporate tax payments net 
of costs in order to achieve firm value maximization, in other words, 
shareholders wants firms to be optimally aggressive in their tax reporting to 
benefit themselves. However, the underlying motivation has been questioned. 
It is argued by Desai & Dharmapala (2006) that a form of agency costs, for 
example, an information asymmetry between shareholders and managers in 
terms of corporate tax sheltering activities, can facilitate managers acting for 
their own interests resulting a negative relationship between tax 
aggressiveness and firm value; and a positive relationship between book-tax 
differences and Tobin's Q is found only for well-governed firms in Desai & 
Dharmapala (2009). Prior studies examining the association between the 
measure of tax aggressiveness and stock performance of firms provide 
evidences consistent with a negative relationship between tax aggressiveness 
and future firm performance (Lev& Nissim, 2004; Hanlon, 2005; Wahab & 
Holland, 2012). In contrast,some studies find no direct association between 
related measure of tax aggressiveness and measures of firm value; this may be 
due to the effect of unquantifiable non-tax costs (Cloyd, Mills & Weaver, 
2003). 
 
The empirical studies suggest that on average there is negative valuation 
implication of tax aggressiveness. In this section, we look for the association 
between ABTDs and several measure of firm value in Chinese context, in 
order to study shareholders' valuation of tax aggressiveness. This study 
contributes to the growing book-tax differences literature, including the branch 
that examines the shareholder value of tax planning activities. Meanwhile, we 
will examine whether the valuation effects of tax aggressiveness depending on 
firms' ex ante strength of corporate governance, following the studies of Desai 
& Dharmapala (2009) and Wahab & Holland (2012). The finding can have 
direct policy implications for shareholders and tax authorities in monitoring 
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and controlling tax planning activities of firms and also is relevant for the 
further studies in next two empirical chapters.  
 
The empirical model in this section is based on a standard valuation model 
used in the accounting literature, An OLS regression was applied to test the 
association between market values of firms and the proxy for tax 
aggressiveness while controlling for firm-specific characteristics and corporate 
governance factors. The data set used for the main analysis was unbalanced 
panel of 1080  firm-year observations for the period 2006 to 2012, in 
consistent with sample selection in Chapter 4. The measure of 'tax 
aggressiveness' applied in this section is initially derived from discussion 
above, it is accepted this proxy is an imperfect measure and can introduce 
measurement error problems to the analyses, although prior studies have 
provided evidence about the book-tax differences as a proxy for tax 
aggressiveness (e.g. Mills, 1998; Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Wilson, 2009).Data 
on financial statements and corporate governance are collected from the 
CSMAR database with WIND database as a complement.  
 
We employ several market-related valuation proxies taken from prior 
literature, including Tobin's Q, cash flow capacity and return volatility in the 
model. Within this literature studying the value implications of corporate tax 
planning, it has become the standard to use Tobin's Q to measure firm value 
(Desai & Dharmapala, 2009). The measure of Tobin'Q
8
is included with its 
definition of q is discussed below. The risk factor, the variability in monthly 
                                                             
8
Tobin's Q (TOBINQ1) that is applied for the main regressions in Table 5.8 is measured as 
market value A divide by ending total assets, where market value A consists of market value 
of equity plus market value of net debt, net assets is used to calculate the market value of the 
equity, denoted by null if the numerator has no value. We also apply another measure of 
Tobin's Q (TOBINQ2) as a robustness test, which is calculated as market value B divide by 
ending total assets, where market value B consists of market value of equity plus market value 
of net debt, negotiable share price is used to calculate the market value of the equity. 
Regressing TOBINQ2 into the independent variables in model 1, 2 and 3 produce 
qualitatively similar coefficients to the results reported inTable 5.8. For robustness check, we 
also repeat all the regressionsusing industry-adjusted Tobin‘s Q ratio (Wu et al.2012; Firth et 
al., 2013), Our findings are unaffected. 
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return of firms for year t, which captures aspects of a firm's underlying 
economic fundamentals such as firm-specific risk (Comprix, Graham & 
Moore, 2011); while the cash flow capacity is proxy for firms' profitability, 
not only earning but also cash flows is of significance to shareholders. The 
control variables are mainly related to agency costs and information 
asymmetry as well as several firm-specificcharacteristicsin line with taxation 
literatures (Jimenez-Augueira, 2007; Desai & Dharmapala 2009; Wahab & 
Holland, 2012; Tang & Firth, 2012) for example, dividend payout ratio (DP), 
capital intensity (CAPINT), leverage (LEV), earning management (EM), 
dummy variable for tax loss (LOSS), and firm size (LNTA). We also include 
the year and industry effects and use robust standard errors by clustering on 
each firm (Petersen, 2009; Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012) in order to correct for 
potential heteroskedasicity and potential time series dependence within firm 
observations. The initial model (1) incorporating the proxy for tax planning 
and related control variables as follows: 
 
Tobin's Qit =αit+ β1ABTDit+β2LEVit +β3EMit + β4LOSSit + β5LNTAit + β6DPit + 
β7ROEit + β8CAPINTit + YEAR+ IND +εit(Model 1) 
  
To assess whether the corporate governance factors have potential effect on 
the valuation of corporate tax planning, the above model is extended by 
including three corporate governance related variables INST, INDEP and OC 
following the studies of Desai & Dharmapala (2009) and Wahab & Holland 
(2012) as follows: 
 
Tobin's Qit =αit+ β1ABTDit+β2LEVit +β3EMit + β4LOSSit + β5LNTAit + β6DPit + 
β7ROEit + β8CAPINTit + β9INSTit   + β10INDEPit + β11OCit +YEAR+ IND 
+εit(Model 2) 
  
The final model is extended by the inclusion of three interaction variables 
ABTD*INST, ABTD*INDEP and ABTD*OC by multiplying a firm's tax 
planning variable by INST, INDEP and OC variables respectively, in order to 
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assess whether the relationship between tax planning and firm value is 
moderated by the strength of firms' corporate governance structures. 
  
Tobin's Qit =αit+ β1ABTDit+β2LEVit +β3EMit + β4LOSSit + β5LNTAit + β6DPit + 
β7ROEit + β8CAPINTit + β9INSTit   + β10INDEPit + β11OCit + 
β12ABTD*INSTit+ β13ABTD*INDEPit+ β14ABTD*OCit  + YEAR + IND 
+εit(Model 3) 
 
In each of the above models, both the ABTDs derived from BTDs OLS and 
fixed-effect regressions has been employed, but the main analysis we discuss 
will focus on ABTDs from fixed-effect model. The regression results for 
ABTDs from OLS model will also be presented (See Table 5.10) as both of 
them produce similar results. The regression results of the three models are 
reported in Table 5.7. The level of multi-collinearity was assessed and the test 
shows the levels were acceptable. The first two models show that a significant 
negative association between tax planning and firm value, which is robust to 
control for firm-specific characteristics (model 1) and corporate governance 
measures in model 2. The results is consistent with Desai & Dharmapala's 
(2006) agency cost theory of tax planning that that managers are provided 
incentives for own benefits at the expense of shareholders when there is a lack 
of transparency associated with tax planning activities. The positive significant 
coefficient with respect to INST is consistent with Yuen & Zhang (2008) and 
Yang, Chi &Young (2011) on the increasingly effective monitoring role 
played by Chinese institutional investors. It can be argued that the negative 
relationship between tax planning and firm value may increase non-linearly 
(Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009; Wahab & Holland, 2012), as a result, model 1 and 
2 were re-estimated with the inclusion of square term defined as 
ABTD*ABTD, the inclusion of this quadratic tax planning variables did not 
change the results reported previously (See Table 5.8).  
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Model 3 incorporate
9
 three interaction variables ABTD*INST, 
ABTD*INDEP and ABTD*OC to examine whether the relationship between 
tax planning and firm value depends upon the strength of corporate 
governance mechanisms. The results shows that the previously negative 
significant relationship between tax planning and firm value still holds, in 
contrast with studies of Desai and Dharmapala (2009). The three interaction 
variables that moderating corporate governance variables with ABTDs 
contribute little in terms of their additional explanatory power when 
comparing the adjusted R
2
 for model 3 with that of model 2. As an additional 
test of the potential effect of corporate governance structure, model 1 was 
examined separately for firm-years observations with high and low levels of 
institutional ownership, with regard to the 'high' and 'low' corporate 
governance effectiveness, following the studies of Desai and Dharmapala 
(2009), where high institutional ownership is defined as being a fraction that 
exceeds the median value of its institutional ownership. The results are 
reported in the final two columns of Table. Both estimations report negative 
relationship between tax planning and firm value, although coefficient on 
ABTDs is significant in the subsample of high levels of institutional 
ownership. In contrast to Desai and Dharmapala (2009), these results suggest 
that corporate governance structure does not mitigate the negative relationship 
between firm value and tax planning even in the case of 'high' (well-governed) 
governance firms (Wahab & Holland, 2012). 
                                                             
9
The recent change in Chinese tax regime that reducing the corporate income tax rate from 33 
percent to 25 percent, that was effective in 2008 provided an opportunity to explore whether 
shareholders change their valuation of firms' tax planning activities in response to the change 
in tax enforcement (Jimenez-Augueira, 2008; Yuan, McIver & Burrow, 2012). It was 
conjectured that the outcome of those tax changes was to increase the value that shareholders 
attached to tax planning in the post-2008 period due to the more stringent tax regulatory 
environment and benefits from tax rate reduction. TR is a dummy variable with 1 stands for 
period 2008 to 2012 and 0 stands for period 2006 to 2007, and The interaction term 
(TR*ABTD) between TR and ABTD, is our main variable of interest. The model is as follows 
with unbalanced panel data from 2006 to 2012: Tobin's Qit =αit+ β1ABTDit+β2LEVit +β3EMit + 
β4LOSSit + β5LNTAit + β6DPit + β7ROEit + β8CAPINTit + + β9TRit + β10TR*ABTDit +YEAR+ 
IND +εit. Due to the insignificance of the variable of interest TR*GOV, the regression results 
are not reported) 
 163 
 
 
Table 5. 8:Regression estimations for shareholder valuation of tax aggressiveness 
 
 
Shareholder 
value and tax 
aggressiveness  
Potential effect of 
corporate 
governance factors 
on valuation of tax 
aggressiveness 
moderating strength of corporate 
governance structure on the 
relationship between firm value and 
tax aggressiveness 
The inclusion of ABTD square 
term 
 
 
  
High 
institutional 
ownership  
Low 
institutional 
ownership 
  Year 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent variables TOBINQ 1 TOBINQ 1 TOBINQ1 TOBINQ 1 TOBINQ 1 TOBINQ1 TOBINQ1 
        ABTD -0.225*** -0.186*** -1.31*** -0.235** -0.058 -0.186*** -0.147*** 
 
(-3.54) (-3.16) (-3.80) (-2.55) (-1.12) (-3.02) (-2.69) 
ABTD*ABTD   
   
0.137** 0.137** 
 
  
   
(2.31) (2.25) 
LEV -0.731*** -0.9*** -0.66*** -1.54*** -0.046 -0.662*** -0.852*** 
 
(-3.65) (-4.18) (-3.63) (-4.54) (-0.26) (-3.23) (-3.94) 
EM 0.046 0.192 -0.02 0.019 0.891* 0.09 0.224 
 
(0.12) (0.52) (-0.26) (0.03) (1.96) (0.24) (0.62) 
LOSS 0.363** 0.238*** 0.263*** 0.719*** -0.06 0.297* 0.165* 
 
(2.07) (3.22) (3.3) (4.24) (-0.15) (1.93) (1.75) 
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LNTA 
-0.341*** -0.367*** -0.434*** -0.337*** -0.409*** -0.341*** -0.352*** 
 
(-7.28) (-6.52) (-8.74) (-4.31) (-8.44) (-7.74) (-6.67) 
DP 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.04** 0.007*** 0.012 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 
(3.77) (3.2) (2.07) (3.87) (0.6) (3.61) (2.99) 
ROE 3.58*** 2.87*** 1.93*** 3.75*** 1.91*** 2.95*** 2.23*** 
 
(7.18) (6.36) (4.7) (5.68) (3.66) (6.43) (5.31) 
CAPINT -0.221 -0.301** -0.304** -0.305 -0.047 -0.152 -0.237 
 
(-1.49) (-1.99) (-2.10) (-1.44) (-0.30) (-1.03) (-1.58) 
INST  0.966*** 1.01*** 
   
0.95*** 
 
 (7.99) (7.99) 
   
(7.98) 
INDEP  -0.047 -0.126 
   
-0.07 
 
 (-0.14) (-0.34) 
   
(-0.25) 
OC  -0.858*** -0.849*** 
   
-0.927*** 
 
 (-4.03) (-4.27) 
   
(-4.31) 
INST*ABTD   -0.663*** 
    
 
  (-2.76) 
    INDEP*ABTD   1.525* 
    
 
  (1.94) 
    OC*ABTD  
 
1.39*** 
    
 
 
 
(3.26) 
    Intercept 4.685*** 5.41*** 6.10*** 4.89*** 5.424*** 4.67*** 5.32*** 
 
(9.72) (11.23) (12.44) (6.05) (10.29) (10.31) (11.85) 
  
 
     Observations 663 641 644 379 284 663 644 
R-square 0.459 0.525 0.577 0.513 0.502 0.48 0.547 
Year dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
Industry dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
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Note: All variables are deflated to control for any scale effects. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results are 
based on robust standard error to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively.Variable definitions: ABTDit are derived from fixed-effect BTDs model in previoussection, figures in ABTDit are all multiplied by 
100 for scale effects; TOBINQ1it is measured as market value A divide by the ending total assets; OCit is the ownership concentration, INSTit is the 
institutional shareholding; INDEPit is the percentage of directors who are independent; LEVit is the leverage ratio; LOSSit is a dummy variable that  is 
equal to 1 if firm i reports a loss, where loss is net income before extraordinary items and 0 otherwise; EMit is the earning management measure which is 
calculated as profit before tax-operating cash flow; LNTAit is log of the total assets at the fiscal year-end t; ROEit is return on equity which is proxy for firm 
profitability; DPit is the dividend payout ratio which is calculated as the dividends per share divide by earning per share; CAPINTit is the capital intensity, 
which is calculated as the fixed assets divide by total assets; Year and industry dummy variables are also included in models.  
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Regression results for the level of operating cash flows(CFO) and stock return 
volatility (VOL) as a dependent variable in model 1 respectively, is a further 
supplement study to the firm value of Tobin's Q.In consistent with the 
negative relationship between tax planning and firm value, the operating cash 
flows is also reducing with the increasing aggressive tax activities, while the 
positive relationship between stock return volatility and the proxy for tax 
planning suggests increased uncertainty of market participants regarding 
managers' behaviors in tax planning activities as well as the information 
conveyed in financial reports (Comprix, Graham & Moore, 2011).  
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Table 5.9: Other measures of firm performance where ABTD is the 
residuals from fixed-effect model 
Year 2006-2012 2006-2012 
Method OLS OLS 
Dependent variables CFO VOL 
   ABTD -0.139** 0.014** 
 
(-2.04) (2.39) 
LEV -0.632*** 0.098*** 
 
(-3.22) (3.58) 
EM 0.09 0.193*** 
 
(0.19) (3.96) 
LOSS 0.112 0.018 
 
(0.55) (0.66) 
LNTA -0.324*** -0.059*** 
 
(-5.64) (-8.13) 
DP 0.006*** -0.004* 
 
(3.67) (-1.77) 
ROE 2.07*** 0.138** 
 
(3.19) (2.18) 
CAPINT -0.027 0.05** 
 
(-0.16) (2.35) 
Intercept 4.62*** 0.931*** 
 
(8.13) (12.48) 
   Observations 663 641 
R-square 0.293 0.718 
Year dummies controlled controlled 
Industry dummies controlled controlled 
 
Note: All variables are deflated to control for any scale effects. Numbers in brackets are 
reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results are based on robust standard 
error to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.Asterisks *,**,*** denote 
two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.ABTDit are derived from 
fixed-effect BTDs model in previoussection, figures in ABTDit are all multiplied by 100 for 
scale effects; CFOit is the cash flow capacity measured as cash flow from operating activities 
divide by ending total assets;VOLit is the volatility of monthly return which measure total risk 
associated with a firm's stock price. 
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Table 5. 10: Robustness tests using ABTD from OLS model 
      
High 
institutional 
ownership  
Low 
institutional 
ownership 
 
 
Year 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent 
variables 
TOBINQ1 VOL CFO TOBINQ1 TOBINQ1 TOBINQ 1 TOBINQ 1 TOBINQ1 TOBINQ1 
    
 
     ABTD -0.189*** 0.015** -0.123* -0.163*** -1.14** -0.197** -0.057 -0.178*** -0.149*** 
 
(-2.89) (2.13) (-1.65) (-2.73) (-2.53) (-2.14) (-0.90) (-2.67) (-2.57) 
ABTD*ABTD 
  
 
   
0.046 0.054 
    
 
   
(0.77) (0.96) 
LEV -0.817*** 0.101*** -0.682*** -0.976*** -0.869*** -1.700*** -0.051 -0.802*** -0.965*** 
 
(-3.83) (3.73) (-3.36) (-4.30) (-4.29) (-4.67) (-0.29) (-3.73) (-4.24) 
EM -0.105 0.199*** 0.006 0.066 -0.203 -0.122 0.862* -0.133 0.034 
 
(-0.25) (4.12) (0.01) (0.17) (-0.48) (-0.19) (1.92) (-0.32) (0.09) 
LOSS 0.322* 0.022 0.083 0.198*** 0.212*** 0.677*** -0.071 0.31* 0.18** 
 
(1.89) (0.77) (0.42) (2.77) (2.83) (4.01) (-0.18) (1.87) (2.38) 
LNTA -0.425*** -0.05*** -0.377*** -0.433*** -0.46*** -0.427*** -0.429*** -0.418*** -0.421*** 
 
(-10.53) (-7.54) (-6.97) (-8.98) (-9.90) (-6.87) (-8.39) (-10.52) (-9.11) 
DP 0.006*** -0.004* 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.012 0.006*** 0.06*** 
 
(3.77) (-1.79) (3.66) (3.18) (2.6) (3.88) (0.58) (3.76) (3.16) 
ROE 3.93*** 0.124** 2.27*** 3.12*** 2.38*** 4.25*** 1.91*** 3.77*** 2.92*** 
 
(7.12) (2.04) (3.28) (6.36) (5.5) (5.91) (3.73) (6.97) (6.00) 
CAPINT -0.196 0.048** -0.011 -0.286* -0.297** -0.273 -0.04 -0.196 -0.29* 
 
(-1.34) (2.25) (-0.06) (-1.90) (-1.96) (-1.31) (-0.26) (-1.34) (-1.94) 
INST 
   
0.984*** 0.992*** 
   
0.986*** 
    
(8.06) (7.96) 
   
(8.01) 
INDEP 
   
0.008 0.013 
   
-0.035 
    
(0.03) (0.04) 
   
(-0.10) 
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OC 
   
-0.904*** -0.901*** 
   
-0.929*** 
    
(-4.12) (-4.24) 
   
(-4.19) 
INST*ABTD 
   
 -0.491 
    
    
 (-1.58) 
    INDEP*ABTD 
  
 1.36 
    
    
 (1.33) 
    OC*ABTD 
   
 1.08** 
    
    
 (2.23) 
    Intercept 5.53*** 0.873*** 5.14*** 6.09*** 6.39*** 5.84*** 5.63*** 5.46*** 5.99*** 
 
(13.27) (11.99) (9.82) (14.3) (14.39) (8.96) (10.46) (13.24) (14.74) 
    
 
     Observations 663 641 663 644 644 379 284 663 644 
R-square 0.448 0.71 0.289 0.519 0.539 0.505 0.501 0.49 0.52 
Year dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
Industry 
dummies 
controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
 
(Note: All variables are deflated to control for any scale effects. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results are 
based on robust standard error to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively.ABTDit are derived from OLS BTDs model in previoussection, figures in ABTDit are all multiplied by 100 for scale effects;other 
variable definitions follow table 5.9) 
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5.7 Conclusion 
  
Managers in firms would face the tradeoffs between tax costs and non-tax 
costs such us financial reporting costs when making financial and tax 
reporting decisions. Recent widespread earning manipulations, tax sheltering 
activities and pervasive accounting scandals have drawn much attention from 
academics, regulators and users of financial information. Prior studies have 
documented that large book-tax differences are' red flags' to investors, tax 
authorities as well as credit agencies (Lev & Nissim, 2004; Hanlon, 2005; 
Wilson, 2009; Ayers et al. 2010). Evidence based on U.S. data shows that 
BTDs can detect earning management in some settings (Phillips et al. 2003) 
and BTDs are also a good indicator of tax aggressiveness (Frank et al. 2009; 
Wilson, 2009; Tang & Firth, 2011).   
 
This study extends the existing literature in China with its unique institutional 
characteristics that are different from those in the developed world. For 
example, the changes in China's tax regime has potentially provided firms 
with incentives to engage in tax and earning management. This study follows 
the approach of Tang & Firth (2011) by using tax-effect BTDs and taking 
advantage of information available in the notes to tax reconciliation to model 
the difference between income for financial reporting purposes and income for 
tax reporting purposes and decomposing between mechanical differences 
(NBTDs) and opportunistic differences (ABTDs). It should be recognized that 
it is difficult to measure corporate tax planning and different measures have 
their own strengths and weaknesses and none are inferior or superior to the 
other. To our knowledge, this is the first such dataset applied in the tax 
literature in Chinese context. 
 
The evidence from our modeled regression is consistent with the view that a 
small number of mechanical factors are responsible for a significant amount of 
book-tax differences, which account for around 45 percent of the differences 
between financial and tax reporting. This study also provides insight into the 
policy debates with regard to book-tax conformity. Institutional mechanical 
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differences are still the major differences between accounting law and tax 
rules, increasing the extent of conformity between accounting income and 
taxable income can be argued as a way of preventing both tax aggressiveness 
and earning management, and also as a way to reduce financial costs and tax 
costs.  These empirical evidences provide new insights to help explain the 
informational content of book-tax differences. 
 
Based on a hand collected sample of 229 publicly listed Chinese firms over 
the 2006 to 2012 period, the basic idea of this study is to refine the procedures 
to estimate normal and abnormal BTDs from a firm, the fitted value from the 
modeled regression give rise to NBTDs and the residuals are the ABTDs 
which are presumed to arise as a result of earning management and tax 
planning. This residual approach is of significance to isolate managers' 
opportunistic behaviors. Then we will use the refined decomposition of tax 
liability to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
abnormal BTDs in the following two empirical chapters. However, there 
remains more research to be done into the nuances of book-tax relationship, 
such as the detailed analysis of particular industries (e.g. financial and 
insurance industries) with more homogeneous financial and tax reporting, 
modeling specific type of expense and income items for the accruals process 
of two rules in order to have a better understanding of both the origin of these 
differences (Manzon & Plesko, 2002). No measure can be perfect, in order to 
prove that the resulting residual is a good proxy for the firm's tax planning 
activity, a validation check can be taken use the sample of firms that are 
involved in ligation in terms of aggressive tax sheltering activities (Graham & 
Tucker, 2006; Desai& Dharmpala, 2009; Frank et al. 2009); However, due to 
the confidentiality of tax data in China, we cannot obtain the list of listed firms 
that are accused for engaging in aggressive tax sheltering, therefore, this can 
be one limitation of our study. Residual approach conducted by Desai & 
Dharmpaala, 2006, 2009) and Frank et al. (2009) are based on U.S. financial 
data, which we cannot apply for comparing their ability to explain tax 
sheltering activity with our BTD model's ability directly, therefore only 
theoretical arguments were derived.   
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The study also examines the shareholder valuation of tax aggressiveness, as it 
is not clear whether benefits of firms' tax planning activities accrue to the 
firms' shareholders or its managers in the Chinese corporate environment, 
while the latter party exploit the tax aggressive positions for the own benefits 
at the expense of their firms' shareholders due to the separation of ownership 
and control would be further studied in the next two empirical chapters. Our 
empirical conclusion extends prior studies that aggressive tax behavior is not 
perceived by shareholders as  a value enhancing activity (Desai & 
Dharmapala 2009; Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009; Wilson, 2009) but in fact is 
value reducing (Wahab & Holland, 2012). A consistent negative association 
between firm value and tax planning activities is found which is robust to a 
wide number of different controls and specifications as well as the inclusion of 
corporate governance measures; and the results are consistent with the agency 
cost theory of tax planning of Desai & Dharmapala (2006). With regards to the 
shareholder valuation of tax aggressiveness, the inferences were based on an 
association test which may cause problem due to the omitted correlated 
variables; meanwhile, the factors used to capture the corporate governance 
structure are far from perfect and further criteria imposed to split firms into 
subgroups are required by researcher (Jimenez-Augueira, 2007), 
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6.0 Controlling block-holders, institutional investors and tax 
aggressiveness of Chinese listed firms 
 
6.1 Introduction 
  
Tax aggressiveness is broadly defined as an activity where transactions are 
made with the aim to increase either after-tax income or after-tax cash flow. 
Prior research examine the extent to which tax disclosure contain information 
about earning information and suggest that book-tax income differences 
(BTDs) relating to both firm's earnings quality and operating performance (e.g. 
Philips et al, 2003; Lev and Nissim, 2004; Hanlon, 2005, Blaylock et al. 2012), 
certain economic characteristics and firm valuation (e.g. Donohoe & McGill, 
2011) as well as to mechanical differences between financial reporting 
standards and tax laws. Shelvin (2002) argues that the growing BTDs may be 
caused by the increased tax aggressiveness behaviors. This chapter examines 
how of the complex corporate ownership in China affects tax reporting 
practices of listed firms. A growing line of literature has looked at ownership 
structure and corporate governance mechanisms in China (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997; Gul et al. 2010; Badertscher et al. 2013). Yet limited researchhas 
examined the role of ownership structures on tax reporting practices of listed 
firms in China (Zheng & Han, 2009;Zeng, 2010;Wu, et al. 2012a; Wu, Rui & 
Wu, 2013). This study is motivated by the growing importance of the role that 
China plays in world economy, which provides a unique institutional setting to 
examine the effect of strength of political connections vs. market forces on the 
tax reporting practices of Chinese listed firms.The governance of China's 
SOEs is subject to both market and non-market forces such as government 
interventions and political connections in China's emerging economies (Fan, 
Wong & Zhang, 2007).  It is argued that political connections constitute a 
valuable source of firm value (Fisman, 2001; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). 
The positive effects that derived from government-related benefits including 
bank loans, favorable tax treatments and market power (Fisman, 2001; 
Adhikari et al, 2006; Claessens et al. 2008). It is emphasized by prior studies 
that the effects of political connections are most pronounced in countries with 
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weak legal enforcements, inefficiencies of independent institutions to monitor 
government and high levels of corruption (e.g. Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; 
Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Claessens et al. 2008).Therefore, it is expected 
that government control and political connections still play a significant role in 
the Chinese market, despite the significant progress has been made on the 
reforms of social and economic systems over the past two decades. This is due 
to the fact that a majority of the Chinese listed firms are spin-offs from wholly 
state owned firms, which has discussed in previous section. The state (central, 
city and regional governments, associated departments and ministries, and 
SOEs) often retain a substantial investment in the spin-off listed firms. State 
ownership represents a strong form of political connection and a more direct 
tie with the government than having connected managers (Wu, Wu, Zhou & 
Wu, 2012). The significanceof political connections as a factor of tax 
aggressiveness has attracted growing research interest (Adhikari et al, 
2006;Faccio, 2006; Wu,Wu, Zhou & Wu, 2012; Chan, Mo & Zhou, 2013). For 
example, Adhikari et al (2006) find that firms with political connections 
inMalaysia pays tax at significant lower effective tax rates than other firms, 
which further suggest the importance of political connections as a determinant 
of tax reporting practices in relationship-based economies.In our study, two 
different types of political connections commonly found in China are 
examined. They are political connections through controlling shareholder and 
connections through the state ownership.From another perspective, 
market-oriented forces resulting from regulatory change can also affect 
corporate governance and firm performance (e.g. Mar & Young, 2001). Since 
the implementation of market-wide reforms, in particular, the split-share 
structure reform, we can evaluate whether market forces represented by 
institutional ownership play an important role on the tax aggressiveness in the 
process of market development, although China's economy is still under 
government interventions. Thus, China's institutional setting is particularly 
conducive to observe the effects of political connections intertwining with 
market-oriented forces in the adoption of tax reporting practices during the 
transition period.Meanwhile, the development of the accounting and tax 
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system in China provides a unique research setting, and the study will 
highlight some aspects of tax management in China. 
 
Our study makes several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, this 
study adds to extant literature by addressing the relationship between 
ownership control and tax strategies from a different perspective, namely, an 
agency perspective within the Chinese institutional framework, examining the 
tax aggressiveness as an indication of the agency problem faced by listed firms. 
It is argued that the root causes of tax aggressiveness in China arise from the 
conflict of interests between controlling ownership and minority shareholders 
(Ding, Zhang & Zhang, 2007). This study attempts to link ownership structure 
of listed firms with their tax aggressive behaviors; given that ownership 
structure is identified as the primary determinant of agency costs.Government 
shareholding of most listed firms is traditionally a typical phenomenon in most 
emerging economies, with the on-going process of market-oriented reforms in 
these economies, our empirical results should contribute to investors' 
understanding of accounting and management behaviors in Chinese listed 
firms and serve as a reference for emerging economies to improve their tax 
compliance. Secondly, this study adds to the mostly U.S.-based BTD literature 
by providing international empirical evidence on the implications of the 
regulatory and opportunistic sources of BTDs for interpreting the influence of 
political forces, market forces and their interaction on tax aggressiveness. Our 
results provide evidence that political connections are an important 
determinant of corporate tax planning in a ‗relationship-based‘ economy.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses 
the relevant institutional background in China. Section 6.3 reviews literature 
and develops the hypotheses. Then the next section 6.4 describes data and 
designs models for the empirical tests. Section 6.5 presents the results and 
sensitivity results. Finally, a conclusion and summary is presented in section 
6.6.  
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6.2 Institutional Background 
6.2.1 Split share structure reform 
  
The split share structure reform of China that started in 2005 marks a major 
change upon the institutional setting of the Chinese stock market (Cumming & 
Hou, 2012). Historically, China's stock market is characterized by a high level 
of ownership concentration and a low level of marketability. Historically, A 
unique institutional feature of China that was different from those of other 
countries was the split share structure (or called a two-tier share structure), 
which refers to the presence of both tradable shares and non-tradable shares 
although both types of shares have the same cash flow and voting rights but 
with different tradability (Zou et al. 2008).  Prior to the split-share structure 
reform as of February 2005, non-tradable shares accounted for two-thirds of 
the total A-shares outstanding and were mainly controlled by the various 
levels of Chinese governments and legal persons, with the remaining 
shareholding held by a large numbers of individuals and some financial 
institutions. In China, the top 10 shareholders are normally the state and legal 
person for most listed firms. The aim of this split share structure was designed 
to significantly constrain the tradability of shares held by state and legal 
persons in order to give government absolute control over the partially 
privatized companies in stock markets while improving the performance of 
SOEs with market mechanisms at the same time. This unique split share 
structure can induce conflicts of interests between tradable and non-tradable 
shareholders as well as divergent interests, which has long been recognized as 
the main cause of many corporate governance problems in China (see Chen, 
Firth, Gao & Rui, 2006, Chen, Firth, Xin &Xu, 2008). 
  
It is argued by Shleifer &Vishny (1997) and Claessens&Fan (2002)thatthe 
expropriation of smaller shareholders by thelargest shareholders is the main 
agency problem in Asian emerging markets, which indicate that the 
controllingshareholders of Chinese listed firms may use their control rightsfor 
tunneling, for example, controlling shareholders are provided with incentives 
to transfer cash from listed firms via cash dividends (Chen, Jin &Yuan, 2011). 
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Wei & Geng (2008) provide evidence that such a split share structure has 
created severe agency problems between the controlling non-tradable 
shareholders and other tradable shareholders due to the misalignment between 
risk sharing and exercise of control by non-tradable shares. On the one hand, 
managers of the non-tradable shares controlled firms have greater incentive to 
act in the best interests of state or legal persons due to weak managerial 
incentives faced by them and their political appointments; on the other hand, a 
lack of common interest for market disciplines and shareholder value 
maximization resulted in agency problem between holders of tradable shares 
and non-tradable shares, as non-tradability may induce non-tradable 
shareholders to expropriate firm resources for their private interests. Aharony, 
Wang, and Yuan (2010),Jian & Wong(2010) and Jiang et al. (2010) provide 
evidencesthat listed firms can benefit the controlling shareholders at the cost 
of smaller shareholders through related party transactions. Meanwhile, Yu et 
al. (2006) find that controlling shareholders use false information disclosure to 
engage in earning manipulation in order for compliance with CSRC's 
profitability requirements. 
  
In order to solve the governance problems, a split share structure reform 
program was initiated by the Chinese government in April 2005, with the aim 
of converting non-tradable shares into tradable shares. It is worth noting that, 
conversion from all non-tradable shares to tradable can have a huge downward 
price pressure to the existing tradable shares due to the increased liquidity and 
extra supply of tradable shares in the market, non-tradable shareholdersare 
required to compensate tradable shareholders in order to maketheir shares 
tradable in the future (Firth, Chen & Zou, 2010). With the exception of 
thecompensation plan, the reform had very little direct immediate impact on 
the structure of the Chinese stockmarket in the short run. 
 
According to The Measures for the Administration of the Share-Trading 
Reform of Listed Companies, there is a compulsory 12-month lockup periodto 
restrict holders of non-tradable shares from selling their shares after the reform 
plan becomes effective for each participant firm. In addition, non-tradable 
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shareholders are only allowed to sell, at most, 5 percent (10 percent) of the 
shares outstanding within 12 (24) months after the lockup period (Liao, Liu & 
Wang, 2011). 
  
It can be expected that the impact of this reform to be more pronounced 
among Chinese firms controlled by state ownership, since it enhances the 
incentives of the dominant shareholders to monitor and ensure firm value 
maximization by managers and it is of interest to examine the effect of 
different types of ownership structure on the tax reporting practices of listed 
firms in China after the split share structure reform.  
  
The figure 6.1 illustrate how the ownership structures of the Chinese listed 
firms have evolved over time since the year 2005 when the split share reform 
started to the year 2012. It is clearly that the proportion of state ownership as 
well as total non-tradable shareholding consistently decreased from 2005 to 
2012, which is consistent with the changing policies of Chinese government to 
divert more of state shares since the split share structure reform that was 
effective in 2005. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the proportion of tradable 
sharesincrease significantly since the 2005 with the restricted shares decrease 
over time simultaneously, reflecting the role of split share structure reform. 
The proportion of the managerial ownership and the institutional ownership 
was very low initially and increase consistently over time, which is in 
consistent with the growing number of mutual fund and securities firms 
associated with the latter. 
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Figure 6. 1: Evolvement of ownership structure for Chinese listed firms 
(In percentage) 
 
  
 
 6.3 Literature review and Hypothesis 
 
Managers are provided with incentives for diversification or activities that 
reduce shareholder value, given the separation of ownership and control, but 
managers would be pressured by large shareholders to reduce diversification 
and increase economic performance. Therefore, the identity of the owners of a 
firm has implications for the objectives of a firm and the way managers 
exercise their power. In our study, in terms of the research question at hand, 
state ownership and ownership concentration represent a strong form of 
political connection and a more direct tie with Chinese government while 
institutional ownership represents the form of market forces. 
  
 
6.3.1 State ownership and tax aggressiveness 
 
A special feature of the corporate ownership structure in China is the existence 
of non-tradable shares including shares owned by the state to retain control 
over listed firms which are classified as state shares and legal person shares. 
The non-tradable shareholders are entitled with exactly the same cash flow 
and voting rights but with restriction on public tradability even if the firm is 
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listed. Meanwhile, they are provided with the controlling power to direct and 
influence the decision-making of the firms, with their wealth is irrelevant to 
the market price of tradable shares (Tong, Zhang & Zhu, 2012). Despite the 
non-tradable shares reforms during the recent decade, the majority of Chinese 
listed firms are still closely linked to the government. The largest and the 
controlling shareholder for Chinese listed firms is most likely a large SOEs or 
central/city government, which can largely influence managerial decisions 
through its shareholding and political power (Liu & Lu, 2007; Lo et al. 2010). 
  
Empirical evidences suggest state ownership was not an effective governance 
mechanism in China due to inefficient monitoring and operation
10
, low 
managerial incentives and higher agency costs (Xu & Wang, 1999; Chen & 
Al-Najjar, 2012). The presence of state shareholding can be problematic due 
to several reasons (Jiang,Laurenceson&Tang, 2008). Firstly, the government 
shareholding can lead to inefficiencies such as lack of incentives to minimize 
costs (Shleifer&Vishny, 1997) and complicate the usual principal-agent 
problem due to the social and political objectives (e.g. maintaining level of 
employment) of government shareholding are conflicted with minority 
shareholders (e.g.maintaining level of employment) of government 
shareholding are conflicted with minority shareholders (e.g. profit 
maximization). Secondly, the status of their non-tradability precludes an 
outside market in corporate control (e.g. takeovers) and opportunistic 
behaviors have been widespread within listed firms (Yenug, 2009). 
 
Several studies examined the influence of state shareholding on tax strategies 
and offered divergent conclusion. On the one hand, it is argued that managers 
of government-controlled firms may have different tax objectives compared 
                                                             
10
The behaviors include: 1) transferring and appropriating company's profit and assets through 
unfair related partytransactions; 2) neglecting conflict of interest and engaging in self-dealing 
in pursuit of private gains; 3) cheating onprofit level to meet public offering requirements; 4) 
manipulating IPO and secondary market prices; 5) trading oninsider information; 6) engaging 
in deceiving public investors for private gains through outright misrepresentation;7) 
developing connections by using companies' resources. (Yenug, 2009:p10) 
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with their counterparts (Crocker & Slemrod, 2005; Zeng, 2010; Wu, Wang, 
Gill & Luo, 2012; Chan, Mo & Zhou, 2013). As managers in 
government-controlled firms are appointed and evaluated by the government 
(Kato & Long, 2006a.b), state ownership provide them with incentive to 
pursue social and political objectives besides objective of maximization of 
after-tax profits. Cao and Zhang (2008) and Zeng (2010) find that 
management in firms with higher state shareholding are less aggressive in tax 
reporting in order to obtain a good reputation of more tax payments to get 
promoted and a promising political career. Wu et al. (2007) and Wu, Wang, 
Gills & Luo (2012) do not find a significant relationship between state 
shareholding and tax burdens; however, the effect of firm size on effective tax 
rate depends on the nature of the controlling shareholder.  
 
On the other hand, managers of government-controlled firms are more likely 
to maximize corporate resources under their control through aggressive tax 
strategies by taking advantage of their political connections (Cull & Xu, 2005; 
Faccio, 2006), which may in turn increase managerial compensation through 
its impact on firm value (Bushman et al. 2004; Wang, Wong & Xia, 2008). 
For example, Adhikari et al. (2006) find that firms in Malaysia with higher 
state shareholding pay less tax due to benefits from their political connections. 
Kim and Zhang (2013) also shows that political connections are positively 
associated with aggressive tax planning, due the fact that lower cost of tax 
aggressiveness such as reduction in the probability of tax planning being 
detected by related administrators and a lesser need for financial transparency 
via political connections (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Yu & Yu, 2011). 
Therefore, it is possible that the cost of tax planning is lower and the benefit is 
higher for politically connected firms than for that of counterparts.  
 
The argument for the influence of political influence on corporate tax 
aggressiveness is inconclusive and leads to our first hypothesis: 
  
H1: State ownership is associated with tax aggressiveness of Chinese listed 
firms. 
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6.3.2 Ownership concentration and tax aggressiveness 
 
Large controlling shareholders typically can exercise control power through 
their concentrated ownership over major corporate decisions including tax 
strategies and directly engage in the managerial process. There are two 
counteracting effect of ownership concentration on corporate governance (La 
Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2002). First, an incentive alignment effect. 
Concentrated ownership can serve to align the interests between controlling 
and minority shareholders in countries with a less developed legal and 
institutional environment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Lins, 2003). Second, an 
entrenchment effect. The controlling shareholders are provided incentives to 
transfer cash flows from the firm at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Claessens et al. 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002; Johnson et al. 2000). Empirical 
studies apply the ownership concentration as a proxy for the monitoring 
strength (e.g. Wright et al, 1996) and find a negative relationship between 
managerial opportunistic behaviors and ownership concentration. In view of 
the unique institutional environment in China, the widespread concentration of 
state ownership in Chinese listed firms induces more entrenchment effect and 
less incentive alignment effect, which in turn lead to weak corporate 
governance and low transparency (e.g. Ding, Zhang & Zhang, 2007; Gul, Kim, 
and Qiu, 2010).  
 
Prior literature provides mixed results on the association between ownership 
concentration and the level of tax aggressiveness. On the one hand, firms in 
countries with higher ownership concentration are provided with incentives of 
tax aggressiveness as they have lower non-tax costs and may be more tax 
aggressive because large shareholders can effectively monitor and incentivize 
managers to generate more tax savings (Desai & Dharmapala, 2008; Zeng, 
2010;). In this case, ownership concentrated firms are more concerned with 
tax saving strategies in order to benefit themselves. On the other hand, firms in 
countries with higher ownership concentration may be less tax aggressiveness 
due to implementation costs and agency costs involved (Chen et al. 2010). In 
firms with highly concentrated ownership structure, the large shareholders will 
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have incentive to monitor managers' behaviors including their tax-saving 
activities due to the significant costs associated with risky tax planning 
activities and to ensure that managers behave in ways that benefit shareholders 
(Firth et al. 2007a.b; Badertscher et al. 2013). Therefore, we test the following 
hypothesis:  
  
H2: Ownership concentration is associated with tax aggressiveness of Chinese 
listed firms. 
 
 
6.3.3 Institutional ownership and tax aggressiveness 
 
Institutional shareholding is considered as good for overall corporate 
governance practices, due to the active role of monitoring and disciplining 
managerial opportunism as well as improvement of information efficiency that 
play in the capital market (Bushee, 1998, 2001; Gillan & Starks, 2000; Wei, 
Xie & Zhang, 2005). It is often been assumed that all institutional shareholder 
are equal in their monitoring role, however, the power of institutional investors 
is partially a function of the size of their individual or collective shareholding 
(Maug, 1998; Chung et al. 2002). When institutional investors have high 
shareholdings, they will typical hold for a longer period of time and have 
greater incentives to monitor managers‘ actions. When shareholdings are low, 
they often invest for short-term horizons and have less incentive for them to 
monitor managerial opportunism, as they can liquidate easily or sell off their 
investment shares in response to unfavorable performance. In the similar vein, 
it is argued by Gasper et al (2005) that investment horizon of shareholders 
affects managerial decisions in corporate control events and weak monitoring 
role of short-term investors facilitate managers to trade-off interests of 
shareholders for personal benefits. The presence of asymmetry in the 
effectiveness of monitoring role indicates that ‗active monitoring‘institutional 
investors potentially with longer investment horizon and lower monitoring 
costs often exert more influences than other block-holders (Bushee, 1998, 
2000). The ‗short-termism‘institutional investors are more emphasis on short 
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term performance, and trade heavily based on current earnings; therefore fail 
to serve as effective monitors (Laverty, 1996; Koh, 2003; Callen & Fang, 
2013), Yan and Zhang (2009) provide evidence that short-term institutional 
shareholders are better informed and actively trade to exploit their 
informational advantages for self-interests than long-term institutional 
shareholders. If this is true, it is expected that concentrated shareholding in the 
hands of institutional investors is likely to reduce accounting quality. Koh 
(2007) also provides evidence that aggressive earning management among 
firms that manage earning to meet earnings targets is constrained by long-term 
institutional investors but no such relationship holds for short-term 
institutional shareholding. Chung et al. (2002) find that large 
institutionalshareholding in a firm prevents managers from in pursuit of 
opportunistic earning management through discretionary accrual choices. Prior 
empirical studies find that the practices of tax aggressiveness are related to the 
representation of active institutional shareholders, although the results are 
mixed (Koh, 2003; Park & Shin, 2004; Wong et al. 2009). Moore (2012) 
analyzes the impact of institutional ownership on the level and time-series 
variability in book-tax differences among US firms and show that institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with book-tax differences. In contrast, 
Khurana & Moser (2013) find that U.S. firms with higher institutional 
ownership which also have higher ownership concentration are generally more 
tax aggressiveness. However, this finding is driven by firms with higher levels 
of short-term institutional investors, which is claimed to typically influence 
firms to promote short-term market value as opposed to long-term profitability 
and are more likely to push managers to invest in projects with greater 
expected near-term earnings (Laverty, 1996; Bushee, 1998, 2001; Gasper et al. 
2005), whereas firms with higher institutional investors with longer-term 
investment horizon are more concerned about long-term consequences of tax 
aggressiveness owing to a long lag between the design/implementation of tax 
transactions and detection by the IRS (Khurana & Moser, 2013) and thus are 
less tax aggressive. 
 
On balance, it is clear that large institutional shareholders have become 
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increasingly active in corporate governance and corporate decisions. Tax 
aggressiveness may not increase shareholder value or firm value, for example, 
more aggressive tax behaviors can cost firm value in the long-term in terms of 
increased probability of a tax auditing which lead to additional taxes, penalties 
and fined by tax administrations (Mills, 1998). On the one hand, institutional 
investors may effectively discipline and monitor managers in order to ensure 
that they maximize long-term firm value by constraining tax aggressiveness; 
on the other hand, institutional investors may influence managers to be more 
tax aggressiveness with an effort to maximize after-tax cash flow or after-tax 
earnings, as these institutional investors have a focus on short-term firm 
performance and induce managers to boost short-term earnings. Due to lack of 
consensus, we examine the relationship between tax aggressiveness and 
institutional ownership but do not predict the direction of the association. 
Therefore, our third alternative hypotheses are formally stated as follows: 
  
H3: Institutional ownership of a firm in China is related to its level of tax 
aggressiveness. 
 
 
6.4 Regression models for hypothesis testing 
 
We test a multivariate regression specification to examine the relationship 
between the various proxies of ownership structure and the level of tax 
aggressiveness. αitis the constant term capturing the fixed effect and the 
coefficient β captures the effects of independent variables on listed firms' level 
of tax aggressiveness, εitis an error term. Residuals from the BTDs model in 
previous chapter 5 are abnormal BTDs which will be regressed on a set of 
variables in the following equations. The first two equations test Hypothesis 1, 
the equation3 tests hypothesis 2 and equation 4 tests hypothesis 3. Equation5, 
6 and 7 are designed to examine the interaction between market forces (INST) 
and government-related interventions (OC, STA and GOV) on the level of tax 
aggressiveness. The effects of ownership shareholding are studied in separate 
regressions as these shareholdings are highly correlated and severe 
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multicollinearity will be present if both are included in one regression (Wei, 
Xie & Zhang, 2005).  
 
The basic specifications are as follows: 
 
ABTDit =αit+ β1OF_STAit + control variables + YEAR+ IND +εit(1) 
  
ABTDit =αit+ β1GOVit+ control variables + YEAR+ IND +εit(2) 
 
ABTDit =αit+ β1OCit+ control variables + YEAR+ IND +εit(3) 
 
ABTDit =αit+ β1OF_INSTit+ control variables + YEAR+ IND +εit(4)  
  
ABTDit =αit+ β1OC +β2 OF_INSTit +β3OCit* OF_INSTit + control variables+ 
YEAR+ IND +εit (5) 
  
ABTDit =αit+ β1OF_INSTit+β2GOVit +β3INSTit*GOVit + control variables+ 
YEAR+ IND +εit(6) 
 
ABTDit =αit+ β1OF_INSTit+β2 OF_STAit +β3INSTit* OF_STAit + control 
variables+ YEAR+ IND +εit(7) 
 
Where: 
ABTDit is the residual BTDs derived from BTD model in chapter five, scaled 
by total assets 
 
OCit is the oownership concentration which is calculated as the percentage of 
shares held by the largest ten shareholders over the total outstanding shares 
 
OF_STAit is the state shares fraction which is the percentage number of state 
shares as well as legal person shares over total outstanding shares. 
 
OF_INSTit is the institutional share fraction which is the level of total 
institutional shareholding over total outstanding shares 
 
GOVit is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the largest shareholder is 
government-related, and 0 otherwise 
 
Control variables are a set of control variables 
  
YEAR and IND are year and industry dummy variables 
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11
Each of the models is deflated to control for any scale effects (Akbar & Stark, 
2003). The reported results are based on OLS estimation with presence of 
dummy variables. One possible problem in panel data estimation across years 
is that error terms for a given firm-year observation are correlated across years, 
therefore, we use robust standard errors by clustering on each firm (Petersen, 
2009; Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012), in order to correct for potential 
heteroskedasicity and potential time series autocorrelation within firm 
observations.  
 
 6.4.1 Ownership variables 
 
We include a set of variables that are likely sources of book-tax differences or 
incentives to invest in tax planning. Here we include indicator variables 
ownership concentration (OCit) and ownership share fraction (OFit), which are 
our main variables of interest. Ownership concentration (OCit), on the one 
hand, plays a significant role in alleviating information asymmetry and 
improving corporate governance effectiveness (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
On the other hand, however, it is argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) the 
ownership concentration may result in expropriations of other minority 
stakeholders by the largest shareholders. Most Chinese listed firms have a 
                                                             
11
The application of difference-in-differences methods has become very widespread for 
estimation of causal effects, which measure the effect of a treatment for two groups for two 
time periods (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009; Lechner, 2011). It is often used to measure change 
induced by a particular treatment or event and difference-in-difference estimator represent the 
difference between pre- and post-differences of the treatment and control groups, in this study, 
is the change in accounting policy that was effective in 2008. With unbalanced panel data 
from 2006 to 2012, I compare changes in outcomes for group affected by tax reform that was 
effective in the year 2008 with changes in outcome for groups not affected by tax reform. TR 
is a dummy variable with 1 stands for period 2008 to 2012 and 0 stands for period 2006 to 
2007, which is the equivalent of 'treatment', and GOV is a dummy variable with 1 stands for 
government-related firms and 0 stands for non-government-related firms, which is the 
equivalents of 'control groups', capture the possible difference between treatment and control 
groups. The interaction term (TR*GOV) between TR and GOV, is our main variable of 
interest, which is the same as a dummy variable equal to one for those government-related 
firm observation in the treatment group in the period 2008-2012. The model is as follows, 
ABTDit =αit+ β1GOVit+β2TRit +β3TRit*GOVit + control variables + YEAR+ IND +εit. Due to 
the insignificance of the variable of interest TR*GOV, the regression results are not reported. 
 
 188 
 
dominant shareholder and will have greater influences with the increase in 
number of shares they owned. We therefore examine whether the proportion 
of shares owned by the largest shareholders has an influence on the 
manipulation of tax planning.  
 
The variable ownership share fraction (OFit) can be applied to test the 
influence of different level of ownership structure that are typical of Chinese 
listed firms on tax aggressiveness in China respectively, namely, in our study, 
state ownership plus state-owned legal person shareholding (OF_STAit), the 
percentage of institutional investors shareholding (OF_ INSTit)
12
 and the 
percentage of mutual funds shareholding (OF_ FUNDit). As the proportion of 
ownership held by the above different level is obviously correlated, so we test 
their effect on tax aggressiveness separately. GOVitis a dummy variable which 
is equal to 1 when the largest shareholder is government-relatedinstitution and 
0 otherwise. These two measuresOF_STAit and GOVit examine the extent of 
influence of government on a firm.  
  
 
6.4.2 Firm-specific Characteristics 
 
In addition to test the association between types of ownership structure and 
aggressive tax activities, we also control for year-fixed effects, industry-fixed 
effects and several additional firm-specific characteristics that the prior 
literature (e.g., Manzon and Plesko, 2002; Rego, 2003; Mills, 1998; Dyreng et 
al, 2008; Frank et al, 2009; Chen et al, 2009;Zeng, 2010;Khurana & Moser, 
2013) suggest that could be associated with aggressive tax reporting to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms so as to ensure that the results are not 
driven by fundamental differences among the level of ownership structure. As 
                                                             
12
Institutional shareholding disclosed in Chinese stock market including shareholding held by 
mutual funds, insurance companies, securities companies, wealth management products, QFII, 
pension funds, financial companies, trust companies, banks and the general legal persons. In 
this study, the INSTit is measured as the total institutional shareholding minus the general 
legal persons shareholding. 
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indicated by Marra et al. (2011), failure to control for potentially confounding 
factors may result in a misleading interpretation of results. 
 
We include variables commonly found in the tax literature that affect costs, 
benefits and opportunities of firms to engage in tax sheltering activities. We 
include LOSSit and LEVit to controls for a firm's need to tax planning. we 
include LOSSit to capture a firm's current profitability and whether loss firms 
have greater incentive to engage in aggressive tax strategies (Chan, Lin & Mo, 
2010; Tang & Firth 2011; Badertscher et al, 2013), which is a dummy variable 
that equals to 1 when a consolidated entity has a loss in the current year t and 
0 otherwise. we use LEVitto measure a firm's leverage level in order to capture 
the impact of the firm's capital structure on firm risk and the extent of the tax 
shield of debt (Hanlon, Maydew & Shevlin, 2008;Wilson, 2009; Frank, Lynch 
& Rego, 2009; Armstrong, Blouin & Larcker, 2012), which is measured as 
total liabilities divided by total assets. This is due to the fact that firms have 
less incentives to tax planning with greater leverage arise from the associated 
tax benefits of debt financing such as interest on borrowing is tax deductible 
(Stickney & McGee,  1982; Porcano, 1986). Meanwhile, leverage could 
imply the increasing monitory by debt-holders and managers are also 
concerned with increased financing reporting costs associated with tax savings 
(Zeng, 2010). A higher non-tax cost of conforming book income will be 
associated with a tax aggressiveness position given the higher leverage, and 
thus a negative relationship between leverage and aggressiveness can be 
expected (Chan, et al. 2010). However, due to the mixed empirical evidences 
on the relationship between leverage and BTDs in prior literature (Mills & 
Newberry, 2001; Frank et al. 2009; Moore, 2012), therefore, we make no 
prediction about the sign of the coefficient on LEVit .  
 
 In addition, market value of equity, all in natural logarithm (SIZEit) is added 
to capture changes in the scale or size of the firm and also proxy for the 
benefits of tax sheltering (Jiang, Lee & Anandarajan, 2008; Wilson, 2009; 
Armstrong, Blouin & Larcker, 2012; Tang & Firth, 2012; Khurana & Moser, 
2013). The impact of firm size on tax aggressiveness is inconclusive, on the 
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one hand, larger firms have higher political pressure to be less aggressive, and 
onthe other hand, larger firms may take advantage of greater political 
influence and are better able to enjoy tax benefits (Wu, Wang, Gills & Luo, 
2012). Dyreng et al. (2008) find that long-run tax sheltering is positively 
associated with firm size. Larger firms are more likely to have asophisticated 
internal tax department, given the presence of economies of scale of tax 
planning (Armstrong, Blouin, & Larcker, 2010). Capital intensity (CAPINTit), 
which is measured as fixed assets divided by total assets, isadded to control for 
the opportunities related to investments in fixed assets, and can affect book-tax 
differences through its accelerated depreciation relative to its actual lives of 
assets (Porcano, 1986; Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Mills & Newberry, 2001; 
Phillips, 2003; Frank et al. 2009; Lin, Lu & Zhang, 2012; Wu, Wang, Gills & 
Luo, 2012; Wu, Rui & Wu, 2013). Capital-intensive (CAPINT) firms are more 
influenced by the differences in financial reporting and tax treatments of 
depreciation. 
  
The other variables are related to firms' financial performance, ROEit is added 
to control for firm's profitability because growing and profitable firms are 
more likely to make larger investments in depreciable assets. Therefore, the 
overall firm performance is controlled and the specific effects of tax 
management is teased out by inclusion of variable ROEit (Hanlon, Maydew & 
Shevlin, 2008; Chen, Chen, Cheng & Shelvin, 2010; Armstrong et al. 
2012;Khurana & Moser, 2013).   
 
Finally,measure for earning management (EMit) is added to control for 
Chinese listed firms' engage in earning management for financial reporting 
purpose, due to the fact that ABTD can be indicative of earning management 
and tax management of the Chinese listed firms (Mills & Newberry, 2001; 
Phillips et al. 2003; McGill & Outslay, 2004; Hanlon, 2005; Frank, Lynch & 
Rego, 2009; Tang & Firth, 2011; Firth, Lo & Wong, 2013). The study 
conducted by Phillips et al (2003) find firms' management of their book 
income in order to avoid reported losses, which in Chinese listed firms, Jiang 
& Wang (2008) find that percentage of firms with small profits is significantly 
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higher than that of firms with small losses, which further provide evidence on 
Chinese listed firms' engagement in earning management (Firth, Lo & Wong, 
2013); meanwhile, it is regulated by CSRC (2001) in terms of delisting and 
trading restrictions that losses for three consecutive years cannot be reported 
by Chinese listed firms in case of their shares being suspended and delisted. 
As a result, there is propensity for Chinese listed firms to report positive 
earning to avoid delisting (Tang & Firth, 2011). Therefore, it is necessary to 
control for earning management as it can give rise to similar differences in 
examining effects of BTDs (Phillips, Pincus & Rego, 2003; Hanlon, 2005; 
Wahab & Holland, 2012). We do not predict the sign for control variables 
including LEV, ROA and SIZE as prior studies do not have consistent results 
(Gupta & Newberry, 1997; Wu, Wang, Lin & Li, 2007;Zeng, 2010). 
  
 
6.4 Data collection and preliminary results 
 
Data on financial statements and ownership structure are collected from the 
CSMAR database, while the information about different types of ownership 
structure is collected from both CSMAR database and WIND database. The 
data set used for the main analysis was unbalanced panel of 1080 firm-year 
observations for the period 2006 to 2012, in consistent with sample selection 
in Chapter 4.  
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics for variables in the ABTD model 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
ABTD 958 0 0.008 -0.055 -0.030 
OC 1051 0.636 0.178 0.148 1.018 
STA 1048 0.200 0.248 0 0.863 
INST 1024 0.169 0.179 0 0.882 
FUND 944 0.133 0.158 0 0.774 
GOV 1010 0.846 0.361 0 1 
LEV 1054 0.519 0.200 0.014 1.376 
LOSS 1073 0.072 0.259 0 1 
SIZE 1040 10.026 0.061 8.486 12.700 
ROE 1044 0.078 0.334 -8.889 0.662 
EM 1054 -0.063 0.099 -0.453 0.905 
CAPINT 1054 0.305 0.210 0 0.861 
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations Matrix 
  ABTD OC STA INST FUND GOV LEV LOSS SIZE ROE EM 
OC 0.161 
          STA 0.105 0.316 
         INST -0.095 0.096 0.205 
        FUND -0.129 0.066 0.247 0.879 
       GOV 0.150 0.167 0.314 -0.006 -0.078 
      LEV 0.132 0.013 -0.063 -0.031 -0.012 -0.005 
     LOSS -0.087 -0.065 0.031 -0.123 -0.117 0.026 0.166 
    SIZE 0.172 0.490 0.239 0.287 0.278 0.209 0.036 -0.147 
   ROE 0.082 0.082 -0.004 0.135 0.133 -0.042 -0.134 -0.367 0.126 
  EM 0.194 -0.035 -0.075 -0.079 -0.065 -0.055 0.097 -0.192 -0.113 0.109 
 CAPINT 0.049 0.228 0.163 0.016 -0.007 0.187 -0.090 0.125 0.163 -0.038 -0.352 
 
  
Panel C: Firms' applicable tax rates 
Year 
Nominal 
tax rate 
Total 
firms 
Number 
of firms 
with 
applicable 
tax rate 
lower than 
nominal 
tax rate 
percentage 
of firms 
with 
applicable 
tax rate 
lower than 
nominal 
tax rate 
2006 0.33 105 53 0.505 
2007 0.33 126 56 0.444 
2008 0.25 155 68 0.439 
2009 0.25 169 73 0.432 
2010 0.25 194 76 0.392 
2011 0.25 192 72 0.375 
2012 0.25 132 30 0.227 
Total   1073 428 0.399 
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Table 6.1 provides the descriptive statisticsof all major variables. All variables 
arestationary
13
 based on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
unit root tests.Pearson correlation among explanatory variables is presented in 
Panel B. Both of the state shareholding and government-related firms dummy 
variable are positively correlated with ABTDs, which is different from Ding, 
Zhang & Zhang (2007); Zeng (2010); Tang & Firth (2011) and suggests the 
need for further analysis.Because no correlation coefficient between 
independent variables is greater than 0.8 and Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) 
are relatively low and smaller than 10, it can be concluded that the issue of 
multi-collinearity problems is unlikely to be present in the regression models 
(Gujarati, 2009). Furthermore, it is indicated by Firth, Fung & Rui (2007a.b) 
that the endogeneity issue of ownership is less of a concern due to the fact that 
dominant owners are usually selected by the state, subsequent transfers of the 
dominant shareholding are relatively rare and state's approval is required. 
 
A new Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law) that general tax rate 25 on 
company profits was effective in January 2008, However, the effect of new 
EIT Law on Chinese listed firms would depend on firms' prior statutory tax 
rate (Yin & Cheng, 2004; Lin, Lu & Zhang. 2012). For firms with a statutory 
tax rate that is higher than the new income tax rate of 25 percent would be 
expected to be tax planner before the implementation of the New EIT 
law.However, managers' strategies on book income and taxable income 
management may not always be preferred by firms due to the various conflicts 
among stakeholders. It shows that, on average the applicable tax rate (ATR) is 
23 percent, which is much less than the nominal rate of 33 percent (25 percent 
since 2008). Panel C of Table 1 shows firms' applicable tax rate in each year 
from 2006 to 2012. Since 2006, the number of firms that enjoy preferential 
rates has been reduced to 23 percent; this reduction is consistent with the 
change in tax policy discussed in Chapter 3. Overall, almost two-fifths of the 
sample observations in our study have ATRs lower than 33 percent (25 
percent since 2008).The maximum ATR of a firm is greater than one, it is 
                                                             
13
The results for unit root tests are not reported to conserve space 
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possible for a number of reasons, one reason may arise from the process of 
consolidation within a group of subsidiaries or associated firms with their net 
operating profits are combined net operating losses of those subsidiaries or 
associated firms (Adhikari et al. 2006).   
 
Table 6.2 shows the mean differences tests.It shows that government 
controlled firms have slightly higher ownership concentration and much 
higher state shareholding compared to private investor controlled firms. The 
sample mean tests of ABTD by firm control type, high-low ownership 
concentration, and high-low institutional ownership show that firms under 
government control or exhibit high ownership concentration are more tax 
aggressive than their counterparties. Firms with high mutual funds 
shareholdings are less tax aggressive than those with low mutual funds 
shareholdings. 
 
Table6.2:Mean differences tests  
Variables 
Government-related 
firms (GOV=1) 
Non-government-related 
firms (GOV=0) 
Difference 
ABTD 0.121 -0.073 -0.194*** 
OC 0.651 0.568 -0.083*** 
STA 0.237 0.019 -0.218*** 
Variables 
High ownership 
concentration 
(OC>64%) 
Low ownership 
concentration 
(OC<64%) 
Difference 
ABTD 0.095 -0.091 -0.186*** 
Variables 
High institutional 
shareholding 
(INST>11%) 
Low institutional 
shareholding 
(INST<11%) 
Difference 
ABTD -0.036 0.032 0.068 
Variables 
High mutual fund 
shareholding 
(FUND>7%) 
Low mutual fund 
shareholding 
(FUND<7%) 
Difference 
ABTD -0.027 0.061 0.088*** 
High and low ownership concentration and institutional shareholdingsare 
defined by being above or below their median value.***1% significance 
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6.5 Regression results 
6.5.1 Ownership structure and tax aggressiveness 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, decision-makers in firms need to take into account 
the tradeoff between the benefits and costs associated with determining the 
level of tax aggressiveness (Chen, Chen, Cheng & Shevlin, 2010). Benefits 
associated with effective tax management include greater tax savings and rent 
extraction for decision-makers at the cost of shareholders; while in terms of 
costs, there are not only potential penalties by tax departments but also 
significant non-tax costs such as implement costs, price discount imposed by 
other shareholders in the case of rent extraction (Desai & Dharmapala, 2006). 
As a result, the choice to engage in opportunistic behaviors depends on tax and 
non-tax cost consideration as well as on incentives of managers.  
  
The sample goes down to only around more than 900 observations due to 
missing values for ABTDs from BTDs model and some control variables. 
Overall, the R-square for the models ranges from 16 percent to 21 percent, 
suggesting that the magnitude of ABTDs can capture the reporting distortions 
induced by incentives of managers in response to Chinese institutional setting, 
after controlling for the mechanical misalignments between accounting and 
tax rules. Our main results reflect tests of H1, H2 and H3 are shown in Table 
6.3, and Table 6.3 shows the results from models 1 through 7.  
 
In terms of our hypothesis 1, the coefficients on STA and GOV are of interest. 
Although we make no prediction regarding the relationship between ABTD 
and the state ownership,Model 1 of Table 6.3shows that the variable STA has 
a significant positive coefficient (p<0.01) which shows there is a strong 
significant relationship between state shareholding and the level of tax 
aggressiveness. This is consistent with model 2 result when we replace STA 
with the dummy variable for government control GOV. The coefficient on 
GOV is also positive and significant at the 0.01 level, its coefficient suggests 
that on average, the abnormal book-tax differences is higher by 21.5 percent 
for government-controlled firms than for non-government-related firms, thus 
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they have strong incentives for tax management, the evidence is consistent 
with Adhikari etal. (2006) and Tang & Firth (2011) and Wu, Wu Zhou & Wu 
(2012), but is in contrast with study of Cao & Zhang (2008); Zheng & Han 
(2008) and Zeng (2010). One explanation would be that managers in 
government-related firms or firms with a higher state shareholding still have 
incentives to tax planning in an effort to increase their 
accounting-performance-based compensation, to attract foreign investment 
and to obtain permission to issue additional shares in the equity markets (Chen, 
Chen, Lobo & Wang, 2011). However, the reality of political connections as a 
possible factor in the tax reporting practices of Chinese listed firms needs to 
be recognized. As discussed above,multi-dimensional perspectives of political 
connections existed in the context of Chinese 'relationship-based' economy 
where the connections are based on informational ties between firms and 
politicians (Adhikari et al. 2006; Wu, Wu, Zhou & Wu, 2012; Ma, Ma & Tian, 
2013). Political connections can be translated into government support for a 
range of overlapping reasons, while the percentage of state shareholding in a 
firm (STA) or the government involvement in the firm (GOV) represent a 
strong form and a more direct tie with the Chinese government and can be 
viewed as a proxy for government support. Government involvement is 
associated with institutional environment in China (Wu, Rui & Wu, 2013). 
Managers are provided with incentive to be more tax aggressive than their 
counterparts, in order to take advantage of these tax benefits from 
governments, such as lower possibility of tax audits and penalties being 
imposed for tax evasions (Faccio, 2006; Li et al. 2006; Claessens et al. 2008; 
Faccio, 2010; Wu, Wu Zhou & Wu, 2012). Most of prior studies such as Ding, 
Zhang & Zhang (2007), Wu, Wang, Gills & Luo (2012) find a negative 
relationship between the high level of state ownership and tax planning in 
China, which suggest that the associated political goals and social objectives 
such as tax revenue maximization and unemployment settlement with state 
ownership, in order to make managers themselves in these firms promoted, 
resulting in less incentives to engage in tax planning activities.  
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For hypothesis 2,Model 3 of Table 6.3shows that, ownership concentration 
(OC)
14
 has a significant positive (p<0.01) association with the level of tax 
aggressiveness as expected in line with prior studies such as (Liu & Lu, 2007; 
Zeng, 2010). It does support the argument that entrenchment effect are 
expected to dominate the alignment effect in Chinese context, and indicate that 
large shareholders in firms with highly concentrated ownership will have 
sufficient incentive to exercise control and power over managerial process 
including their tax-saving activities that they are concerned, thus increasing 
monitoring costs, which is an inefficient corporate governance strategy in 
Chinese market with weak legal protection of minority shareholders. 
Meanwhile, it also suggest that large shareholders in Chinese listed firms have 
ties with government through political connections, which can be utilized to 
help firms to obtain government-related resources and supports such as 
tax-benefits (Zeng, 2010; Wu, Wu, Zhou & Wu, 2012), in line with our 
hypothesis 1 test results considering the government as major block-holders of 
the majority of listed firms in China. 
  
Finally, in terms of hypothesis 3, the coefficient on INST, which is proxy for 
market forces, is of interest. The coefficient on institutional ownership (INST) 
is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level; suggest that firms with 
higher level of total institutional ownership generally report lower ABTDs. In 
other words, firms with greater institutional ownership are less tax aggressive 
after controlling for other factors that affect tax sheltering activities, in 
consistent with study of Moore (2012) and Khurana & Moser (2013). The 
results provide evidence on decrease in information asymmetry between 
shareholders and managers by the higher level of institutional ownership 
andthe greater external monitoring by institutional investors on managerial 
reporting decisions. Model 5 further focuses on mutual funds as the most 
important institutional investors and shows that the result shows a consistent 
                                                             
14
Ownership concentration exclude the largest one shareholding is reconsidered, that is the 
ownership concentration from top2 to top 10 shareholding, and our results are unaffected. 
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positive sign but larger coefficient on FUND, whichsuggests the greater active 
monitoring of management by mutual fund investors. 
 
 
6.5.2 Interaction between political forces and market forces 
  
In model 6-11, we further add three interaction terms OC*INST, OC*STA and 
INST*GOV as an independent variablerespectively where appropriate to 
examine the relative strength of government association versus institutional 
investors influence on tax aggressiveness.We notice that with presence of the 
interaction variables, the coefficients on these variables are still positive. In 
contrast, the coefficient on INST and FUND are still negative and highly 
significant. Such results generally indicate that the institutional investors exert 
effective constraint on firm tax aggressive strategies and can mitigate the 
associated risks of a firm utilizing its political connections for aggressive tax 
avoidance. This finding also supports the promotion of institutional investors 
as monitoring agencies for corporate governance and minority interest 
protection in China. We also re-estimate the respective models using mutual 
fund shareholding (FUND) for robustness tests, new results are qualitatively 
equivalent to the previous results.  
 
In sum, empirical results shows that the tax reporting practices could also be 
driven by government control and government interests in China, a country 
which is similar to other emerging economies in its lack of full market 
competition and democratization. It provides implications for firms that they 
should integrate political behaviors and market strategies effectively, and 
balance the relationship between political behaviors and the market-oriented 
strategies. Firms with political connections should not ignore the improvement 
of their market orientation.  
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6.5.3 Effects of control variables. 
  
We discuss the effects of the control variables on the level of tax 
aggressiveness in this section. Several control variables
15
 are also significant. 
Table 6.3shows that the coefficients for LEV, EM, SIZE and CAPINT are 
statistically significant across model 1 through 7.  
  
The coefficient on LEV (leverage ratio) is positive and statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level, indicating that as long-term debt to total asset ratio increases, 
our sample firms experience higher abnormal permanent book-tax differences, 
in consistent with studies of Frank, Lynch & Rego (2009) and Chen, Chen, 
Cheng & Shevlin (2010) that highly leveraged firms may benefit from 
deductions in interest expenses compared to their counterparts. In addition, the 
coefficient of CAPINT (capital intensity) is significantly positive, suggesting 
that capital-intensive firms, proxied by a higher ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets, have more opportunities in selection of differing estimates and methods 
for purpose of depreciation expenses calculation, tend to have higher positive 
abnormal book-tax differences, which is in consistent with study of Mills & 
Newberry (2001), Chen, Chen, Cheng & Shelvin (2010) and Lin, Lu & Zhang 
(2012).  
 
In terms of firm size (SIZE), the coefficient is positive and significant, larger 
firms are more likely to be subject to political costs in terms of political cost 
hypothesis (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) as they are more subject to scrutiny 
                                                             
15
For robustness test, the control variablesCFO, measured as operating cash flow for firm i in 
year t scaled by the ending total assets,Change in sales growth(GSALE) which is measured as 
the difference between current sales and the prior year's sales over the prior year's sales as 
well as book to market ratio and Book to market ratio (BM) which is calculated as ending total 
assets divided by market Value are added respectively in order to ensure that ensure that the 
main results are not driven by the omission of a control variable. The results are virtually 
identical to those reported in Table 6.6, which indicate that our main empirical results are not 
affected by whether the model includes a control for cash flows or growth. In addition, as tax 
incentives of firms' tax sheltering activities are highly correlated with its financial 
performance, we employ different financial measures in the regression models, including 
ROA and Tobin's Q to test our hypotheses sequentially (instead of ROE), the results remain 
consistent with previous findings, albeit weaker. 
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and may have larger and more sophisticated tax departments (Yin & Cheng, 
2004). If this is true, by taking advantage of the scale and scope of operations, 
larger firms tend to have greater and better opportunities to engage in 
tax-planning activities relative to the other firms in their industries  (Phillips, 
2003;  Jiang, Lee & Anandarajan, 2008; Wilson, 2009, Chen, Chen, Cheng & 
Shevlin,2010; Khurana & Moser, 2013). More importantly, a firm's propensity 
to engage in book-tax non-conforming strategies is in part determined by 
earning management strategies, after controlling for the measure of earning 
management (EM) with adjustments on operating cash flow, the effects 
predicted by H1, H2 and H3 remain significant.No significant relationship 
between LOSS, ROE and abnormal BTDs is found in this study.  
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Table 6.3: Estimated regression results for ownership structure and tax aggressiveness 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
STA 0.325*** 
    
0.186   0.260* 
    
 
(2.58) 
    
(1.08) (1.67) 
    GOV 
 
0.215*** 
     
0.043 0.119 
  
  
(2.75) 
     
(0.44) (1.30) 
  OC 
  
 0.483*** 
      
0.267 0.133 
   
(2.67) 
      
(1.27) (0.65) 
INST 
   
-0.797*** 
 
-0.983*** 
 
-1.469*** 
 
-1.556** 
 
    
(-5.01) 
 
(-4.55) 
 
(-3.91) 
 
(-2.52) 
 FUND 
    
-1.080*** 
 
-1.432*** 
 
-1.421*** 
 
-2.848*** 
     
(-5.52) 
 
(-5.24) 
 
(-3.61) 
 
(-4.40) 
STA*INST 
     
0.727 
     
      
(1.09) 
     STA*FUND 
      
1.092 
    
       
(1.43) 
    INST*GOV 
       
0.870** 
   
        
(2.16) 
   FUND*GOV 
        
0.567 
  
         
(1.29) 
  OC*INST 
         
1.186 
 
          
(1.29) 
 OC*FUND 
          
 2.750*** 
           
(2.93) 
LEV 0.750***   0.732***  0.719*** 0.705***  0.740*** 0.703***  0.732*** 0.701***  0.736*** 0.685***  0.692*** 
 
(5.11) (4.93) (4.90) (4.76) (4.71) (4.73) (4.69) (4.72) (4.67) (4.62) (4.36) 
EM 2.081***   2.147***  2.184*** 1.943***  1.940*** 1.890***  1.877*** 1.932***  1.922*** 2.041***  2.084*** 
 
(5.56) (5.66) (5.78) (5.26) (5.34) (5.19) (5.33) (5.20) (5.23) (5.51) (5.70) 
ROE 0.149 0.161 0.137 0.179 0.031 0.186 0.036 0.191 0.038 0.176 0.027 
 
(0.93) (1.04) (0.86) (1.15) (0.26) (1.17) (0.32) (1.22) (0.33) (1.11) (0.23) 
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LOSS -0.066 -0.019 -0.034 -0.067 -0.047 -0.090 -0.081 -0.050 -0.046 -0.063 -0.044 
 
(-0.47) (-0.13) (-0.24) (-0.47) (-0.30) (-0.63) (-0.51) (-0.35) (-0.29) (-0.44) (-0.28) 
CAPINT 0.424***  0.448***  0.405*** 0.433***  0.295** 0.447***  0.312** 0.418***  0.292** 0.418***   0.292** 
 
(2.73) (2.89) (2.64) (2.83) (2.08) (2.93) (2.21) (2.72) (2.04) (2.76) (2.07) 
SIZE 0.181***  0.209***  0.148*** 0.331***  0.338*** 0.301***  0.310*** 0.295***  0.292*** 0.284***  0.308*** 
 
(3.78) (4.01) (3.03) (6.52) (6.31) (5.74) (5.78) (5.70) (5.39) (5.25) (5.41) 
Constant -2.425***  -2.757***  -2.175*** -3.559***  -3.573*** -3.407***  -3.473*** -3.262*** -3.262*** -3.223***  -3.331*** 
 
(-5.21) (-5.38) (-4.62) (-7.16) (-7.00) (-6.76) (-6.84) (-6.43) (-6.26) (-6.34) (-6.37) 
Observations 944 903 943 924 856 924 856 899 833 924 856 
R-squared 0.158 0.171 0.159 0.185 0.193 0.193 0.209 0.197 0.202 0.193 0.209 
 
Note: All variables are deflated to control for any scale effects. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results are 
based on robust standard error to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. Variable definitions are as follows: ABTDit are abnormal BTDs derived from BTDs model in previous section, figures in ABTDit are 
all multiplied by 100 for scale effects; OCit is the ownership concentration, STAit is the state shareholding, INSTit is the institutional shareholding, FUNDitis 
the percentage of mutual funds shareholding; GOVit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the largest shareholder is government-related, and 0 
otherwise; LEVit is the leverage ratio; LOSSit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if firm i reports a loss, where loss is net income before extraordinary 
items and 0 otherwise; EMit is the earning management measure which is calculated as profit before tax-operating cash flow; SIZEit is log of the market 
value of equity at the fiscal year-end t; ROEit is return on equity which is proxy for firm profitability; CAPINTit is the capital intensity, which is calculated 
as the fixed assets divide by total assets; Year and industry dummy variables are also included in models, coefficients on the year and industry dummies are 
not reported to conserve space.  
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6.5.4 Further analysis 
  
To examine the robustness of our empirical results, we perform several 
sensitivity tests.   
  
6.5.4.1 Ownership structure using beginning value (lagged value) and 
Difference-in-Difference approach 
 
A caveat so far in our model is the potential endogeneity problems as 
limitations of hand collected sample prohibit us from using more complex 
dynamic models. We offer two robustness tests in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. Most 
prior studies use static models to test firm ownership structure and tax 
reporting practices (e.g. Chenet al. 2010; Zeng, 2010; Moore, 2012; Wu et al. 
2012; Badertscher et al. 2013). One may expect their association to be lagged 
due to slower adjustments of tax strategies responding to ownership changes. 
In table 6.7, we use the lagged firm ownership variables to replace their 
contemporaneous terms used in Table 6.4 to rerun the regressions. Our 
findings are unaffected. 
 
In table6.5, we adopt a difference-in-difference approach by using the 2008 
tax reform as a quasi-experiment to test difference in firm response to the tax 
reform. This method is often used to measure change induced by a particular 
treatment or event and the difference-in-difference estimator represent the 
difference between pre- and post-differences of the treatment and control 
groups. We follow An (2012) and define treatment firms as domestic 
enterprises who were subject to tax rate decrease in 2008 and control firms as 
foreign invested firms who were subject to tax rate increase in 2008. As 
'additional notes to financial statements' were unavailable before 2006, we are 
unable to incorporate a longer pre-reform period. Never the less, our results 
reported in Table 6.5 support the findings reported earlier. We are particularly 
interested in the interaction of dummy variables 
POSTREFORM*TREATMENT in model 1. The insignificant coefficient 
suggests that there is no difference between domestic enterprises and foreign 
invested enterprises response to the tax reform in terms of their tax 
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aggressiveness. In model 2, we further divide the domestic firms (the 
treatment group) into government controlled and private investor controlled 
firms. The coefficient on the interaction 
POSTREFORM*TREATMENT*GOVnow shows the difference between 
government controlled domestic enterprises and private investor controlled 
domestic enterprises and it significantly positive. Hence, we may conclude 
that the direction of tax rate changes as a result of the 2008 tax reform is not 
important for firm tax aggressiveness. In line with our earlier findings, what 
appears to be important for firm response to the tax reform is government 
association.   
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Table 6.4: Estimated regression results with lagged independent variables of interest 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
L.STA 0.343*** 
    
0.276* 0.096 
    
 
(2.97) 
    
(1.78) (0.64) 
    GOV 
 
 0.215*** 
     
0.074  0.092 
  
  
(2.75) 
     
(0.72) (0.96) 
  L.OC 
  
 0.519*** 
      
0.328 0.040 
   
(2.84) 
      
(1.36) (0.18) 
L.INST 
   
-0.766*** 
 
-0.859*** 
 
-1.155*** 
 
-1.701*** 
 
    
(-5.33) 
 
(-4.25) 
 
(-3.08) 
 
(-3.25) 
 L.FUND 
    
-1.142*** 
 
-1.622*** 
 
-1.635*** 
 
-2.999*** 
     
(-6.43) 
 
(-6.05) 
 
(-3.88) 
 
(-5.25) 
L.STA*L.INST 
     
0.363 
     
      
(0.62) 
     LSTA*L.FUND 
      
 1.551** 
    
       
(2.21) 
    L.INST*GOV 
       
0.567 
   
        
(1.41) 
   L.FUND*GOV 
        
0.673 
  
         
(1.48) 
  L.OC*L.INST 
         
 1.385* 
 
          
(1.80) 
 L.OC*L.FUND 
          
 2.834*** 
           
(3.35) 
Observations 941 903 941 918 838 918 838 893 816 918 838 
R-squared 0.159 0.171 0.160 0.186 0.218 0.195 0.234 0.192 0.228 0.200 0.234 
 
The dependent variable is ABTD. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics based on robust standard errors. *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. Coefficients on the year, industry dummies, and the control variables are not reported to conserve space. Variable definitions follow 
Table 6.3  
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Table 6.5: Difference-in-Difference tests 
Model (1) (2) 
   TR -0.044 -0.057 
 
(-0.31) (-0.39) 
TREATMENT -0.144 -0.144 
 
(-0.85) (-0.84) 
TR*TREATMENT 0.196 -0.091 
 
(1.13) (-0.42) 
GOV*TR*TREATMENT 
 
0.371*** 
  
(2.68) 
LEV 0.849*** 0.869*** 
 
(4.89) (5.06) 
EM 1.872*** 1.885*** 
 
(4.51) (4.55) 
ROE -2.284*** -2.113*** 
 
(-4.65) (-4.41) 
SIZE 0.291*** 0.271*** 
 
(4.96) (4.60) 
LOSS -0.580*** -0.520** 
 
(-2.82) (-2.50) 
Constant -3.136*** -2.980*** 
 
(-5.73) (-5.37) 
   Observations 777 745 
R-squared 0.214 0.232 
 
Note: The dependent variable is ABTD. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors. *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Coefficients on the year and industry dummies are not reported to conserve space.Variable 
definitions follow Table 2.TREATMENT is a dummy variable which equals to 1 for domestic 
listed firms and 0 for foreign invested listed firms; TR is a dummy variable which equals to 
for the period from 2008 to 2012 and 0 for the period from 2006 to 2007; GOV is a dummy 
variable which equals to 1 when the largest shareholder is the government or a government 
agency, and 0 otherwise. 
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6.5.4.2 Accounting for board characteristics and audit supervision 
 
We carry out additional analyses by accounting for the internal monitoring 
role of the board of directors as well as auditor supervision in determining the 
book-tax differences. Auditors acts as an important intermediary for the fair 
representation of financial information for users of financial statements. Audit 
fee is the fee disclosed in the proxy statement related to the financial statement 
in the fiscal year (Hanlon, Krishnan & Mills, 2012). It has been modeled as a 
function of audit risk, size and the complexity of the audit client (Simunic, 
1980; Rainsbury, et al, 2009). The auditors would need to exert more efforts 
on firms with large book-tax differences if the latter is proxy for higher tax 
sheltering activities or greater complexity, which in turn increase the level of 
audit fees for these fees relative to the counterparties with smaller book-tax 
differences, holding all else constant (Hanlon, 2005; Donohoe & Knechel, 
2009; Hanlon, Krishnan & Mills, 2012). Hanlon, Krishnan & Mills (2012) 
examine whether large book-tax differences are associated with higher audit 
fees and find a significant positive relationship between them, it is expected 
that audit fees to be higher in order to compensate for higher expected losses 
and higher audit efforts due to the risk of legal actions and/or loss of 
reputation (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). Meanwhile, Donohoe & Knechel 
(2009) and McGuire, Omer & Wang (2012) find a positive relationship 
between the level of a firm's tax sheltering activities and audit fees. Audit 
standards have evolved rapidly although audit independence is quite new in 
China (Chen et al. 2006), the evidence from financial statements do support 
that the ‗Big 4‘ international auditors are argued to provide high-quality and 
more independent audits than other counterparties, and high audit quality can 
detect and correct misconduct (e.g. Becker et al. 1998; Francis, 2004). Audit 
opinion can be viewed as a proxy for financial disclosure in constraining 
corporate aggressive tax activities, which examines the monitoring effect of 
corporate transparency of firms' financial statements in the context of 
corporate tax management practices, a unique setting in China where there is 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors and 
opportunities for managers to exploit tax aggressiveness. Audit opinion and 
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audit fees are added in all the models as a proxy for auditor efforts and 
measurement of auditor risk (Wang, Wong & Xia, 2008), it focuses on how 
auditing as an outside government mechanism prevent corporate tax 
aggressiveness and the differences in effects between government-related 
firms and non-government-related firms. Audit opinion is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if the audit opinion is standard unqualified and zero 
otherwise, and Audit fee is the natural logarithm of annual audit fee which the 
data were disclosed publicly (Wang, Wong & Xia, 2008). Big 4 auditors is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is the client of Big 4 auditors 
and zero otherwise. 
 
We further add the proportion of independent director on the board (INDEP), 
the size of board (BODSIZE), the CEO duality (DCEOD) and the total 
number of board meetings (BODMET) that a board of director conducted in a 
year, audit opinion (AUDOP), audit fees (AUDITFEE) and Big 4 auditors 
(BIG4) (Wang, Wong & Xia, 2008; Minnick & Noga, 2010; Lanis & 
Richardson, 2011). Overall, the R-square of the models and the results for the 
control variables closely resemble those reported in Table 6.3 and the 
inferences remain the same. The significantly positive relationship between 
tax aggressivenessand audit fees is consistent with our expectations, and it is 
of significance to strengthen audit supervision on tax activities in order to 
improve efficiency of audit supervision on tax aggressiveness. However, there 
is weak or insignificant relationship between audit opinion as well as Big 4 
auditors and the level of tax aggressiveness, which suggest that auditors have 
relatively weak incentive to prevent the aggressive tax activities. In addition, 
there is only weak evidence of the relationships between board 
characteristicsand tax planning; these results provide evidence that the main 
findings are not significantly affected by the inclusion of the variables that 
control for board of directors characteristics (e.g. internal monitoring).  
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Table 6.6: Further analysis that control for board characteristics and audit supervision 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
STA 0.323** 
    
0.106 0.267 
    
 
(2.40) 
    
(0.61) (1.62) 
    GOV 
 
0.245*** 
     
0.051 0.173* 
  
  
(2.93) 
     
(0.50) (1.80) 
  OC 
  
0.430** 
      
0.006 -0.103 
   
(2.21) 
      
(0.03) (-0.47) 
INST 
   
-0.567**
* 
 
-0.861**
* 
 
-1.360**
* 
 
-2.359**
* 
 
    
(-2.90) 
 
(-3.31) 
 
(-3.11) 
 
(-3.28) 
 
FUND 
    
-0.455* 
 
-0.793** 
 
-0.622 
 
-3.137**
* 
     
(-1.74) 
 
(-2.27) 
 
(-1.37) 
 
(-4.13) 
STA*INST 
     
1.302* 
     
      
(1.75) 
     STA*FUND 
      
0.970 
    
       
(1.14) 
    INST*GOV 
       
1.019** 
   
        
(2.24) 
   FUND*GO
V 
        
0.414 
  
         
(0.85) 
  OC*INST 
         
2.817** 
 
          
(2.53) 
 OC*FUND 
          
4.204*** 
           
(3.65) 
INDEP 0.434 0.398 0.560 0.391 0.060 0.198 -0.116 0.278 -0.010 0.344 -0.043 
 
(0.98) (0.94) (1.27) (0.88) (0.14) (0.45) (-0.27) (0.66) (-0.03) (0.77) (-0.10) 
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BODSIZE 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.030** 0.040*** 0.028** 0.039*** 0.028** 0.048*** 0.037*** 
 
(2.82) (2.63) (3.16) (3.06) (2.24) (2.91) (2.10) (2.79) (2.01) (3.40) (2.66) 
BODMET -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.008 -0.004 
 
(-1.44) (-0.67) (-1.56) (-1.43) (-0.59) (-1.33) (-0.43) (-0.64) (0.13) (-1.52) (-0.74) 
DCEOD 0.202 0.182 0.220 0.183 0.097 0.148 0.074 0.144 0.062 0.196 0.104 
 
(1.44) (1.26) (1.58) (1.29) (0.79) (1.03) (0.60) (1.00) (0.50) (1.39) (0.87) 
AUDITFEE 0.223*** 0.236*** 0.211*** 0.196*** 0.158*** 0.187*** 0.149*** 0.208*** 0.175*** 0.183*** 0.145*** 
 
(5.23) (5.31) (4.85) (4.59) (4.02) (4.36) (3.79) (4.70) (4.31) (4.24) (3.69) 
AUDOP 0.399* 0.249 0.404* 0.371 0.094 0.386 0.103 0.243 -0.159 0.375 0.102 
 
(1.65) (1.02) (1.66) (1.46) (0.32) (1.53) (0.35) (0.96) (-0.97) (1.48) (0.34) 
BIG4 0.032 0.021 0.020 0.007 0.069 0.034 0.089 0.029 0.095 0.017 0.080 
 
(0.45) (0.30) (0.27) (0.09) (0.94) (0.47) (1.21) (0.41) (1.31) (0.24) (1.10) 
Observation 774 745 773 756 698 756 698 741 684 756 698 
R-squared 0.218 0.229 0.217 0.223 0.285 0.235 0.299 0.244 0.306 0.237 0.306 
 
 
Note: The dependent variable is ABTD. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics based on robust standard errors. *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. Variable definitions are as follows: BODSIZEit is total number of directors on board; INDEPit is the percentage of directors 
who are independent; BODMETit is the total number of meetings a board of directors has conducted in a year; DCEODit is CEO-chair duality which is 
equal to 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board is different person and 0 otherwise. AUDOPit is the audit opinion, a dummy variable which is equal to 
1 if the audit opinion is standard unqualified and 0 otherwise; AUDITFEEit, logarithm of audit fee is the natural logarithm of annual audit fee which the 
data were disclosed publicly. BIG4it is the big 4 auditors, a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the firm is the client of big 4 auditors and zero 
otherwise. Coefficients on the year and industry dummies and the control variables are not reported to conserve space. Other Variable definitions follow 
Table 6.3. 
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6.5.4.3 Subsample of Positive and Negative ABTDs 
 
It is documented by Mills (1998:p350) that limited the primary analysis to 
firms where book income exceeds taxable income, based on the assumption 
that BTDs ''are the most 'suspicious' when book income exceeds taxable 
income''. In consistent with this hypothesis, Mills (1998) finds that the extent 
of the BTDs is not associated with the proposed audit adjustments for firms 
with negative BTDs in its supplemental analysis. Therefore, It is possible 
thatthere might be less likely to engage in tax sheltering activities if measure 
of tax aggressiveness ABTDs is negative (Blaylock, Shevlin & Wilson, 2012). 
We extend this analysis to examine whether it is only positive ABTDs that are 
associated with tax sheltering activities, and the models will be re-estimated 
with positive and negative ABTDs (Table 6.7). Although the number of 
firm-year observations is different for each model, the significant association 
between tax planning and ownership structure variables of interest remains for 
firms with positive ABTDs, but there is also a significant relationship between 
some variables of interest and the magnitude of negative. However, it is worth 
noting the small sample size would significantly limit the power of this test.  
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Table 6.7: Further analysis: Estimated regression results for subsamples of ABTDs 
 
Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                          
STA 0.217** 0.071 
        
0.198 -0.219 
 
(2.19) (0.43) 
        
(1.04) (-0.82) 
GOV 
  
0.022 0.235*** 
        
   
(0.32) (2.86) 
        OC 
    
0.305** 0.107 
      
     
(2.01) (0.49) 
      INST 
      
-0.166* -0.310** 
  
-0.092 -0.413** 
       
(-1.91) (-2.01) 
  
(-0.84) (-2.00) 
FUND 
        
0.118 -0.875*** 
  
         
(0.55) (-3.67) 
  STA*INST 
          
-0.108 0.425 
           
(-0.26) (0.77) 
STA*FUND 
            
             INST*GOV 
            
             FUND*GOV 
            
             OC*INST 
            
             OC*FUND 
            
             Constant -1.127*** -0.439 -1.293*** -0.453 -0.897** -0.429 -1.599*** -1.108 -1.348*** -1.274* -1.428*** -1.117 
 
(-3.35) (-0.60) (-3.45) (-0.60) (-2.57) (-0.59) (-4.00) (-1.39) (-3.41) (-1.72) (-3.40) (-1.35) 
             Observations 515 429 495 408 514 429 502 422 472 384 502 422 
R-squared 0.117 0.169 0.105 0.194 0.116 0.169 0.114 0.174 0.118 0.193 0.119 0.176 
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Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
Positive 
ABTD 
Negative 
ABTD 
  Model (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)   
             STA 0.290* 0.025 
          
 
(1.94) (0.15) 
          GOV 
  
0.056 -0.027 -0.003 0.114 
      
   
(0.44) (-0.17) (-0.03) (1.25) 
      OC 
      
0.480** -0.675* 0.353** -0.156 
  
       
(1.99) (-1.79) (2.30) (-0.58) 
  INST 
  
-0.115 -0.756** 
  
-0.044 -1.807*** 
    
   
(-0.46) (-2.58) 
  
(-0.17) (-3.64) 
    FUND 0.247 -1.210*** 
  
-0.049 -1.055*** 
  
0.347 -1.948*** 
  
 
(0.79) (-3.87) 
  
(-0.10) (-2.68) 
  
(0.40) (-3.16) 
  STA*INST 
            
             STA*FUND -0.734 1.177* 
          
 
(-0.82) (1.73) 
          INST*GOV 
  
-0.077 0.649** 
        
   
(-0.30) (2.02) 
        FUND*GOV 
    
0.201 0.378 
      
     
(0.38) (0.91) 
      OC*INST 
      
-0.241 2.207*** 
    
       
(-0.67) (3.13) 
    OC*FUND 
        
-0.360 1.715* 
  
         
(-0.28) (1.86) 
  Constant -1.335*** -1.419* -1.593*** -0.770 -1.281*** -0.913 -1.166*** -0.858 -0.869** -1.412* 
  
 
(-3.31) (-1.89) (-3.94) (-0.92) (-3.17) (-1.21) (-2.85) (-1.06) (-2.04) (-1.91) 
  
             Observations 472 384 493 406 463 370 502 422 472 384 
  R-squared 0.127 0.205 0.114 0.207 0.117 0.219 0.128 0.193 0.127 0.199   
 
Note: All variables are deflated to control for any scale effects. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results are based on 
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robust standard error to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. Variable definitions follow Table 6.3. Results for year dummies, industry dummies and control variables are not reported to conserve the space. 
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6.5.4.4 Difference between local and central government 
 
To further examine what are the incentives that drive managers of 
government-related firms to pursue aggressive tax activities, we perform 
additional tests for the government-related subsamples by comparing the 
results of the central government-related firms (GOVT=1) with those of local 
government-related firms (GOVT=0) (Chan, Mo & Zhou, 2013) where GOVT 
is an indicator variable. It is argued by Chan, Mo and Zhou (2013) that tax 
revenues collected from some central government-related firms and all local 
government-related firms are shared different level of government, and local 
governments can only take 40 percent of the tax revenues starting from 2002 
(State Council, 2001). As a result, those respective local government-related 
firms are provided incentives to pay less tax in order to keep more corporate 
resources in its firms. The regression results in Table 6.8 show that there is no 
significant difference in tax planning between central and local 
government-controlled firms, except for the variables INST and MINST which 
are significant only for local government-controlled firms and the variable OC 
is significant only for central government-controlled firms. Due to the 
conflicting interests of OC and INST, it is indeterminate whether those local 
government-related firms evade taxes more than those of central 
government-controlled firms and it need to be acknowledged that the small 
sample size in this study also limits the power of these regressions. 
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Table 6.8: Further analysis for government-controlled firms, to control for difference between local and central 
government 
 
  Government-controlled firms Central government-controlled firms Local government-controlled firms 
 
GOV=1 GOVT=1 GOVT=0 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  
            STA 0.125 
   
0.316 
   
0.005 
   
 
(0.88) 
   
(1.48) 
   
(0.03) 
   OC 
 
0.607*** 
   
1.313*** 
   
-0.213 
  
  
(2.82) 
   
(3.55) 
   
(-0.75) 
  INST 
  
-0.638*** 
   
-0.304 
   
-0.524** 
 
   
(-3.66) 
   
(-1.26) 
   
(-2.00) 
 FUND 
   
-0.928*** 
   
-0.454 
   
-0.905** 
    
(-4.10) 
   
(-1.39) 
   
(-2.48) 
LEV 0.681*** 0.642*** 0.661*** 0.716*** 0.577** 0.491* 0.599** 0.797*** 0.395** 0.413** 0.364** 0.422** 
 
(4.37) (4.10) (4.31) (4.46) (2.13) (1.83) (2.19) (2.75) (2.24) (2.31) (2.08) (2.28) 
EM 1.957*** 2.102*** 1.848*** 1.767*** 2.116*** 2.012*** 1.976** 1.430** 2.321*** 2.239*** 2.189*** 2.163*** 
 
(4.69) (5.01) (4.47) (4.45) (2.73) (2.75) (2.52) (2.00) (5.03) (4.59) (4.92) (4.53) 
ROE 0.207 0.197 0.231 0.084 0.236 0.214 0.248 0.101* -2.095*** -2.107*** -1.889*** -1.648* 
 
(1.31) (1.22) (1.44) (1.05) (1.43) (1.21) (1.51) (1.71) (-4.25) (-4.27) (-3.83) (-1.92) 
LOSS 0.049 0.067 0.026 0.052 -0.148 -0.144 -0.129 -0.079 -0.252 -0.261 -0.259 -0.198 
 
(0.32) (0.44) (0.17) (0.31) (-0.64) (-0.64) (-0.55) (-0.27) (-1.05) (-1.10) (-1.11) (-0.71) 
CAPINT 0.332** 0.324* 0.324* 0.166 0.620* 0.343 0.491 0.162 -0.331 -0.355* -0.270 -0.182 
 
(1.97) (1.95) (1.92) (1.08) (1.93) (1.08) (1.51) (0.53) (-1.63) (-1.68) (-1.27) (-0.78) 
SIZE 0.273*** 0.198*** 0.345*** 0.349*** 0.331*** 0.206*** 0.374*** 0.335*** 0.340*** 0.389*** 0.386*** 0.413*** 
 
(5.15) (3.45) (6.69) (6.51) (4.29) (2.70) (5.25) (5.18) (4.35) (3.85) (4.90) (4.36) 
Constant -3.172*** -2.650*** -3.660*** -3.649*** -3.713*** -2.960*** -4.003*** -3.637*** -3.183*** -3.560*** -3.542*** -3.838*** 
 
(-6.24) (-4.96) (-7.33) (-7.19) (-4.70) (-3.95) (-5.31) (-5.25) (-4.21) (-3.87) (-4.65) (-4.27) 
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Observations 766 765 763 714 361 360 359 331 405 405 404 383 
R-squared 0.165 0.177 0.182 0.181 0.231 0.272 0.228 0.182 0.245 0.246 0.256 0.242 
Year dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Ind dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
 
Note: All variables are deflated to control for any scale effects. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results are 
based on robust standard error to control for heteroscedasticity. Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.GOVit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the largest shareholder is government-related and 0 otherwise. GOVTit is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 for the central government-related firms and 0 for local government-related firms.Variable definitions follow Table 6.3. Results for year 
dummies, industry dummies and control variables are not reported to conserve the space.
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6.5.4.5 Other measure of tax avoidance 
  
We test whether our results are robust to other measure of tax aggressiveness, 
following the study of Chen et al.(2010), we compute GAAP effective tax rate, 
cash effective tax rate and income-effect book-tax difference. The GAAP ETR 
is dividing total income tax expense by the pre-tax income while the cash 
effective rate is calculated as the cash tax payment divided by pre-tax income. 
The higher value for these two measures indicates a lower level of tax 
aggressiveness. Income-effect BTD is calculated as difference between pre-tax 
income and current tax expenses from consolidated firms which grossed up by 
the current applicable tax rate. Results in Table 6.9 show that our conclusions 
in terms of the association between tax planning and ownership structure 
variables continue to hold for these three alternative measures of tax 
avoidance, albeit the results appear to be statistically insignificant, which 
further indicate our measure of tax aggressiveness is better to capture the 
effects of earning management and tax planning.  
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Table 6.9: Robustness tests: estimated regression results for other measure of tax avoidance 
Panel A: Income-effect book-tax differences 
Year 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
VARIABLES BTD BTD BTD BTD BTD BTD BTD BTD BTD BTD BTD 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
                        
STA 0.528 
    
-0.131 0.146 
    
 
(1.23) 
    
(-0.11) (0.26) 
    GOV 
 
-0.588 
     
-1.635* -0.114 
  
  
(-1.57) 
     
(-1.85) (-0.38) 
  OC 
  
0.038 
      
-1.138 -0.293 
   
(0.06) 
      
(-1.09) (-0.36) 
INST 
   
-0.375 
 
0.243 
 
-1.604 
 
-0.136 
 
    
(-0.94) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(-1.03) 
 
(-0.09) 
 FUND 
    
2.754*** 
 
3.385*** 
 
1.809 
 
4.931** 
     
(4.55) 
 
(3.47) 
 
(1.39) 
 
(2.16) 
STA*INST 
     
-0.403 
     
      
(-0.19) 
     STA*FUND 
      
-5.261** 
    
       
(-2.20) 
    INST*GOV 
       
2.452 
   
        
(1.59) 
   FUND*GOV 
        
0.356 
  
         
(0.25) 
  OC*INST 
         
0.737 
 
          
(0.38) 
 OC*FUND 
          
-4.686 
           
(-1.39) 
Observations 1,030 986 1,029 1,009 934 1,009 934 982 910 1,009 934 
R-squared 0.463 0.463 0.422 0.466 0.445 0.475 0.460 0.478 0.451 0.476 0.458 
Year dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Ind dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
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Panel B: GAAP ETR 
Year 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Variables GAAPETR GAAPETR GAAPETR GAAPETR GAAPETR GAAPETR GAAPETR GAAPETR GAAPETR GAAPETR GAAPETR 
  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
 
                      
STA -0.006 
    
-0.016 -0.014 
    
 
(-0.50) 
    
(-0.55) (-0.71) 
    GOV 
 
-0.016 
     
-0.006 -0.021 
  
  
(-1.45) 
     
(-0.30) (-1.26) 
  OC 
  
-0.001 
      
0.067* -0.016 
   
(-0.02) 
      
(1.66) (-0.46) 
INST 
   
-0.007 
 
-0.015 
 
0.000 
 
0.063 
 
    
(-0.46) 
 
(-0.67) 
 
(0.01) 
 
(1.14) 
 FUND 
    
0.060*** 
 
0.027 
 
0.037 
 
-0.067 
     
(2.68) 
 
(0.90) 
 
(0.72) 
 
(-0.86) 
STA*INST 
     
0.051 
     
      
(0.88) 
     STA*FUND 
      
0.121 
    
       
(1.60) 
    INST*GOV 
       
-0.019 
   
        
(-0.49) 
   FUND*GOV 
        
0.023 
  
         
(0.40) 
  OC*INST 
         
-0.105 
 
          
(-1.45) 
 OC*FUND 
          
0.194* 
           
(1.69) 
Observations 947 908 947 928 869 928 869 905 848 928 869 
R-squared 0.148 0.158 0.051 0.159 0.166 0.159 0.168 0.159 0.162 0.161 0.168 
Year dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Ind dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
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Panel C: Cash ETR 
Year 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Variables CASHETR CASHETR CASHETR CASHETR CASHETR CASHETR CASHETR CASHETR CASHETR CASHETR CASHETR 
  (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) 
 
                      
STA 0.011 
    
0.042 0.004 
    
 
(0.51) 
    
(0.93) (0.15) 
    GOV 
 
-0.012 
     
0.012 -0.028 
  
  
(-0.72) 
     
(0.39) (-1.10) 
  OC 
  
0.030 
      
0.075 0.004 
   
(0.86) 
      
(1.18) (0.09) 
INST 
   
-0.024 
 
-0.005 
 
0.011 
 
0.022 
 
    
(-1.02) 
 
(-0.15) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.25) 
 FUND 
    
0.010 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.062 
 
-0.121 
     
(0.27) 
 
(-0.48) 
 
(-0.81) 
 
(-1.10) 
STA*INST 
     
-0.093 
     
      
(-1.10) 
     STA*FUND 
      
0.116 
    
       
(1.04) 
    INST*GOV 
       
-0.050 
   
        
(-0.87) 
   FUND*GOV 
        
0.083 
  
         
(1.05) 
  OC*INST 
         
-0.077 
 
          
(-0.65) 
 OC*FUND 
          
0.202 
           
(1.29) 
Observations 764 738 763 752 705 752 705 734 687 752 705 
R-squared 0.181 0.179 0.183 0.183 0.200 0.185 0.202 0.184 0.201 0.186 0.202 
Note: All variables are deflated to control for any scale effects. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results are based on robust 
standard error to control for heteroscedasticity. Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.Year and industry dummy 
variables are also included in models, coefficients on the year and industry dummies are not reported to conserve space. Variable definitions follow Table 6.3 
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6.5.4.6 Test for model misspecification 
We estimate abnormal ABTDs based on a cross-sectional model with attempts 
to remove mechanical differences driven by differences in financial reporting 
and income tax law, leaving the components driven by the opportunistic 
differences in earning management and tax planning. Another major concern 
that whether our model successfully separating mechanical differences from 
opportunistic differences. To examine the concern, we regress the fitted value 
NBTDs (instead of ABTDs) as the dependent variables into regressions in 
studying relationship between the ownership structure and tax aggressiveness 
(Table 6.10), our results indicate that few of the independent variables that are 
of our interests is significant from zero, and the explanatory power is mainly 
arise from the firm-specific characteristics that are included to control for 
fundamental financial and economic determinants of firms' level of tax 
aggressiveness. The results suggests that only opportunistic differences 
(ABTDs) that capture the corporate governance characteristics and that our 
BTDs model disentangles NBTDs and ABTDs. 
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Table 6.10: Robustness tests: test for model misspecification for chapter 5: NBTD fitted value from OLS model 
Year 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 2006-2012 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Variables NBTD NBTD NBTD NBTD NBTD NBTD NBTD NBTD NBTD NBTD NBTD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
                        
STA 0.057 
    
0.276 -0.008 
    
 
(0.49) 
    
(0.98) (-0.11) 
    GOV 
 
-0.198** 
     
-0.311 -0.021 
  
  
(-2.38) 
     
(-1.47) (-0.39) 
  OC 
  
0.056 
      
0.108 -0.167** 
   
(0.55) 
      
(0.80) (-1.97) 
INST 
   
0.078 
 
0.196* 
 
-0.174 
 
0.228 0.166*** 
    
(0.90) 
 
(1.83) 
 
(-0.49) 
 
(0.79) (2.80) 
FUND 
    
0.475*** 
 
0.622*** 
 
0.771*** 
  
     
(4.84) 
 
(4.78) 
 
(3.76) 
  STA*INST 
     
-0.444 
     
      
(-0.92) 
     STA*FUND 
      
-0.519 
    
       
(-1.47) 
    INST*GOV 
       
0.280 
   
        
(0.79) 
   FUND*GOV 
        
-0.398* 
  
         
(-1.82) 
  OC*INST 
         
-0.222 
 
          
(-0.68) 
 OC*FUND 
          
0.550*** 
           
(3.99) 
LEV -0.685*** -0.693*** -0.694*** -0.704*** -0.635*** -0.702*** -0.630*** -0.713*** -0.637*** -0.701*** -0.658*** 
 
(-7.00) (-7.27) (-6.74) (-7.10) (-8.10) (-7.19) (-8.04) (-7.08) (-8.37) (-6.84) (-8.36) 
EM 0.727 0.790 0.747 0.757 0.107 0.772 0.127 0.785 0.186 0.754 0.117 
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(1.02) (1.06) (1.02) (1.05) (0.49) (1.06) (0.58) (1.11) (0.83) (1.02) (0.53) 
ROE 0.390* 0.369* 0.387* 0.381* 0.272* 0.383* 0.270* 0.364* 0.267* 0.381* 0.271* 
 
(1.82) (1.81) (1.82) (1.81) (1.92) (1.79) (1.93) (1.80) (1.91) (1.81) (1.94) 
LOSS -0.648*** -0.652*** -0.643*** -0.636*** -0.648*** -0.636*** -0.643*** -0.645*** -0.644*** -0.636*** -0.644*** 
 
(-6.79) (-6.87) (-6.56) (-6.74) (-8.04) (-6.64) (-7.98) (-6.94) (-7.91) (-6.72) (-8.13) 
CAPINT -0.127 -0.132 -0.131 -0.124 -0.326*** -0.109 -0.328*** -0.146 -0.337*** -0.125 -0.316*** 
 
(-0.65) (-0.71) (-0.69) (-0.67) (-4.90) (-0.56) (-4.92) (-0.89) (-5.02) (-0.68) (-4.69) 
SIZE 0.250*** 0.297*** 0.247*** 0.246*** 0.229*** 0.232*** 0.234*** 0.289*** 0.256*** 0.242*** 0.234*** 
 
(6.78) (9.54) (6.74) (7.98) (7.44) (6.14) (7.57) (10.09) (8.39) (6.95) (7.75) 
Constant -1.833*** -2.075*** -1.803*** -1.779*** -1.680*** -1.724*** -1.701*** -1.897*** -1.908*** -1.804*** -1.648*** 
 
(-5.76) (-6.45) (-5.50) (-5.97) (-5.78) (-5.31) (-5.87) (-5.61) (-6.75) (-5.25) (-5.70) 
            Observations 944 903 943 924 856 924 856 899 833 924 856 
R-squared 0.393 0.420 0.393 0.394 0.479 0.396 0.482 0.422 0.504 0.394 0.481 
Year dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Industry 
dummies Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
 
Note:All variables are deflated to control for any scale effects. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results are 
based on robust standard error to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. NBTDit are normal BTDs derived from BTDs model in Chapter 5, figures in NBTDit are all multiplied by 100 for scale 
effects.Variable definitions follow table 6.3. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
  
Prior studies have shown that substantial benefits are associated with tax 
sheltering activities e.g.Graham & Tucker, 2006), which lead to the variation 
in firms' ability to minimize income taxes (Dyreng et al. 2008). However, it is 
argued by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) that the determinants of firm‘s tax 
sheltering activities remain unclear. This study contributes to the stream of 
existing research that examines the variation in firms' tax sheltering activities.  
 
This study seeks to understand the fundamental firm characteristics that 
influence corporate tax practices based on the agency theory and institutional 
theory to build a framework for how specific feature of organizational 
structure, namelypolitical vs. market forces impacts corporate tax practices. 
This chapter marks one step forward to a better understanding of the effects of 
ownership structure on firms' tax sheltering activities in the Chinese 
institutional environment, this is of interest due to a hybrid corporate 
governance and ownership structure with historically a high level of state 
ownership as well as ownership concentration, and then reduce significantly 
associated with split-share structure reform that was effective in 2005 in 
Chinese listed firms. This study takes advantage of the recent split-share 
structure reform in China with its aim at making its stock market more vibrant 
and attractive to investors as well as its tax policy changes that was effective 
in 2008. Even after change in tax policy, income tax revenue remains one of 
major sources of central and local government revenue.   
  
Based on a hand collected sample of 229 publicly listed Chinese firms over 
the 2006 to 2012 period, we find that institutional ownership which are proxy 
variable for market forces are negatively associated with the level of tax 
aggressiveness equating to more effective monitoring of management and 
institutional investors are more concerned with tax reporting. However, 
ownership concentration and the state ownership which are proxy for political 
connections are positively associated with the level of tax aggressiveness. 
Large shareholders in China can have control power in a firm‘s tax-saving 
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activities for their self-serving behaviors through their concentrated ownership; 
as a result, they are more concerned with tax-saving strategies to benefit their 
shareholders. We also find a positive relationship between government-related 
ownership and the level of tax sheltering when examining the strength of 
political connections vs. market forces. Our empirical result is in support of 
the  political connections explanations in a relationship-based economy 
rather than a 'market-based' economy, specifically, the evidence suggest that 
political connections through controlling shareholder and state ownership are a 
significant determinant of the relationship between tax aggressiveness and 
government involvement and their effects should be accounted for. 
  
This study contributes to existing literature that explore the relationship 
between tax and corporate governance characteristics in both developed and 
emerging markets, meanwhile, the empirical evidences provide a better 
understanding of the issues concerning listed firms in China during its 
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy in terms of separation 
of control and tax aggressiveness and have important theoretical as well as 
policy implications. Transitional economies are often characterized by weak 
legal environment and poor  corporate governance system, the evidence 
suggest that political connections are a significant determinant of corporate tax 
practices in Chinese listed firms when compared to the impact of market 
forces, the functions of market forces in Chinese listed firms is limited by 
political connections. The finding should serve as a caution to regulators and 
policymakers and alter them to the critical role played by political connection, 
and should pay more attention to the role of market forces under the 
intervention of non-market forces,  in terms of government policy changes in 
order for the success of China's economic reform. It is insufficient to only 
introduce market forces by way of market reforms, for example, purely split 
share structure reform is far from enough. Further studies should also be 
conducted to explore the relationship between tax policy changes and 
tax-related activities of Chinese listed firms, given the dramatic changes in tax 
policy in China over the years.  
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In terms of the results, it is again worth noting that the measure of tax 
sheltering uses only publicly available financial information that may lead to 
misstatement. It is difficult to measure the level of tax aggressiveness, like 
those applied in prior literature, there are strengths and weakness associated 
and none is superior or inferior to the other. Despite the fact that numerous 
firm characteristics are controlled for the variation in tax planning across firms 
in regression models, the results should be interpreted with caution in the 
event that any variable that is correlated with ownership structure has 
inadequately controlled (Badertscher et al, 2013).The result of any tax 
management study depends to a certain extent on the reliability of the 
book-tax difference model as a proxy for tax planning; there is no best model 
in the extant accounting and corporate governance literature. It is argued by 
Wahab & Holland (2012) that financial reporting and tax regulatory 
departments should take account of the increased tax-related disclosure by 
listed firms in order for the shareholders to be effective monitors and 
controllers in firms' tax-related decisions. In determining the extent and forms 
of additional disclosures depends on the tradeoff between legitimate and 
illegitimate tax sheltering activities, this is due to the fact that, shareholders 
and tax authorities would benefit as illegitimate tax sheltering activities would 
be reduced to the degree of increased tax-related disclosures; one the other 
hand, managers might be discouraged from pursuing legitimate activities 
along with disclosures. 
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 7.0 Executive and board managerial cash compensation and 
tax aggressiveness 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the association between executive and firm leadership 
compensation and tax aggressiveness. Consistent with prior research, it is 
assumed that executive and board ownership as well as appropriate 
compensation schemes serve to maximize firm value and mitigate agency 
conflicts, where the optimal compensation contracts minimize agency costs by 
aligning incentives of managers with those of shareholders. 
  
Since Jensen & Meckling's (1976) pioneering study, a large strand of research 
focuses on corporate governance mechanisms that can be alternatively 
employed by firms to mitigate agency related problems. The internal 
governance mechanisms including firms' ownership structure, board and 
executive compensation structure, which have been suggested as the primary 
mechanisms that can help align the interests of managers with those of 
shareholders which result in increased shareholder value (e.g. Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Gillan, 2006). A complementary body of research highlights the 
impact of external governance mechanisms on firm value including market for 
corporate control, legal framework and protection against takeovers (Gompers 
et al. 2003; Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005). 
  
From the perspective of institutional theory, the political influences and social 
norms need to be incorporated for the development of a strong corporate 
governance system (Lin, Hutchison & Percy, 2009). China, with its transition 
economy, has focused on the rationalization of the ownership structure and the 
development of a practical corporate governance system which is suitable for 
its institutional setting. The political and economic systems are important in 
China and play an important governance role both directly and indirectly 
through their interaction with internal corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. 
Cheng et al. 2008). As a result, this study will consider the role of internal 
control governance mechanisms, especially executive as well as firm 
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leadership compensation and various characteristics of the board of directors 
in constraining tax aggressiveness in China. 
  
Prior research are mostly based on the U.S. context which examine the 
characteristics of the executives, board of directors, and ownership structure 
influence on tax strategies (e.g. Phillips, 2003; Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; 
Dyreng et al. 2009; Wilson, 2009; Chen et al. 2010; Minnick & Nogo, 2010; 
Armstrong et al. 2012;Khurana & Moser, 2013). The existing research 
examine the relationship between practices of corporate governance system 
and tax/earning management in China includes the role of board  (Firth, Fund 
& Rui, 2006; Liu & Lu, 2007; Erle, 2008; Lin, Hutchison & Percy, 2009; 
Lanis & Richardson, 2011) and ownership concentration (Ding et al. 2007; 
Firth, Fund & Rui, 2007). The existing literature suggest that there is an 
association between corporate governance mechanisms and tax sheltering 
activities, however, the empirical results are somewhat mixed and inconsistent 
and dependent upon the specific institutional setting and governance structure 
being studied. 
  
Studies that employ the relationship between managerial power and the level 
of tax aggressiveness in the context of emerging countries such as China are 
scant. Managers in firms play an important role in the selection of a tax 
reporting strategy, as they are responsible for firm performance, resource 
allocation, as well as maximization of shareholder wealth. In this study, we 
examine the effects of firm executive and overall leadership compensation and 
shareholding on the level of tax aggressiveness using sample of firms between 
2006 and 2012. We define executive, directors and supervisors as firm 
leadership. Specifically, we also include specific board characteristics which 
are indicative of internal corporate governance mechanisms as firms with 
different corporate governance structure may be more likely to pursue 
different types of tax strategies. Prior studies provide inconclusive and mixed 
results on the effect of board characteristics on firm performance and tax 
aggressiveness (Chen et al.2006; Liu & Lu, 2007; Lo et al. 2010; Minnick & 
Noga, 2010). Minnick & Noga (2010) find little evidence on the association 
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between board characteristics and a firm's tax management in the United 
States, therefore the effects of corporate governance on tax aggressiveness in 
China is yet to be explored.   
  
Our study makes several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, our 
study extend several streams of research that investigate whether the use of 
executive/leadership compensation practices align incentives of managers in 
firms with those of shareholders. Our results have implication for 
compensation committees in Chinese listed firms that design the structure of 
executive and leadership compensation contracts, for firm stakeholders and 
regulators that monitor tax reporting practices in firms as well as academic 
researchers interested in understanding the determinants of corporate tax 
aggressiveness. Secondly, the study provides a better insight into the effect of 
governance mechanisms on tax aggressiveness upon the Chinese institutional 
setting by looking at the tax management. Thirdly, this study extends other 
recent studies on tax aggressiveness carried out in the U.S context (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2006; Dyreng et al. 2010; Armstrong et al. 2012; Rego & Wilson, 
2012) by studying the tax-motivated activities of publicly listed Chinese firms 
where there is little evidence in the literature.  
  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 present the 
literature review as well as hypotheses of the study, in section 7.3 presents the 
data availability and descriptive statistics. Section 7.4 presents research 
methodology and regression models. Following that is the findings of the 
study as well as a series of robustness tests in section 7.5.The last section 7.6 
provides a summary of the conclusion of the study.  
 
 
7.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
7.2.1 Compensation practices and tax aggressiveness 
 
Compensation disclosure in China is different from U.S, and the CSRC 
regulates the disclosure on executive compensation information. Historically, 
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Chinese listed firms were not required to disclose complete information on 
executive compensation in their financial statements and some firms did on a 
voluntary basis (Conyon & He, 2011), since 2001 to 2005, firms are required 
to disclose the sum of total compensation for the three highest-paid 
management and the three highest-paid members of the board including 
executive board members (CSRC, 2002b).  Only since the year 2006, listed 
firms were required to disclose total compensation of each individual board 
members and top management as the sum of salary, bonus, stipends and other 
benefits (CSRC, 2005a, 2007), firms were also required by CSRC rules to 
disclose information on stock option if the Chinese listed firms that have 
successfully completed structural reforms to offer stock options or restricted 
stocks to their top management and the members of board and supervisory 
board excluding independent directors (CSRC, 2005b). Further administrative 
measures in terms of equity incentives of listed firms were governed by CSCR 
(2005b) and Guidelines on equity incentives for state controlled listed firms 
were update by SASAC in 2006 and 2010. However, the stock option or stock 
grants are rarely in Chinese listed firms' annual reports, and in China, 
managers' compensation does not depend directly on stock performance, as 
equity compensation of Chinese executive is only evident in Hong Kong (Gao 
& Kling, 2012).  
 
According to Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia (2002), agency theory also 
implicitly assume that the presence of power exists in the relationship between 
executives and shareholders due to the ability of executive to pursue 
self-interest for high compensation. Board composition appears to have a 
moderating role in the agency relationship (Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, 2002). 
The main contribution of our study is to empirically document executive as 
well as firm leadership compensation to proxy for managerial power and 
connections within a firm that affect the tax reporting practices of Chinese 
listed firms. Tax also plays a role in the design of compensation plans, 
including the choice between cash and equity compensation and between 
different forms of equity incentives (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010); the incentive 
compensation is constructed to tie shareholder incentives to managerial 
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incentives. As managers are responsible for undertaking tax minimization 
strategies, recent studies have paid attention to investigate the effect of 
managerial incentives and characteristics on the level of firms' tax sheltering 
activities. It can be expected that managers are compensated for some level of 
tax aggressiveness but would not be compensated for tax aggressiveness that 
cause firms to incur additional costs that reduces shareholder wealth as well as 
that costs outweigh the benefits (Rego & Wilson, 2012).  
  
On one hand, managers with higher incentive compensation help align their 
incentives with those of shareholders and induce managers to invest more 
resources in tax planning and to be more aggressive about maximizing firm 
value through tax sheltering activities. Phillips (2003) examine whether the 
compensation based on after-tax performance measures results in lower 
effective tax rates, which the latter is used as the proxy for tax planning 
effectiveness. Erickson et al. (2006) find a positive relationship between 
equity-based compensation and non-tax compliance. Armstrong et al. (2012) 
and Rego & Wilson (2012) provide evidences on the relationship between 
executive compensation and tax aggressiveness in the short-run, they find 
executives are rewarded for being tax aggressive, and further suggest that this 
link reflects efficient contracting rather than rent extraction. Robinson et al. 
(2010) report that firms with tax departments identified as profit centers 
(versus cost centers) have lower effective tax rates. The empirical literature 
above taken together suggests that incentive compensation induces tax 
planning activities.  
 
On the other hand, Desai & Dharmapala (2006) study how equity-based 
compensation incentives affect decision of tax sheltering, Following the work 
of Desai & Dharmapala (2006) and Rego & Wilson (2012), on the one hand, if 
a significant negative relationship between executive compensation and tax 
aggressiveness are found in firms with weaker corporate governance structure 
and do not operate with optimal corporate governance mechanisms in place, 
then managers are more able to increase their personal wealth rather than 
shareholder wealth through aggressive tax planning. On the other hand, if a 
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significant negative relationship between executive compensation and tax 
aggressiveness are found in firms with stronger corporate governance structure, 
then managers are compensated for efficient tax planning decisions. As a 
result, it can be expected the relationship to be strongest with weak corporate 
governance. However, Seidman & Stomberg (2011) directly challenge the 
assumptions underlie the Desai & Dharmapala (2006) model, for example, the 
implicit assumption that equity-based compensation does not create tax shields 
and a negative relationship between option compensation and tax planning is 
driven by rent diversion and tax sheltering being complementary activities; 
and report that firms with higher level of equity compensation are less likely 
to require or benefit from additional tax shields from tax planning activities.  
  
Mangers' remuneration mainly consists of six elements, including base salary, 
bonus, stock options, restricted share plans (stock grants), pension and other 
benefits (e.g. car, health care) (Mallin, 2007). Managers are in a position to 
provide more resources toward tax management and are more likely to be a 
driver of a firm's long-term performance. Ryan & Wiggins (2001, 2004) 
provide evidence that similar to the executives, board with more outside 
independent directors provide themselves with larger stock and option grants 
that are more closely aligned to performance of stock price. Linn and Park 
(2005) provide evidence that director compensation is tied to investment 
opportunities, directors with higher levels of compensation is necessary for 
firms with high costs of monitoring, especially using equity compensation to 
mitigate agency costs; viewing tax planning as an investment choice, directors 
earn more than others in firms where they manage taxes more actively. 
However, In China, the information about the stock option grants or stock 
grants is rarely in financial statements and we will focus cash compensation in 
our study.    
  
Taken together, it is reasonable to expect that firms will invest a certain 
amount of resources into tax planning. However, the tax strategies that firm 
choose is likely to be driven by corporate governance and compensation 
practices in place. Moreover, Core et al (1999) argue that corporate 
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governance structure in practice should convince managers to select the level 
of tax aggressiveness that could result in firm value maximization. In this 
study, we examine cash compensation by top executives as well as firm 
leadership that include all executives, board of directors and supervisors. The 
use of cash compensation of overall firm leadership is appropriate in Chinese 
context due to their coordinated roles to help build consensus around firm 
strategies. Such features of firm leadership in China may empower executives 
and member of board to pursue self-interests which are provided incentives to 
reduce firm value maximization. To formally test the association between 
corporate compensation practices and the level of tax aggressiveness, the 
following hypothesis is proposed 
  
H1: Executive and firm leadership compensation is negatively associated with 
corporate tax aggressiveness. 
 
 
7.2.2 Board characteristics and tax aggressiveness 
 
Our second hypothesis studies internal governance mechanisms. Some recent 
studies provide evidence that board characteristics affect a firm's tax strategies 
(e.g. Minnick & Noga, 2010; Lanis & Richardson, 2011). Board of directors 
characteristics are considered by a related strand of the existing literature as 
important determinants of corporate governance structure including: board 
independence (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991,2003), stock shareholding of 
board members (Bhagat, Carey & Elson, 1999) and whether CEO duality 
(Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1997).  
 
Board of directors is one decision system that separate management and 
control in order to mitigate any residual loss to shareholders from tax 
aggressiveness arising from agency problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Lanis & 
Richardson, 2011). The board of directors is held ultimately responsible for 
the firms' strategic decision making for all other stakeholders and to the 
society as a whole (Rose, 2007). The strategic influences by controlling 
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shareholders through directors on board complicate the evaluation of board 
effectiveness, given the higher level of ownership concentration in China. 
Little research are studied in terms of how board of directors is directly 
involved in corporate tax planning (Erle, 2008), Relating the literature to 
research question at hand, based on the foregoing discussion in section 3, 
small board may be more functional and may provide better oversight for 
financial reporting (Xie et al. 2003; Minnick & Noga, 2010), therefore may 
find it easier to assure management to allocate resources towards tax 
management. It is reasonable to expect that the existence of a higher 
proportion of independent directors on the board of directors are in a better 
position to divert resource to tax management, especially when board 
independence provide a broader perspective of the firm and its overall 
performance (Minnick & Noga, 2010), which as a result  significantly reduce 
the possibility of tax aggressiveness. CEO duality undermines the firm's 
governance standards, which leads to managers to be less motivated to pursue 
performance growth, as well as less resources and efforts allocated to reduce 
tax. 
  
In this study, we specifically examine the impact of board size, number of 
board meetings conducted in a year, percentage of independent directors on 
the board and duality in the CEO/chairman position on the tax aggressiveness. 
Hence, we formulate our hypothesis as follows: 
  
H2: Board effectiveness is related to the level of tax aggressiveness. 
  
 
7.2.2.1 Board independence 
 
The standard view is that board independence is a necessary condition for 
effective corporate governance. It is suggested by Fama (1980) and Fama & 
Jensen (1983) that the effectiveness of board in monitoring managerial 
discretionary is a function of insider management coupled with outside 
members who serve on the board (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Lanis & 
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Richardson, 2011), outsider directors who are independent of management 
influence protect shareholder interests against managerial opportunism which 
as a result help enhance shareholder value (see Klein, 2002; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003 for a review).  
  
There are two reasons for boards with a higher percentage of outside 
independent directors are deemed to be more effective. Firstly, outsider 
independent directors are provided with incentives to signal their managerial 
competence to other potential employers (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Secondly, 
the outside independent directors have the incentive to monitor management 
as they want to develop their reputations as experts in control of decision and 
this will enhance their chances of securing other directorships (Fama, 1980; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
  
The effect of board independence on the internal monitoring mechanisms of 
firms has been extensively studied in the literature on corporate governance 
(e.g. Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; 
Klein, 2002; Park & Shin, 2004; Peasnell et al, 2005). For example, Both 
Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996) find the negative relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors on the board and the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud, which provide evidence on the ability 
of larger proportion of outside independent directors to properly exercise its 
monitoring function to prevent financial statement fraud; Klein (2002) and 
Peasnel et al. (2005) find that a measure of board independence is negatively 
related to the earning management activities. However, Park & Shin (2004) 
fail to provide empirical supports on the relationship between board 
independence and earning management in Canada with highly concentrated 
ownership and control by large block-holders on the listed firms.  
 
7.2.2.2 Board size 
 
Board size is also likely to be related to board performance and the 
effectiveness of a board to exercise its monitoring responsibility (Jensen, 
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1993).  However, there is still no any consensus on the optimal size of board 
structure. On the one hand, some researchers propose that a large size of the 
board strengthens management of information, which means diversity of 
opinions and therefore a better control (Kouki et al. 2011). Evans (2004) finds 
a significant and positive association between board size and quality of 
financial communication.  
  
However, on the other hand, prior studies show that larger boards are viewed 
as less flexible and more inefficient, and are detrimental to the effectiveness of 
the board of directors, due to the difficulty in achieving a consensus among 
board members to oppose against the CEOs and the decline in work 
productivity with a larger board (Beasley, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et 
al. 1998; Vafeas, 1999; Cahan et al. 2005). These studies suggest that a 
positive relationship between the board size of a firm and earning management 
activities, and if small boards are claimed to be more effective monitoring in a 
firm, then they should be associated with less tax aggressive activities. These 
results confirm for the role of board in mitigating conflicts between managers 
and shareholders by providing control on behaviors of managers vis-a-vis 
financial statements, which in turn tends to reduce managers' opportunities 
behaviors (Kouki et al. 2011). 
 
 
7.2.2.3 CEO duality 
 
The board plays a significant role in the process of hiring, firing, evaluating 
and compensating the CEOs and the chairman of the board is responsible for 
the evaluation and monitoring of the performance of the executive directors 
including the CEOs, but in many cases, the CEO also serves as chair of the 
board. Traditionally, in U.S firms, the same person occupies the CEO position 
and chairman of the board of directors while in most European and Canadian 
firms, separation is required to ensure the better governance (Lin & Liu, 2009). 
Two theoretical arguments drawn from agency theory and stewardship theory 
provide contrast conclusions with each other. It is argued by Peng et al (2007: 
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p205) that ''not only are these two competing theoretical perspectives, but 
previous research examining the performance implications of CEO duality has 
also been described as 'largely inconclusive''. 
  
On the one hand, Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Fama & Jensen (1983) posit 
that CEO/Chairmen separation is of importance for the effective monitoring 
function of the board due to the significant control that chairmen of board can 
exercise over the board through his or her power to set the agenda of board, 
and the CEOs duality over the board can be viewed as a source of excessive 
power. In U.S. context, Yermack (1996) shows that firms with separate CEOs 
and chairmen of board outperformed firms with CEO duality; it is likely for 
the CEO duality to exercise control over managerial performance and the 
process of  financial reporting and does not necessarily decrease performance. 
Some studies provide evidence that firms with weak governance or aggressive 
earning management are associated with a higher possibility of CEO duality 
(Dechow et al. 1996; Hudaib & Cooke, 2005).  Empirical studies supports 
the view that CEO duality is more likely to lead to more managerial 
opportunism arise from the ineffective board monitoring over managers, while 
separating CEO position from board chairmen appear to be positively related 
to the   information content of accounting earnings (Dechow et al. 1996; 
Anderson et al. 2003) and high voluntary corporate disclosure for Hong Kong 
firms (Gul & Leung, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, it is argued by stewardship theory that leadership of CEO 
duality plays a necessary and important role at the top of the organization, and 
helps to avoid confusion among employees, managers and other stakeholders 
as well as facilitate more effective and more timely decision-making, thus 
encouraging a CEO to better serve the firm and its shareholders (e.g. 
Finkelsten & D'Aveni, 1994; Davis et al. 1997).  
  
Under the institutional setting in China, the duality role of CEO and chairman 
is not prohibited (Chan et al. 2013), corporate governance is still weak and in 
its infancy, many firms suffer from inside control, CEO duality increases the 
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possibility of weak supervision, power concentration, and insider control, 
which in turn gives CEOs more negotiation or bargaining power (Chen & 
Al-Najjar, 2012).  
 
 
7.2.2.4 Frequency of board meetings 
 
The frequency of board meetings indicates the significance of the board in 
firm's decision-making, and more meetings may indicate a strong position of 
the board in a firm (Gao & Kling, 2008). 
  
Vafeas (1999) applies the frequency of board meetings as the proxy for the 
time efforts that directors have to monitor management and provide evidence 
that increase in performance with more frequency of board meeting; a board 
with frequent meetings should be able to devote more resources to issues such 
as tax strategies and is less likely to skip over management plans without 
questioning the motives behind them (Xie et al. 2003). Beasley et al. (2000) 
find fraud firms are associated with fewer audit committee meetings when 
examine the relationship between the likelihood of financial statement fraud 
and frequency of audit committee meetings. Carcello et al (2002) find that 
board activity complements auditor oversight as the firm pay higher audit fees 
when meeting of boards is more frequently. Ebrahim (2007) finds that in more 
active boards as proxied by the frequency of annual board meetings, a 
significant relationship exists between board independence and earning 
management. 
 
 
7.2.3 Audit quality 
 
The auditor type and auditor opinion are of significance to auditor quality of a 
firm.The evidence from financial statements do supports that Big 4 auditors 
are of higher quality on average than other smaller accounting firms (Francis, 
2004), due to the fact that Big 4 auditors are more concerned with litigation 
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costs and risk than non-Big 4 auditors as they have more incentive to protect 
the brand name reputations and capitals. The Chinese Big 4 auditors have even 
an incentive to maintain their international reputation in terms of 
underdeveloped legal environment and the potential litigation costs in Chinese 
context. In examining the audit reporting of Big 4 auditors versus local 
auditors in Chinese market in terms of the implementation of China‘s 2006 
Bankruptcy Law, Mo et al (2015) provide evidence that those Chinese 
affiliates of Big 4 auditors are more likely to issue going concern modified 
reports than local Chinese auditors not only in the post China‘s 2006 
Bankruptcy law, but also in the pre-law period; the results suggest that Big 4 
auditors are more concerned with increased litigation costs and regulation risk 
associated with enact of Bankruptcy Law. In China, most listed firms are 
audited by Chinese local auditors, and only about 6.5 percent of them were 
audited by Big 4 audits during 2001 to 2010 (Mo, et al. 2015), but the number 
of the latter are increasing recently. Therefore the Chinese auditing market 
provide an excellent institutional setting to examine the issue. Prior studies 
that sought to link audit quality to earning management (e.g. Becker et al. 
1998; Francis et al. 1999) and suggest that large audit firms are more effective 
in constraining managerial opportunisticbehaviors in terms of accruals-based 
earning management and in restraining the ability of their client firms to 
manipulate earnings, therefore, are able to give greater credibility to the 
reported earnings of their client firms. In essence, prior literature suggests that 
large auditors provide higher quality of audits relative to other counterparties.  
 
Audit independence is essential for the audit effect and audit quality, standard 
audit opinion is regarded as the proxy for auditor independence (Krishnan, 
2005). In China, there are two categories of audit opinion (Chen et al. 2013) 
which are very similar to those required in the International Standards on 
Auditing. The first category is the standard unqualified opinions which are 
issued when a financial statement is judged to be true and free from material 
misstatements and the second category is the non-standard opinion also is 
known as modified audit opinions, which are issued when some problems are 
identified by audit firms, while the latter category also includes four subtypes 
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such as an unqualified opinion with explanatory notes, a qualified opinion, a 
disclaimer of an opinion and an adverse opinion. Number prior studies have 
studies the role of audit opinion in Chinese context ( e.g. Chan, Lin & Mo, 
2006; Chen, Sun & Wu, 2010; Chan & Wu, 2011; Wang, Wong & Xia, 2008; 
Gul, Wu & Yang, 2013). Audit opinion can be viewed as a proxy for financial 
disclosure in constraining corporate aggressive tax activities, which examines 
the monitoring effect of corporate transparency of firms' financial statements 
in the context of corporate tax management practices, a unique setting in 
China where there is information asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors and opportunities for managers to exploit tax aggressiveness. 
 
In this study, we specifically examine the impact of auditor type and audit 
opinion on the tax aggressiveness. We use a dummy variable (BIG4) to 
measure auditor type, and it takes a value of one if the firm is a Big 4 
accounting firm client and zero otherwise and use audit opinion (AUDOP) as a 
dummy variable which take a value of one if it is standard un-qualified 
opinion and zero otherwise. To formally test the association between audit 
quality and the level of tax aggressiveness, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
H3: Audit quality is related to the level of tax aggressiveness.  
 
 
7.3 Data Collection and Descriptive statistics 
 
Financial data and data on corporate governance variables are collected from 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and WIND. 
Table 7.1 provides the descriptive statistics of all major variables. Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests indicate that all variables are stationary. 
The variance inflation factors 
16
(VIFs) are calculated when estimating the 
regression model to test for the issue of multi-collinearity between the 
                                                             
16
The results for unit root tests and VIFs are not reported to conserve space. 
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independent variables. The results shows that VIFs are relatively low and none 
of the VIFs exceed 10 for any of our independent variables, therefore, the 
serious multi-collinearity problem is unlikely to be present for our study 
(Gujarati, 2009).  
  
Table 7.2 shows that approximately 75% and 40% of the firm-year 
observations have zero executive shareholding and zero overall firm 
leadership shareholding respectively. The table also indicates that for the 
observations with positive shareholdings, executive management shareholding 
(EXSH), on average is approximately 0.25 percent while the overall firm 
leadership shareholding (MANSH) on average is approximately 0.97 percent. 
The mean of total cash compensation for the top 3 executives and the total 
cash compensation for the overall firm leadership are 2.18 million and 6.49 
million Chinese Yuan respectively. The average size of leadership team is 22. 
On average, median board size (BODSIZE) is 11 members, where 37 percent 
are independent (INDEP) on the board for the sample, and there are 10 board 
meetings (BODMET) conducted by board of directors over a year. DCEOD 
indicates that the CEO is also the chair of the board of directors is only 10 
percent of our sample observations. BIG4 indicates that there is 58 percent of 
firms that is audited by the Big 4 accounting firms in the sample. AUDOP 
indicates that over 90 percent of listed firms receive standard unqualified 
opinions from auditors in the sample. Table 7.3 shows the Pearson correlation 
coefficients for the independent variables. The concern of the potential for 
harmful collinearity among any of the independent variables does not appear 
to be an issue in our study.  
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Table 7.1: Variables descriptive statistics  
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
ABTD 958 0.0000015 0.008 -0.055 -0.029 
LOGMANPAY 1037 5.31 0.342 4.088 6.645 
LOGEXEPAY 1046 6.207 0.333 5.045 7.486 
MANSH 1038 0.0003 0.002 0.000 0.028 
EXSH 1048 0.0006 0.014 0.000 0.436 
DCEOD 1039 0.925 0.262 0.000 1.000 
INDEP 1044 0.369 0.065 0.091 0.8 
BODSIZE 1044 9.989 2.313 4 18 
BODMET 1053 10.013 5.122 2 57 
LEV 1054 0.519 0.2 0.014 1.376 
LOSS 1073 0.073 0.259 0 1 
SIZE 1040 10.026 0.061 8.486 12.7 
ROE 1044 0.078 0.334 -8.889 0.662 
EM 1054 -0.063 0.099 -0.453 0.905 
BM 1046 0.793 0.291 0.174 2.515 
BIG4 1073 0.581 0.493 0 1 
AUDOP 1054 0.971 0.169 0 1 
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Table 7.2: Executive and leadership shareholding and cash compensations 
Panel A: The percentage of shareholdings   
 Executive Total Leadership 
 Shareholding=0 Shareholding>0 Shareholding=0 Shareholding>0 
Obs 809 239 419 629 
Mean 0 0.254 0 0.971 
Std. Dev. 0 2.833 0 6.111 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 0 43.653 0 57.222 
 
Panel B: Total cash compensation in Chinese Yuan in Thousands   
Executives Leadership  Executives  Leadership 
Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Obs 1046 1047 
1% 238 111 463 245 Mean 2181 6496 
5% 412 153 955 294 Std. Dev. 2164 8077 
10% 632 161 1373 326 Skewness 4.672 6.315 
25% 980 190 2440 332 Kurtosis 41.954 69.107 
50% 1628  4387     
  Largest  Largest    
75% 2586 15900 7954 53000    
90% 4175 16900 12700 64900    
95% 5544 17700 17800 106000    
99% 11200 30700 38500 120000    
        
Panel C:Size of Leadership 
   
Percentiles Smallest Obs 1054 
1% 12 0 Mean 22 
5% 15 0 Std. Dev. 5.769 
10% 16 0 Skewness 0.632 
25% 18 0 Kurtosis 7.355 
50% 21    
  Largest  
 
75% 25 41  
 
90% 29 41  
 
95% 32 56  
 
99% 37 61  
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Table 7.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
 ABTD INDEP BODSIZE BODMET DCEOD BIG4 AUDOP LOGMANPAY LOGEXEPAY MANSH EXSH LEV EM ROE LOSS SIZE 
INDEP 0.077*                
BODSIZE 0.099* -0.343*               
BODMET 0.022 -0.018 -0.007              
DCEOD 0.062 -0.031 0.025 0.057             
BIG4 0.135* 0.173* 0.132* 0.091* 0.032            
AUDOP 0.075* 0.027 -0.0008 -0.050  -0.006 0.066*           
LOGMANPAY 0.069* 0.065* 0.258* 0.234* -0.073* 0.372* 0.099*          
LOGEXEPAY 0.081* 0.055 0.178* 0.255* -0.064* 0.359* 0.111* 0.932*         
MANSH 0.007 -0.023 -0.038 0.045 -0.013 -0.111* 0.021 0.068 0.039        
EXSH 0.02 -0.009 0.065* 0.035 -0.111* 0.029 0.007 0.031 0.033 0.156*       
LEV 0.132* 0.162* -0.0005 0.243* 0.068* 0.136* -0.163* 0.117* 0.077* 0.044 0.051      
EM 0.194* 0.107* -0.111* 0.162* 0.073* -0.078* -0.004 0.051 0.038 0.057* 0.02 0.097*     
ROE 0.082* -0.057 0.033 0.012 -0.036 0.036 0.023 0.168* 0.187* 0.014 0.000 -0.134* 0.109*    
LOSS -0.087* 0.034 -0.031 -0.002 -0.004 -0.031 -0.122* -0.192* -0.203* -0.033 -0.01 0.167* -0.192* -0.367*   
SIZE 0.172* 0.163* 0.221* 0.071* -0.014 0.484* 0.155* 0.398* 0.405* -0.063* 0.014 0.036 -0.113* 0.126* -0.147*  
BM 0.273* 0.133* 0.077* 0.139* 0.092* 0.320* 0.105* 0.204* 0.185* -0.048 0.027 0.232* 0.070* -0.027 0.029 0.119* 
 
(Note: Asterisks * significant at 0.05 level) 
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7.4 Modeling the impact of executive/leadership compensation and board 
characteristics on tax avoidance activity 
 
We estimate the regression in two different ways. Firstly, we estimate the 
regression with only information on executive/leadership compensation at one 
time. Secondly, we estimate the regression by including board of directors 
attributes. Three models are estimated. Equation 1 and 2 restrict the set of 
explanatory variables to firms' executive as well as firm leadership 
compensation and their relative ownership structure. Secondly, Equation 3 
jointly considers the firm's board composition as well as compensation and 
ownership structure. All models include industry dummies and year dummies 
to control for industry and year effects. The specifications are as follows. 
  
ABTDit =αit + executive compensation +executive shareholding + Control 
variables + YEAR + IND +εit( equation 1) 
  
ABTDit =αit + leadership compensation +leadership shareholding + Control 
variables + YEAR + IND +εit(equation 2) 
  
ABTDit =αit + executive/leadership compensation + shareholding + 
Governance characteristics+ Control variables + YEAR + IND +εit(equation 
3) 
  
  
Where: 
  
ABTDit is the residual BTDs derived from BTD fixed-effect model of tax 
sheltering activities in chapter five, which have been scaled by total assets. 
YEAR and IND are year and industry dummy variables.  (Note: the detailed 
variables are defined in the variable definition in Appendix II) 
 
 
We collect the cash compensation for executives (LOGEXEPAY) for the top 3 
officers' total amount, and the average cash compensation for leadership per 
person (LOGMANPAY) (including all directors, supervisors and executives 
as proxy for firm leadership) is then calculated. Both executive shareholding 
(EXSH) and average leadership shareholding (MANSH) are also included, due 
to the fact the shares allocation to management is based on hierarchical 
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positions in Chinese firm leadership, executives with significant structural 
control and power can influence other employees' actions and remuneration 
(Li et al. 2007) and are provided with incentives for higher compensations and 
self-interests (Grabke-Rundell & Gomez-Mejia, 2002).EXSH refers to the 
percentage of executives while MANSH is average leadership shareholding 
percentage per person by firm leadership
17
, including shareholding of board 
and supervisors and executives, no repeated calculations. In consistent with 
most existing literature on executive compensation, we would take the natural 
log of compensation for top 3 officers and total compensation in consideration 
of right skewed distribution of executive and leadership pay(Rego & Wilson, 
2012).  
 
In model 3, six variables are included to further control for board 
characteristics and audit quality. board independence (INDEP) is measured as 
the proportion of independent director to the total number of director on the 
board; board size (BODSIZE) is measured as total number of board of 
directors on the board;  board meetings (BODMET) is measured as the total 
number of board meetings conducted in a year; CEO duality (DCEOD) is 
measured as a dummy variable and is equal to 1 if  the CEOs (or managing 
directors) additionally occupy the position of the chairman of the board, or 
zero if otherwise. Auditor type (BIG4) is measured as a dummy variable that 
is equal to 1 if the firm is a Big 4 accounting firm client and zero otherwise. 
Audit opinion (AUDOP) is measured as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the audit opinion is standard unqualified and zero otherwise. 
 
Following prior literature, in all the three equations, we control for several 
firm-specific features that capture observable tax related proxies of tax 
sheltering activities including LOSSit , LEVit , ROEit , SIZEit, EMit and BMit 
which are proved to be associated with tax aggressiveness that is under the 
control of managers and boards (Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Dyreng et al. 2008; 
                                                             
17
Alternatively,  I  test  models  using  the  total  leadership  shareholding and cash  
compensations,  and  our  findings  are consistent with the results reported. 
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Wilson, 2009; Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009; Minnick & Noga, 2010). The 
inclusion of these control variables have been discussed in chapter 6. 
Variables in each of the models are deflated to control for any scale effects 
(Akbar & Stark, 2003). The reported results are based on OLS model 
estimation with presence of dummy variables. Meanwhile, we use robust 
standard errors by clustering on each firm to control for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Petersen, 2009; Chen & Al-Najjar, 2012).  
 
 
7.5 Regression results 
7.5.1 Executive and board managerial cash compensation and tax 
aggressiveness 
 
Table 7.4 provides the regression results for panel OLS models, coefficients 
on year and industry dummy variables are not reported. The R-square for each 
of models suggest that the independent variables are able to provide 
statistically significant information about level of tax aggressiveness captured 
in the models selected. Regarding the relationship between the effects of cash 
compensation on the level of tax aggressiveness in H1, our results in model 1 
and 2 of Table 7.4 document significant and negative coefficients indicating 
that cash incentive compensation has a negative effect on tax sheltering 
activities, in consistent with the findings of Desai & Dharmapala (2006), 
Seidman & Stomberg (2011) and Armstrong et al. (2012). The findings show 
support for agency theory that increase in alignment of shareholders and 
manager interests through executive/leadership incentive compensation 
mitigate agency conflicts, which in turn induces managers to shelter less 
income and results in decreased tax planning, and firms with high levels of 
incentive compensation are less likely to require or benefit from additional tax 
shields from tax planning activities (Seidman & Stomberg, 2011). Alternative 
explanation for the causal interpretation of our findings would be the role of 
managerial control in setting compensation. In consistent with the emphasis on 
the agency problem between managers and shareholders, managers have less 
control and influence over their cash compensation from the view of optimal 
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contracting approach (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003), as a 
result, managers that are provided adequate incentive compensation packages 
lead to a decrease in tax planning activities. We carry out additional test on the 
subsample of firm leadership by the top 3 directors, model 5 and 6 show that 
the coefficient is still negative and highly significant which is in consistent 
with the agency theory explanations. Taken together, the results provide an 
understanding to the role of incentive compensation plays in motivating 
managers' efforts, which should aid in further research in examination of 
effective tax planning strategies. The estimate of potential explicit tax benefits 
associated with compensating executives as well as directors and supervisors 
should be useful to decision-makers in their design of incentive compensation 
plans (Phillips, 2003).  
  
H2 test the influence of board composition and audit quality, specifically 
board size, board independence, board meeting, duality of CEO, Big 4 
auditors and audit opinion on ABTDs. Model 3 and 4 of Table7.4 show little 
support for H2. Only BODSIZE is significantly associated with ABTDs 
(p<0.1), which is in consistent with findings of Beasley (1996), Evans (2004) 
and Moore (2012). The regression results document that the coefficient of 
independent directors (INDEP) is positive but not significant related to 
ABTDs. Since it is not clear whether independent directors increase or 
decrease level of tax aggressiveness of firms, we use an independent director 
dummy that takes the value of one if the proportion of independent directors is 
more than 50 percent of the board, and zero if otherwise, and we find 
qualitatively the similar results. In consistent with Caramanis and Lennox 
(2008)and Tsipouridou and Spathis (2014), we find weak or insignificant 
association between the audit quality and the level of tax aggressiveness, this 
suggest that auditors have relatively weak incentives to prevent the aggressive 
tax activities. As reported in the correlation table, the significant correlations 
between control variables LEV, EM, ROE, SIZE, LOSS and BM could also 
lead to higher standard errors and lower t-statistics associated with coefficient 
estimates of main explanatory variables of interest, making them 
insignificance (Phillips, 2003). Taken together, the lack of significance on the 
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board structure variables is consistent with Minnick & Noga (2010) and 
Wintoki et al. (2012), which suggest that board structure does not appear to be 
significantly associated with tax activities and show no evidence that the 
strength of corporate governance mechanisms moderate these relationship 
between incentive compensation and tax planning. In terms of the control 
variables, tax planning is shown to be significantly associated with LEV, EM, 
SIZE and BM in several of our regression model specifications (p<0.10 or 
better). 
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Table7.4: Estimated regression results for cash compensations and tax 
aggressiveness 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
LOGEXEPAY -0.165* 
 
-0.213** 
   
 
(-1.74) 
 
(-2.08) 
   EXSH 1.240 
 
-2.082 
   
 
(0.24) 
 
(-0.34) 
   LOGMANPAY 
 
-0.226** 
 
-0.248** 
  
  
(-2.41) 
 
(-2.46) 
  MASH 
 
6.172 
 
7.136 
  
  
(0.97) 
 
(1.06) 
  TOP3DIRECTOR 
    
-0.000*** -0.000*** 
     
(-2.69) (-2.77) 
BODSHARE 
    
0.245 0.228 
     
(0.70) (0.63) 
INDEP 
  
0.062 0.118 
 
0.047 
   
(0.14) (0.27) 
 
(0.11) 
BODSIZE 
  
0.023* 0.021* 
 
0.024** 
   
(1.89) (1.76) 
 
(1.97) 
BODMET 
  
-0.002 -0.003 
 
-0.004 
   
(-0.50) (-0.56) 
 
(-0.87) 
DCEOD 
  
0.156 0.149 
 
0.153 
   
(1.22) (1.15) 
 
(1.18) 
BIG4 
  
0.084 0.090 
 
0.070 
   
(1.29) (1.39) 
 
(1.12) 
AUDOP 
  
0.227 0.226 
 
0.213 
   
(1.00) (1.00) 
 
(0.95) 
LEV 0.540*** 0.555*** 0.551*** 0.566*** 0.551*** 0.572*** 
 
(3.62) (3.71) (3.46) (3.55) (3.70) (3.59) 
EM 1.785*** 1.770*** 1.838*** 1.833*** 1.781*** 1.842*** 
 
(5.06) (5.03) (5.17) (5.19) (5.06) (5.21) 
ROE 0.173 0.184 0.187 0.189 0.164 0.174 
 
(1.11) (1.19) (1.20) (1.21) (1.06) (1.12) 
SIZE 0.209*** 0.216*** 0.155*** 0.166*** 0.207*** 0.154*** 
 
(4.20) (4.30) (3.05) (3.24) (4.48) (3.10) 
BM 0.746*** 0.756*** 0.683*** 0.688*** 0.739*** 0.682*** 
 
(6.11) (6.19) (5.35) (5.42) (6.03) (5.34) 
LOSS -0.023 -0.008 0.003 0.000 -0.010 0.022 
 
(-0.16) (-0.06) (0.02) (0.00) (-0.07) (0.15) 
Constant -1.924*** -1.867*** -1.780*** -1.925*** -2.882*** -3.000*** 
 
(-3.48) (-3.79) (-2.67) (-3.22) (-6.22) (-5.48) 
       Observations 937 930 914 915 937 914 
R-squared 0.196 0.199 0.208 0.209 0.198 0.209 
Year dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
IND dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
 
Note: All variables are deflated to control for any scale effects. Numbers in brackets are 
reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results are based on robust standard 
error to control for heteroscedasticity. Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  Variable definitions are as follows: ABTDit 
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are derived from BTDs model in previous section, figures in ABTDit are all multiplied by 100 
for scale effects; BODSIZEit is total number of directors on board; INDEPit is the percentage 
of directors who are independent; BODMETit is the total number of meetings a board of 
directors has conducted in a year; DCEODit is CEO-chair duality which is equal to 1 if the 
CEO and the chairman of the board is different person and 0 otherwise; BIG4 is the big 4 
auditors which is equal to1 if the firm is the client of big 4 auditors and zero otherwise; 
AUDOP is audit opinion which is equal to 1 if it is standard unqualified opinion and zero 
otherwise; LOGEXEPAYit is log of the top three executives' compensation as the proxy for 
managerial compensation; LOGMANPAYit is log of average of management pay per person, 
including compensation of board of directors, supervisors, and executives; MANSHit is the 
average shareholding of directors, supervisors and executives; EXSHit is the total 
shareholding of executives; LEVit is the leverage ratio; LOSSit is a dummy variable that  is 
equal to 1 if firm i reports a loss, where loss is net income before extraordinary items and 0 
otherwise; EMit is the earning management measure which is calculated as profit before 
tax-operating cash flow; SIZEit is log of the market value of equity at the fiscal year-end t; 
ROEit is return on equity which is proxy for firm profitability; BMit is the book to market ratio, 
which is calculated as ending total assets /market value as the proxy for the growing rate of a 
firm ; Year and industry dummies are also included in the model, coefficients on the year and 
industry dummies are not reported to conserve space. 
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7.5.2 Board effectiveness, cash compensation, and tax aggressiveness 
 
The choice of a tax strategy may be affected by both the strategy costs and 
firms' governance structure. In this section, westudy how governance structure 
interacts with executive compensation that jointly affects tax strategies. Prior 
literature such are Core et al. (1999) and Armstrong et al. (2012) has shown 
that various governance mechanisms are associated with compensation 
practices of firms. Ownership concentration and state ownership affect the 
level of executive compensation in China (Firth et al. 2006; Kate & Long, 
2006a.b; Gu et al. 2010; Wang & Xiao, 2011). We repeat the analyses by 
including more governance variables: GOV is a dummy variable that equals to 
1 if the Chinese listed firm is ultimately controlled by the government and 0 
otherwise; OC is ownership percentage of controlling shareholders as the 
proportion of shares owned by the largest 10 shareholders, a higher level of 
OC implies a stronger influence of controlling shareholders on Chinese listed 
firms;while SHATTEND is the attending rate of shareholding meetings in a 
year which is proxy for shareholder activism. We include their interactions 
between these variables and executive as well firm leadership cash 
compensation in Model 1 and 2 and results are reported in Table 7.5. 
  
In Table 7.5, all the three interaction variables between the cash compensation 
and three governance variables appear insignificant, and the total cash 
compensation for executive and firm leaders is consistently negative in 
determining the level of tax aggressiveness. It is possible that none of 
significant coefficients on our corporate governance interaction terms due to 
that cash compensation contracts can act as substitutes for other governance 
mechanisms in order to align incentives of managers with those of 
shareholders (Rego & Wilson, 2012). To explore this possibility, we 
decomposed total cash compensation into normal components of cash 
compensation and excessive or abnormal components of cash compensation. 
The normal cash compensation is based on firm-level characteristics, which is 
a product of managerial equity shareholding, board independence, Tobin's Q, 
return on equity as well as firm size (See Table 7.6). The excessive cash 
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compensation for executives and firm leader are calculated as the difference 
between their actual pay and the normal pay from the model predictions, 
which reflect managerial control and influence over their incentive 
compensations and capture the portion that is not associated with normal 
characteristics of the contracting environment (Armstrong et al. 2012). Then 
these two components are regressed against with proxy of tax planning 
activities respectively. The results show that the excessive components of cash 
compensation are still negatively related to our measure of tax aggressiveness, 
it can be interpreted that managers are motivated to engage in less-aggressive 
tax planning, and the incentive alignment may act as a substitute for other 
governance mechanisms.  
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Table 7.5: Interaction term of governance structure and cash compensation and tax aggressiveness 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
LOGEXEPAY -0.343* -0.172* -0.175*    
 (-1.76) (-1.80) (-1.82)    
EXSH -24.236* 3.335 2.515    
 (-1.78) (0.66) (0.49)    
LOGMANPAY    -0.215** -0.236** -0.233** 
    (-2.21) (-2.51) (-2.48) 
MANSH    20.258* 6.07 6.12 
    (2.45) (0.93) (0.95) 
LOGEXEPAY*GOV 0.311      
 (1.42)      
LOGEXEPAY*OC  0.026     
  (0.94)     
LOGEXEPAY*SHATTEND   0.018    
   (0.62)    
LOGMANPAY*GOV    0.039**   
    (2.69)   
LOGMANPAY*OC     0.029  
     (0.91)  
LOGMANPAY*SHATTEND      0.016 
      (0.47) 
LEV 0.554*** 0.545*** 0.558*** 0.553*** 0.561*** 0.575*** 
 (3.71) (3.64) (3.77) (3.65) (3.73) (3.86) 
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EM 1.741*** 1.805*** 1.796*** 1.764*** 1.791*** 1.782*** 
 (4.82) (5.11) (5.07) (4.91) (5.07) (5.03) 
ROE 0.175 0.171 0.171 0.191 0.182 0.182 
 (1.11) (1.09) (1.10) (1.22) (1.16) (1.17) 
SIZE 0.169*** 0.188*** 0.203*** 0.194*** 0.196*** 0.213*** 
 (2.83) (3.66) (3.86) (3.29) (3.74) (3.96) 
BM 0.709*** 0.720*** 0.721*** 0.717*** 0.731*** 0.733*** 
 (5.58) (5.91) (5.84) (5.69) (6.00) (5.93) 
LOSS 0.0003 -0.017 -0.019 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.00) (-0.12) (-0.14) (-0.04) (-0.03) (-0.04) 
Intercept -0.589 -1.737*** -1.863*** -1.886*** -1.679*** -1.852*** 
 (-0.45) (-2.95) (-3.20) (-3.53) (-3.21) (-3.56) 
       
Observations 897 936 929 891 929 923 
R-square 0.211 0.196 0.198 0.211 0.198 0.201 
       
Year dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
Industry dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
 
Note: Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results are based on robust standard error to control for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Variable 
definitions are as follows: GOVit is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the Chinese listed firm is ultimately controlled by the government and 0 
otherwise; OCit is ownership percentage of controlling shareholders as the proportion of shares owned by the largest 10 shareholders; SHATTENDit is the 
attending rate of shareholding meetings in a year. Year and industry dummies are also included in the model, coefficients on the year and industry 
dummies are not reported to conserve space. 
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Table 7.6: Predicted and excessive cash compensation and the level of tax 
aggressiveness 
Panel A: Cash compensation models  
 
Year 2006-2012 2006-2012 
Method OLS OLS 
Dependent variables ABTD ABTD 
   
Predictedlogexe 2.18**  
 (2.05)  
Predictedloglp  1.968** 
  (2.21) 
LEV 0.328** 0.316** 
 (2.12) (2.04) 
EM 2.05*** 2.02*** 
 (5.04) (4.99) 
SIZE -0.47 -0.398 
 (-1.50) (-1.52) 
BM 0.606*** 0.568*** 
 (4.49) (4.07) 
LOSS -0.135 -0.142 
 (-0.87) (-0.92) 
Intercept -9.02*** -6.54*** 
 (-2.77) (-3.46) 
Observations 944 944 
R-square 0.20 0.20 
Year dummies controlled controlled 
Industry dummies controlled controlled 
 
 
Note: we use OLS model to estimate the expected/normal cash compensation based 
on determinants including managerial equity shareholding Shareholdingit and board 
independence B.INDas measures of managerial power in determining their 
compensations, Tobin's Q ratio as a proxy for firm growth opportunities, return on 
equity ROEit as firm profitability and firm size measured as natural logarithm of 
market capitalization LOG(MC)it.The model is as follows:   
 
Payit = αit + β1Shareholdingit + β2LOG (Tobin's Q)it + β3ROEit  + β4LOG(MC)it 
+ β5B.INDit +YEAR+ IND +εit .  
 
When decomposing the realized cash compensations into their expected normal 
component and excessive component, then these excessive components are regressed 
against with our proxy of tax planning activities for further analysis, the model is as 
follows:  
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ABTDit = αit +Excessive cash component+ Control variables + YEAR + IND +εit 
 
Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results 
are based on robust standard error to control for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. Asterisks *,**,***denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. Coefficients on the year and industry dummies are not reported 
to conserve space. Panel A reports the estimated models for the expected cash 
compensation  for  top  executives, top directors and  average  cash  
compensation  per person for firm leadership, with the sample of total number of 
firms involved in the previous sample selection over 2006 to 2012. In Panel B, the  
excessive/abnormal  cash  compensation  values  are  calculated as the  
difference between  the  actual compensations  minus  the  expected  
compensation values  predicted  by  panel  A regression models.  The 
dependent variable in Panels B is the abnormal BTDs, proxy for the level of tax 
aggressiveness; ABTDitare all multiplied by 100 for scale effects. LSHit refers to the 
average shareholding percentage per person by firm leadership groups, including 
directors, supervisors, and executives; EXSHit refers to the total of the top 3 
executives‘ shareholding; BODSHit refers to the total of the board of directors' 
shareholding. LOGLPit is the log of average leadership cash compensation per person 
in thousands of Chinese Yuan; LOGEXEit is the log of the total for the top 3 
executives‘ cash compensation in thousands of Chinese Yuan. ROEit is the return  
on equity using earnings before extraordinary  items;LOGTOBINQit is calculated  
as  the total  market  value  of  the  equity  and  debt  divided  by  the  
book  value   of assets  excluding  intangible  assets,  calculated  using  
values  at  the  year‘s  end;  BINDit is the  number  of independent  directors  
to  total  number  of  directors  ratio;  LOG(MC) it,  the  log  of  total  
market capitalization  of  both  tradable  and  restricted  A  and  B  share s  
in  Chinese  Yuan.   
 
Panel B: Excessive cash compensation and the level of tax aggressiveness 
Year 2006-2012 2006-2012 
Method OLS OLS 
Dependent variable ABTD ABTD 
   
Excessivelogexp -0.168*  
 (-1.78)  
Execessiveloplp  -0.215** 
  (-2.30) 
Observations 942 943 
R-square 0.187 0.189 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Year dummies controlled controlled 
Industry dummies controlled controlled 
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 7.6 Further analysis 
7.6.1 Impact of ownership on the relationship between executive 
compensation and tax aggressiveness 
  
In order to determine the impact of ownership on the association between 
executive compensation and the level of tax aggressiveness, alternative 
specification of the models are tested and reported in Table 7.7. We split the 
sample into two subgroups based on the median of state ownership (20 
percent). The variables of interests, executive and firm leadership cash 
compensation is negatively and significantly associated with the level of tax 
aggressiveness for firms with a lower level of state ownership. The results 
suggest that the effectiveness of incentive compensation in constraining tax 
planning activities when the state ownership is at lower levels. 
 
7.6.2 Inclusion of supervisory board in China 
  
Due to a two-tier board structure of Chinese listed firms, based on China's 
company law, the supervisory board has the responsibility to monitor the 
financial statements and accounting system of the firm (Dahya et al. 2003). 
Their impact on the level of tax aggressiveness and accounting 
informativeness has been seldom examined given the few countries have the 
supervisory boards. In our study, we add two variables SUPSIZE (size of 
supervisory board) and SUPMTG (supervisory board meetings) to proxy for 
the strength of supervisory board. As seen from Table 7.8., the regression 
results  remain consistent with previous findings, but the coefficients on these 
two variables related to supervisory board are statistically insignificant, no 
monitoring effect of supervisory board size and meeting is found, which 
indicate the inactive and ineffective monitoring role of supervisory board in 
constraining the tax planning activities of Chinese listed firms (Firth, Fung & 
Rui, 2007a.b; Ding, Wu, Li & Jia, 2010; Wang, 2007); it is often undermined 
by its composition (Wang, 2007). As a result, it can be argued that there is still 
a strong need to improve the effectiveness of the supervisory board and 
strength the monitoring function of the supervisory board. 
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Table 7.7: Further analysis: Split into subsamples on the median of state ownership 
 
  
High state 
ownership 
Low state 
ownership 
High state 
ownership 
Low state 
ownership 
High state 
ownership 
Low state 
ownership 
High state 
ownership 
Low state 
ownership 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
LOGEXEPAY -0.013 -0.229** -0.147 -0.237** 
    
 
(-0.07) (-2.17) (-0.75) (-1.97) 
    EXSH -0.968 4.900 -9.469 4.104 
    
 
(-0.04) (1.00) (-0.35) (0.76) 
    LOGMANPAY 
    
-0.090 -0.292*** -0.163 -0.291** 
     
(-0.51) (-2.66) (-0.95) (-2.33) 
MANSH 
    
1,429.491*** 8.761 1,792.039** 8.905 
     
(3.01) (1.33) (2.29) (1.15) 
INDEP  
  
-0.502 0.351 
  
-0.548 0.428 
   
(-0.80) (0.57) 
  
(-0.90) (0.70) 
BOSIZE 
  
0.031* 0.015 
  
0.026 0.014 
   
(1.72) (0.89) 
  
(1.44) (0.86) 
BODMET 
  
0.006 -0.003 
  
0.007 -0.004 
   
(0.45) (-0.68) 
  
(0.53) (-0.75) 
DCEOD 
  
-0.181 0.305** 
  
-0.203 0.296** 
   
(-0.77) (2.06) 
  
(-0.87) (1.98) 
BIG4 
  
0.153 0.049 
  
0.124 0.064 
   
(1.41) (0.56) 
  
(1.15) (0.71) 
AUDOP 
  
-0.228 0.402 
  
-0.233 0.401 
   
(-1.11) (1.38) 
  
(-1.15) (1.38) 
LEV 0.454** 0.527*** 0.403 0.608*** 0.465** 0.554*** 0.441* 0.625*** 
 
(1.97) (2.64) (1.65) (2.82) (2.00) (2.75) (1.79) (2.89) 
EM 1.557*** 1.776*** 1.647*** 1.755*** 1.527** 1.769*** 1.615*** 1.754*** 
 
(2.61) (3.97) (2.74) (3.95) (2.58) (3.98) (2.70) (3.99) 
ROW 0.582 0.048 0.564 0.079 0.573 0.061 0.560 0.084 
 
(1.31) (0.72) (1.25) (1.28) (1.26) (0.99) (1.23) (1.39) 
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SIZE 0.230** 0.166*** 0.187* 0.104* 0.249*** 0.177*** 0.222** 0.122** 
 
(2.54) (2.69) (1.90) (1.69) (2.79) (2.80) (2.23) (1.97) 
BM 0.713*** 0.749*** 0.677** 0.674*** 0.735*** 0.765*** 0.710*** 0.680*** 
 
(2.89) (5.01) (2.56) (4.32) (3.00) (5.11) (2.69) (4.37) 
LOSS 0.455** -0.401* 0.436* -0.342 0.463** -0.367* 0.445* -0.342 
 
(2.02) (-1.84) (1.91) (-1.56) (2.01) (-1.66) (1.95) (-1.56) 
Constant -3.268*** -0.895 -1.992* -1.233 -3.117*** -0.930 -2.354** -1.385* 
 
(-3.11) (-1.41) (-1.74) (-1.51) (-3.53) (-1.59) (-2.40) (-1.84) 
         Observations 358 579 352 562 356 574 352 563 
R-squared 0.226 0.227 0.239 0.248 0.235 0.229 0.247 0.251 
Year dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
IND dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled 
 
Note: High state ownership is defined as being a fraction exceeds the median value of state ownership and low state ownership is defined as being a fraction 
exceeds the median value of state ownership.All variables are deflated to control for any scale effects. Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective 
coefficients. Model results are based on robust standard error to control for heteroscedasticity. Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively.Variable definitions follows table 7.4. 
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Table 7.8: Further analysis: Control for supervisory board 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     LOGEXEPAY -0.186* 
 
-0.210* 
 
 
(-1.83) 
 
(-1.89) 
 EXSH 1.582 
 
-1.973 
 
 
(0.29) 
 
(-0.32) 
 LOGMANPAY 
 
-0.230** 
 
-0.235** 
  
(-2.26) 
 
(-2.15) 
MANSH 
 
6.441 
 
6.081 
  
(1.02) 
 
(0.89) 
INDEP 
  
0.064 0.112 
   
(0.13) (0.23) 
BODSIZE 
  
0.020 0.018 
   
(1.47) (1.35) 
BODMET 
  
-0.004 -0.004 
   
(-0.60) (-0.68) 
DCEOD 
  
0.171 0.165 
   
(1.29) (1.24) 
BIG4 
  
0.047 0.052 
   
(0.68) (0.75) 
AUDOP 
  
0.236 0.232 
   
(0.99) (0.97) 
SUPSIZE 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.003 
 
(0.49) (0.37) (0.19) (0.15) 
SUPMET 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.012 
 
(0.42) (0.46) (0.56) (0.60) 
LEV 0.529*** 0.548*** 0.554*** 0.571*** 
 
(3.32) (3.42) (3.23) (3.34) 
EM 1.786*** 1.781*** 1.836*** 1.832*** 
 
(4.75) (4.75) (4.87) (4.88) 
ROE 0.172 0.173 0.179 0.179 
 
(1.12) (1.13) (1.15) (1.15) 
SIZE 0.187*** 0.203*** 0.155*** 0.164*** 
 
(3.54) (3.78) (2.86) (3.00) 
BM 0.846*** 0.852*** 0.794*** 0.797*** 
 
(6.59) (6.61) (5.87) (5.89) 
LOSS -0.077 -0.084 -0.056 -0.061 
 
(-0.46) (-0.51) (-0.34) (-0.37) 
Constant -1.738*** -1.862*** -1.914*** -2.078*** 
 
(-2.95) (-3.52) (-2.63) (-3.19) 
     Observations 837 838 823 824 
R-squared 0.208 0.210 0.219 0.220 
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Year dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled 
IND dummies controlled controlled controlled controlled 
 
Note: Numbers in brackets are reported t-statistics for respective coefficients. Model results 
are based on robust standard error to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
Asterisks *,**,*** denote two-tailed statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Variable definitions are as follows:SUPSIZEit is the size of supervisory boardand 
SUPMTGitis the supervisory board meetings to proxy for the strength of supervisory 
board.Other variable definitions follow Table 7.4.
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7.7 Conclusion 
 
Tax sheltering activities can increase net assets, after-tax cash flows and firm 
performance of a firm. In this study, we examine the relationship between 
firms' executive/leadership incentives as well as board characteristics and their 
level of tax aggressiveness upon Chinese institutional environment, which 
provide new insights on how these variables affect tax planning activities 
separately and together. In adhere with agency theory; it is argued that 
mechanisms of corporate governance can play a vital role in affecting and 
promoting corporate tax aggressiveness (Minnick & Noga, 2011). To our 
knowledge, this is the one of few papers to directly study link between the 
executive incentives and measure of their firm's tax planning in China. 
Collectively, this study extends the existing literature on the subject of certain 
corporate governance and tax aggressiveness and contributes to the emerging 
paradigm that linking the main factors of corporate governance to that tax 
sheltering activities. Moreover,  this study provide evidences that are 
consistent with the existing research of tax planning and can assist further 
studies in the examination of effective tax planning strategies. The findings 
should be of interest to tax policymakers who seek to identify the conditions 
that give rise to an increasing level of corporate tax sheltering activities.  
  
Applying data for both A-share and B-share non-financial firms listed in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2006 and 2012, we find 
that, on average, firms with higher-powered cash compensation is associated 
with lower levels of tax aggressiveness, in a manner that is consistent with 
optimal contracting approach, which supports the significance of incentive 
compensation to be another determinant of tax aggressive activities. We also 
find some evidence that stronger monitoring by the board (i.e. a smaller board) 
is associated with lower permanent ABTDs. However, the board 
characteristics do not appear to have a significant consistent effect on 
constraining tax aggressiveness. However, the strength of these empirical 
results may be improved by increase in the sample size. 
  
 265 
 
The subject of corporate governance and tax is still in its initial stage and 
requires more reflection. This study was conducted within a limited sample of 
1080 Chinese listed firms which restricts the generalizability of results. 
However, the preliminary results can provide an area for further research. 
Better results can be extracted with a larger sample. In addition, 
non-availability of data on executive stock option and equity-based 
compensation restrict the scope of this study. Furthermore, this study focuses 
on only few different variables of corporate governance mechanisms, 
introducing variables related to managers' entrenchment could provide a more 
insight into firms' tax aggressiveness behaviors (Kouki, et al, 2011). 
 
It is worth noting that one caveat is that our empirical results cannot be 
interpreted as demonstration of a causal link between board composition and 
incentive compensations and tax aggressiveness due to the issue of 
endogeneity problem that have effects on board literature (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003; Xie, Davidson & Dadalt, 2003). An active board with its 
financial orientation may impact the level of tax aggressiveness but the level 
of aggressiveness may in turn affect the subsequence selection of board 
members. Nevertheless, our results do suggest that an associative link between 
the board characteristicsas well incentive compensations and the level of 
aggressiveness. 
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8.0 Conclusion and future research 
  
The previous chapters extend the research on corporate governance practices 
of transitional economies by presenting an empirical analysis of the impact 
that the internal corporate governance mechanisms of Chinese listed firms 
have on the level of tax aggressiveness. We place corporate tax strategies 
within the Chinese institutional framework and consider them as institutional 
arrangements generating transactions costs within the agency structure of firm. 
The tax sheltering, earning manipulations as well as accounting scandals have 
drawn attentions from researchers, regulators and investors. After audit fees, 
tax-related service are one of the largest source of fee income for Chinese 
accounting firms. The concerns raised by the regulation and other stakeholders 
regarding the growing differences between financial accounting income and 
taxable income and its potential association with the increased tax planning 
activities by firms have led the governments to implement a series of reforms 
to prevent such behaviors. It is generally recognized that the book income and 
taxable income are calculated using rules and laws that differ in the respective 
primary objectives of financial reporting and income tax expense reporting: 
the former is concerned with providing information useful for investors to 
assess firm value and decisions while the latter is more concerned with raising 
fund for increasing government revenue and provide incentive to achieve 
certain economic and social activities. Therefore, a gap between these two 
measures of income may merely capture differences in firms' book and taxable 
income and irrespective of earning management and tax management 
strategies that managers of a firm may employ. However, Prior research from 
U.S. context examine the extent to which tax disclosure contain information 
about earning information and suggest that book-tax income differences 
(BTDs) are related to firm's tax management, earning management activities 
and operating performance in some settings  (e.g. Phillips et al.2003, 2004; 
Lev and Nissim, 2004; Hanlon, 2005; Blaylock et al. 2012). It is further 
argued by some studies that the growing BTDs may arise as a result of the 
increased tax aggressiveness behaviors (e.g.Desai, 2003; Frank et al. 2009; 
Wilson, 2009; Lisowsky, 2010). Therefore, Book-tax differences can arise 
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from the result of mechanical difference between accounting rules and tax 
laws; they can also be due to a firm's tradeoff between the financial reporting 
incentive to increase book income and the tax incentive to lower taxable 
income.  
  
Making use of China's unique institutional characteristics and data advantages 
in the notes to tax reconciliation, we examine the relationships between 
Chinese BTDs with various corporate governance mechanisms. We 
investigate how unique features of Chinese corporate governance, tax policies, 
accounting standards, government-related ownership as well as incentive 
compensation influence managerial opportunistic decisions in a leading 
emerging market.We follow the study of Tang & Firth (2011) by using a 
different method to measure book-tax differences (i.e. tax-effect BTDs) and 
separating BTDs into mechanical differences and opportunistic differences 
which help isolate managers' manipulations. We identify and hypothesize 
drivers of the total book-tax differences and conduct a regression model to 
explain them. The fitted values from the regression are the normal BTDs and 
the residual is the abnormal BTDs. The abnormal BTDs are of interest to 
proxy for tax aggressiveness and to examine the relationship between internal 
governance mechanisms and tax aggressiveness in main analyses.  
  
Even after change in tax policy, income tax revenue remains one of major 
sources of central and local government revenue. While the traditional view of 
corporate tax avoidance as value enhancing, our overall conclusion is that 
investors may not always value tax planning which is consistent with an 
emerging stream of literature (e.g.Wahab & Holland, 2012) due to the 
potential agency costs as well as other non-tax costs associated with tax 
planning activities.   
 
Meanwhile, using a sample of 1080 listed firms over the 2006 -2012 time 
period, the results show a positive and significant association between the 
abnormal book-tax differences and the proxies for political connections as 
well as the interaction terms between political connections and market forces, 
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after controlling for confounding factors. State ownership as well as 
ownership concentration represents a strong form of political connections and 
a more direct tie with Chinese government while institutional ownership 
represents the form of market forces, our evidence suggest that political 
connections are a significant determinant of the abnormal book-tax differences 
and their impacts should be accounted for. Incentive compensation appears to 
be another significant determinant of tax aggressive activities. In particular, 
our results provide evidence that higher-powered cash compensation is 
associated with lower levels of tax aggressiveness, in a manner that is 
consistent with optimal contracting approach, which contribute to our overall 
understanding of the role of incentive compensation that plays in motivating 
managers' efforts. The results however,do not indicate the influence of board 
characteristics and audit quality on tax aggressiveness, which provide 
implications to regulators to strength the monitoring effectiveness of the board 
of directors and auditors. 
 
Our study should be of interest to tax regulators that are concerned with the 
tax reporting practices of Chinese listed firms and to researchers that are 
interested in the effect of different corporate governance mechanisms on tax 
sheltering activities.This study makes several important contributions to the 
literature. Firstly, this study contribute to the existing literature that links 
firms' corporate governance with those of tax aggressiveness by conducting a 
comprehensive analysis of the impact of the interaction between firms' 
strength of corporate governance and tax planning activities. The extant 
literature into corporate tax aggressiveness and corporate governance is mostly 
U.S.-based and does not necessarily translate into Chinese setting due to the 
differences approach to compliance and enforcement and diverse tax laws and 
approaches to compliance and enforcement. We extend the applicability of tax 
theory and agency theory using a setting in a transition economy by taking 
advantage of China's unique institutional features and data availability. 
Secondly, by using the recently available tax reconciliation data from notes on 
financial statements required under ASBE 18 income taxes (ASBE, 2006), this 
study separates measure of tax-related data (normal and abnormal BTDs) to 
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examine the different effect of varying level of tax aggressiveness, previous 
works have generally relied on a lower level of separation of BTDs, such as 
Mills & Newberry, 2001; Desai & Dharmapala, 2009; Frank, Lynch & Rego, 
2009; Tang & Firth, 2011). Thirdly, The sample size is limited due to data 
availability problem in annual reports disclosure of Chinese listed firms, 
which limits the applicability of research results to represent the whole 
Chinese stock market.However, it does add to U.S. based BTDs research by 
providing international evidence of implications for the mechanical and 
opportunistic BTDs in interpreting the corporate governance factors that affect 
tax aggressiveness, in an emerging economy. To my best knowledge, this is 
the first of few studies that investigates the role and usefulness of BTDs in 
Chinese stock markets. Our finding suggest that while some research results in 
the U.S. based studies can be generalized to China, empirical evidences from 
Chinese setting supplement the current BTDs literature.Fourthly, the 
regression analysis is conducted over a seven year period; therefore help 
recognize the components of tax aggressive activities and the attitudes of 
corporate governance structure to tax aggressiveness may vary over time. 
Finally, the empirical evidences on tax and corporate governance mechanisms 
provide policymakers in terms of tax and financial reporting areas with a 
better understanding of potential effects of changes in tax law on Chinese 
listed firms' tax sheltering activities.  
  
Despite its novel contributions, our study is subject to several limitations. 
Firstly, the sample is limited to Chinese public listed firms as wewere only 
able to collect data in term of tax aggressiveness that is disclosed in its 
published financial reports. Information about tax aggressiveness among 
private firms is not made publicly available due to confidentiality concerns. 
Secondly, the sample size is not large due to the data availability problem in 
annual reports disclosure of Chinese listed firms. However, it appears to be 
satisfactory given the sampling time period of seven years; our study does not 
consider the industry and regional preferential tax incentives due to the limited 
data sample, tax incentives are an important factor that affect listed firms' tax 
 270 
 
policies, which can be studied for further research independently (e.g. Wu, 
Wang, Gills & Luo, 2012) 
 
Thirdly, the use of book-tax differences as a measure of a firm's aggressive tax 
planning is also subject to limitations. Book-tax differences are estimated from 
publicly available financial statements, while this calculation has measurement 
error inherent, but it is suitable in our setting as it is the measure that available 
to the public. Capturing both a firm's book income and its taxable income 
would be allowed for better control of scaling issues between the book and 
taxable income as well as the elimination of ambiguity on the sign of the 
book-tax difference ratio, especially when the book-tax differences are 
negative (Smith, 2000). However, Book-tax differences are not only the 
function of tax avoidance, but also the function of earning quality, and by 
definition book-tax differences can only capture non-conforming tax 
avoidance (Hanlon & Hertzman, 2010). Meanwhile, book-tax differences can 
arise as a result of managerial opportunistic behaviors in the process of 
financial reporting that are irrelevant to tax sheltering activities (Frank, Lynch 
& Rego, 2009). No measurecan be perfect, in order to prove that the resulting 
residual is a good proxy for the firm's tax planning activity, a validation check 
can be taken use the sample of firms that are involved in ligation in terms of 
aggressive tax sheltering activities (Desai & Dharmpala, 2009). The 
demonstration would be that the resulting proxy for tax sheltering activities 
should take on large values for a given firm in those years that are accused of 
aggressive tax planning activities than in other years. However, as it is 
difficult to obtain the data for firm involved in tax sheltering litigation in 
Chinese context and further study can also work on it. 
  
Fourthly, we applied the data collected from the tax reconciliation to test for 
the different type of tax aggressiveness, however, there is no regulation on the 
tax reconciliation, and different listed have their own ideas on the tax 
reconciliation in their tax notes without further explanation which might cause 
ambiguity when in the stage of data collection and data analysis. In addition, 
as we can see that the firm-year observations from notes on tax reconciliation 
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in the annual reports decrease from the recent years, especially from the year 
2012, which should raise the attention from related tax administration and 
regulation that, increasing their monitoring on listed firms' compliance with 
the new accounting standards (ASBE, 2006). Meanwhile, we suggest more 
disclosure in annual financial reports for academic study; financial accounting 
disclosures have not yet reached the level of detail found in financial reports 
of companies reporting under IASB standards in mature western economies. 
For example, the annual reports of Chinese listed firms do not have much 
disclosure as that of IAS rules, such as foreign income or segmental reporting 
on foreign operation or subsidiaries, which limit the applicability in the 
empirical studies. With the advent of mandatory disclosure on tax-related 
notes in annual reports, future studies will be able to draw on a larger number 
of firm-year observations, which would be certainly allow more reliable 
inferences.  
  
Finally, another limitation of this study is the lack of previous works on this 
topic upon the Chinese institutional setting, which result in regression models 
that obviously do not have strong capacity to support and explain the results. 
The results of ourstudyare context-specific and should be viewed cautiously 
when generalized to other contexts.Althoughwehave been very tentative 
regarding the generalizability of this study to othersettings, there are 
theoretical reasons to believe that firms in other emerging economies 
mayexperience similar dynamics. This speculation needs to be validated by 
future researchefforts undertaking in other emerging environments.  
 
This study opens avenues for further study in the area of corporate governance 
structure and the level of tax aggressiveness. Further research into the 
interaction of tax aggressiveness and corporate governance could examine 
several important issues, Firstly, as indicated by Lanis & Richardson (2011) 
that, we have considered some internal corporate governance mechanisms that 
could affect tax aggressiveness, further analysis of other director 
characteristics such as practices that outsider directors exert over board, 
management style, difference in personal traits of directors, executive 
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characteristics and other behavioral features may be worthwhile. Meanwhile, 
as we solely concentrate on internal corporate governance mechanisms in the 
current studies, the inclusion of both internal and external governance 
attributes in the construction of governance indices can be considered as a 
topic for future research. Secondly, future studies can be conducted for firms 
in financial and insurance industries, where the legal and regulatory bodies 
play a vital role in monitoring managers' activities. Thirdly, a comparative 
study with a mature western economy such as the UK or US would allow 
additional understanding of the differential factors at play. Finally, another 
dimension that might be study change in tax aggression over time, that is, how 
do changes in institutional arrangements and tax rates/preferences over time 
influence the degree of tax aggression? 
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Appendix I: Variable Definition 
 
 
  Variable Definition Variable Dataset 
Tax aggressiveness 
variables 
    
BTDit Reported tax-effect total permanent BTDs in 
year t, scaled by total assets, and pre-2008 BTDs 
are adjusted for the change in tax rate after 2008 
Notes on financial 
reports 
Institutional variables 
that are unrelated to 
tax planning 
   
TURNOVERit Total turnover for firm i in year t, scaled by total 
assets 
CSMAR-P/L 
account 
OPEit Operating expenses for firm i in year t, scaled by  
total assets 
CSMAR-P/L 
account 
OPEPROFITit Operating profit before interests and taxes for 
firm i in year t, scaled by total assets 
CSMAR-P/L 
account 
TOTALPROFITit Pre-tax profit for firm i in year t, scaled by total 
assets 
CSMAR-P/L 
account 
LAG1PROFITit Prior one year lagged pre-tax profit for firm i in 
year t, scaled by total assets 
CSMAR-P/L 
account 
LAG2PROFITit Prior two year lagged pre-tax profit for firm i in 
year t, scaled by total assets 
CSMAR-P/L 
account 
ASSETSit Log of (total assets divided by average total 
assets across the whole sample) 
CSMAR-B/S 
account 
INVit Investment income for firm i in year t, scaled by 
total assets 
CSMAR-P/L 
account 
INTERESTit The finance interest income for firm i in year t CSMAR-P/L 
account and WIND 
database 
Year Year dummies N/A 
IND Industry Dummies      CSMAR 
Empirical chapter on 
ownershipstructure 
and tax 
aggressiveness 
   
OCit : 
  
Ownership concentration, it is calculated as the 
percentage of shares held by the largest ten 
shareholders over the total outstanding shares 
WIND 
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OFit The ownership shares fraction   
OF_STAit State shares fraction, it is the percentage number 
of state shares as well as legal person shares over 
total outstanding shares. 
CSMAR-CCGR 
OF_ INSTit Institutional share fraction, it is the level of 
institutional shareholding over total outstanding 
shares 
WIND 
GOVit An indicator variable equal to one when the 
largest shareholder is government-related, and 
zero otherwise, for firm i in year t; 
CSMAR-CCCR 
Empirical chapter on 
executive and board 
managerial 
compensation and tax 
aggressiveness 
   
EXSHit Executive share fraction, it is the percentage 
number of shares held by top 3 executives over 
total outstanding shares 
CSMAR 
MANSHit Management shareholding percentage, including 
board and supervisors and executives holdings, 
no repeated calculations 
CSMAR 
    LOGEXEit Log of the top three executives' compensation as 
the proxy for managerial compensation. 
Executive compensation is the aggregated pay of 
the top three officers, defined as the sum of basic 
salary and bonus excluding allowance 
CSMAR-CCGR 
database 
LOGMANPAYit log of management pay, including compensation 
of board of directors, supervisors, and executives 
CSMAR-CCGR 
database 
BODSIZEit Proxy for board size, log of the total number of 
directors on board or the total number of 
directors on board 
CSMAR-China 
listed firms‘ 
Corporate 
governance research 
(CCGR) database 
INDEPit The percentage of directors who are independent 
 
CSMAR-CCGR 
database 
DCEODit CEO-chair duality, equal to one if the CEO and 
Chairman is different person and zero otherwise 
CSMAR-CCGR 
database 
BODMETit Board meetings, the total number of meetings a 
board of directors has conducted in a year 
CSMAR-CCGR 
database 
AUDOPit A dummy variable that takes one if the audit 
opinion is standard unqualified and zero 
otherwise. 
CSMAR 
BIG4it A dummy variable that takes one if a firm is a 
big 4 accounting firm client and zero otherwise 
CSMAR 
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Firm-specific 
characteristics as 
control variables 
   
LEVit the total long-term debt divided by total assets to 
control non-financial costs 
CSMAR 
LOSSit Loss dummy variable, which is equal to one if 
firm i reports a loss, where loss is net income 
before extraordinary items and zero otherwise 
CSMAR 
SIZEit It can be defined as the log of the market value 
of equity at the fiscal year-end t, or the log of the 
book value of total assets or total annual sales, 
depending on the run of the model. 
CSMAR 
LNTAit the logarithm of total assets, a measure of firm 
size 
CSMAR 
ROEit ROE=return on equity, Proxy for firm 
profitability 
CSMAR 
TOBINQ1it Tobin's Q, Proxy for firm value, measured as 
market value A divide by ending total assets, 
where market value A consists of market value 
of equity plus market value of net debt, net 
assets is used to calculate the market value of the 
equity, denoted by null if the numerator has no 
value 
CSMAR 
TOBINQ2it Tobin's Q, measured as market value B divide by 
ending total assets, where market value B 
consists of market value of equity plus market 
value of net debt, negotiable share price is used 
to calculate the market value of the equity 
CSMAR 
TOBINQ3it Industry-median adjusted Tobin‘s Q CSMAR 
VOLit Volatility of monthly return for firm i in the year 
t 
WIND 
BMit Book-to-market ratio, which is calculated as 
Ending Total assets /Market Value as the proxy 
for the growing rate of a firm 
CSMAR 
CFOit Cash flow capacity, which is calculated as cash 
flow from operating activities divide by ending 
total assets, as the proxy for the focus of investor 
and analyst scrutiny 
CSMAR 
ATRit applicable tax rate, which is the applicable tax 
rate that are disclosed in note on tax 
reconciliation 
Annual 
reports-Notes to 
financial statements 
     CAPINTit Capital intensity, which is calculated as fixed 
assets divided by total assets, in order to control 
for the opportunities related to investments in 
fixed assets 
CSMAR 
EMit Earning management measure, which is applied CSMAR 
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  to control for the effect of earning measure, 
which is calculated as profit before tax- 
operating cash flow (CFOs); however, in order 
to ensure that tax is excluded from CFOs. CFOs 
is adjusted by (CFO-tax refund+ various tax 
paid) 
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Appendix II: The major differences between corporate income 
tax laws and Chinese GAAP 
 
The major differences between corporate income tax laws and Chinese GAAP 
Type of 
BTDs 
Items 
 
Type of items 
 
Chinese income 
tax law 
 
Chinese GAAP 
 
Permanent  Sponsor costs 
 
Non-operating 
expenses 
 
Non-deductible Directly 
recognized as 
profit & loss in 
the year they 
occur, add to  
‗non-operating 
expenses‘ 
account 
Permanent Public donation costs 
 
Non-operating 
expenses 
 
Deductible is 
limited to the 12% 
of annual 
accounting profit 
Directly 
recognized as 
profit & loss in 
the year they 
occur, add to  
‗non-operating 
expenses‘ 
account 
Permanent Non-public donation 
 
Non-operating 
expenses 
 
Non-deductible Expensed 
Permanent Penalties and fines 
 
Non-operating 
expenses 
 
Non-deductible Directly 
recognized as 
profit & loss in 
the year they 
occur, add to  
‗non-operating 
expenses‘ 
account 
Permanent Expenditure without 
authorized invoice 
 
Non-operating 
expenses 
 
Non-deductible Directly 
recognized as 
profit & loss in 
the year they 
occur, add to  
‗non-operating 
expenses‘ 
account 
Permanent Account receivables 
cannot be paid 
 
Account 
receivables 
 
Taxable income No limits, Add 
to ‗capital 
surplus‘ account 
Permanent Debt restructuring 
income 
 
Account 
receivables 
 
Taxable income Add to ‗capital 
surplus‘ account 
Permanent Entertainment fees 
 
Management 
expenses 
 
Entertainment fees  
range is 0.3% to 
0.5%, it should be 
0.5% for  the net 
sales below RMB 
No limits, Add 
to ‗management 
expense‘ 
account 
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15 million and  
0.3% for the net 
sales above RMB 
15 million 
Permanent Research and 
development costs 
 
Management 
expenses 
 
Non-deductible 
for the amount 
allocated by the 
State Finance and 
higher authorities, 
additional 50% of 
R&D can be 
deducted from 
taxable income, 
Expensed all 
R&D (except 
that patent 
registration and 
legal costs are 
capitalized) 
Permanent Union fees for domestic 
enterprises 
 
Management 
expenses 
 
Provision of 2% 
of the total 
salaries is 
deductible, the 
excess part cannot 
be deducted 
Expensed when 
incurred 
Permanent Welfare fees  for 
domestic enterprises 
 
Management 
expenses 
 
The employee 
welfare expenses 
incurred by an 
enterprise are 
deductible to the 
extent that it does 
not exceed 14% of 
the total amount 
of salaries and 
wages  
Expensed when 
incurred 
Permanent Borrowing costs 
 
Financial costs 
 
Interest rate is 
limited to the 
existing 
commercial rate, 
the excess cannot 
be deducted 
Limited to the 
capitalized 
assets or 
borrowing 
ranges 
Permanent Use self-built products 
for construction, 
investment, sponsorship, 
donation or welfare 
purposes 
 
Equivalent sales 
 
Taxable income if 
products used for 
items that are 
non-deductible, 
including VAT, 
sales tax, 
consumption tax 
No income 
recognized 
Permanent  
 
Tax loss and tax loss 
utilized 
 
Loss remedy 
 
Tax losses 
incurred 
previously can be 
carried forward 
for a following 
period of up to 5 
years, thereby 
reducing later 
taxable income 
Recognized as 
profit & loss in 
the year they 
occur 
Permanent  
 
Consolidation 
 
Combination of 
enterprise 
 
Income tax is 
calculated based 
on independent 
legal entity,  
Consolidation is 
required 
Permanent  
 
Government subsidies 
 
Non-operating 
income  
Non-taxable  Non-operating 
income 
Permanent  Donation received Other income Donation received Add to ‗capital 
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   in cash and 
non-cash assets 
must be recorded 
as taxable income 
surplus‘ account 
(not the 
accounting 
income) and 
increase 
shareholders‘ 
equity 
Permanent  
 
Interest on national bond 
 
Other income 
 
Tax-exempt 
income, and is 
excluded from 
taxable income 
Revenue 
recognized as 
investment 
income 
Permanent  
 
Dividend from foreign 
invested enterprises 
 
other income 
 
Tax-exempt 
income, dividend 
received by 
foreign invested 
enterprises are 
non-taxable 
Non-operating 
income, 
Revenue 
recognized as 
investment 
income 
Temporary  
 
Provision for impairment 
of fixed and intangible 
assets, short-term and 
long-term investment 
 
Assets 
 
Non-deductible Expensed when 
made 
Temporary  
 
Depreciation-fixed assets 
 
Assets 
 
Using straight-line 
methods and the 
residual value not 
less than 5% of 
original value. 
Other methods can 
be adopted only if 
approved by State 
Administration of 
Taxation. Useful 
life for building, 
machinery 
equipment and 
haulage plant is 
20,10,5 years 
respectively  
The depreciation 
method, 
minimum useful 
life and scrap 
value can be 
determined by 
management 
Temporary  
 
Depreciation-intangible 
assets 
 
Assets 
 
No less than 10 
years 
No less than 10 
years 
Temporary Held-for-trading 
financial assets 
Assets 
 
Tax base is 
determined by 
historical value 
Fair value 
accounting 
Temporary Available-for-sale 
financial assets 
Assets 
 
Tax base is 
determined by 
historical value 
Fair value 
accounting 
Temporary  
 
Organization costs 
 
Management 
expense  
 
The expenses of 
an enterprise are 
classified into 
revenue-related 
expenses and 
capital-related 
expenses. 
Revenue-related 
expenses shall be 
deducted in the 
current accounts, 
Expensed when 
incurred 
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while 
capital-related 
expenses shall be 
deducted by 
instalments or 
included in the 
relevant capital 
costs and may not 
be directly 
deducted in the 
current accounts. 
Temporary  
 
Fixture and fitting fare 
 
Long-term 
deferred 
expenses 
 
Amortize over no 
less than 5 years, 
that is , the 
deduction is 
allowable up to 
20% for the first 
year 
Expensed when 
incurred 
Temporary  
 
Improvement 
expenditure of fixed 
assets 
 
Long-term 
deferred 
expenses 
 
Amortize over no 
less than 5 years, 
that is , the 
deduction is 
allowable up to 
20% for the first 
year 
Expensed when 
incurred 
Temporary  
 
Advertisement fees and 
propagandist costs 
 
Selling expenses 
 
No more than 
15% of the sales 
revenue of the 
current year unless 
it is otherwise 
differently 
provided for by 
the competent 
department of 
treasury or 
taxation of the 
State Council. The 
excess may be 
carried forward to 
future years for 
deduction 
Expensed to 
current period 
Temporary  
 
Employees' salaries for 
domestic enterprises 
 
Employee 
compensation 
payable 
 
The standard for 
salaries payment 
deductions is 
stipulated based 
on different areas 
and industries. 
The excess 
payment cannot be 
deducted 
Expensed when 
incurred 
Temporary  
 
Education fees for 
domestic enterprises 
Management 
expense 
They are 
deductible to the 
extent that they do 
not exceed 2.5% 
of the total 
amount of salaries 
and wages unless 
it is otherwise 
Expensed when 
incurred 
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different provided 
for by the State 
Council. The 
excess may be 
carried forward to 
future years for 
deduction. 
Temporary  
 
Bad debt expense 
 
Account 
receivables 
 
Actual amounts 
incurred are 
deducted  
Balance sheet 
liability method 
for the provision 
or releasing 
provision of bad 
debt 
Temporary  
 
Expense recognition 
such as prepaid rental 
 
Expense 
 
Deductible only 
when incurred 
Accrual basis 
Temporary  
 
Revenue recognition 
 
Revenue 
 
Recognized when 
cash received or 
proof of charging 
received 
Recognized 
when all the 
conditions are 
satisfied for a 
legal sale 
(Source: ASBE 2006; New EIT law, 2008; Tang & Firth, 2011) 
 
Permanent differences: 
Upward tax adjustments: 
Losses caused by penalties, fines and property confiscation 
Fines for delaying tax payment 
Overrun donation for public welfare 
Overrun business entertainment expenses 
Advertisement expenses and propagandist costs 
Expenses that cannot be deducted before tax 
Overrun salaries and wages 
Overrun employees‘ welfare fees 
Overrun union fees 
Overrun employees‘ education fees  
Sub-total 
Downward tax adjustments: 
Tax exempt investment income 
Research and development costs 
150% weighted deduction for research and development costs 
Sub-total 
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Timing differences: 
Upward tax adjustments: 
Accrued salaries and wages 
Internal unrealized profits 
Provision for bad debts 
Plan for the inventory revaluation reserve this year 
Plan for the impairment of fixed assets this year 
Subtotal 
Downward tax adjustments: 
Return to the bad loans 
Recognized as deferred income of the government subsidies 
Approved bad debts loss last year 
Turn the year of the loss of asset impairment 
Prepaid expenses 
Approved other asset impairment last year 
Subtotal 
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